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ABSTRACT 
ON A FOUNDATION, WIDE IN SCOPE: THE HISTORY OF MOUNT 
SINAI HOSPITAL: 1903-1987 
 
by 
Michele M.E. Radi 
 
The University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, 2016 
Under the Supervision of Professor Amanda I. Seligman, Ph.D. 
 
 
 
 
 
This research studies the history of Mount Sinai Hospital in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, a 
private, nonsectarian Jewish hospital. It was supported by the Jewish residents in 
Milwaukee through their philanthropic efforts for eighty-three years. In 1987, the hospital 
merged with a Christian hospital, but in 1992, hospital administrators announced that the 
establishment of operational practices designed to maintain the Jewish identity of the 
current hospital. I sought to answer the question of why a Jewish identity mattered to the 
new hospital after the merger. This research reveals that the Jewish identity of Mount 
came from the strong Jewish support in the early years, not from a large Jewish 
strict religious practices, or a majority of Jewish patients. I argue that the hospital 
represented a sense of collective action between two conflicted groups within the Jewish 
population of Milwaukee. These groups were divided along socioeconomic class and 
ethnic differences. The hospital provided a communal place for all Jewish residents to 
perform acts of charity, including fundraising and volunteer work. I argue the relationship 
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between the Jewish population and the hospital was symbiotic, in that the hospital 
provided opportunities for Jewish doctors to establish practices and also provided 
economic opportunities and gave the Jewish population an icon for their charity efforts. I 
argue that the hospital historically treated more Gentiles than Jewish patients, but was a 
Jewish hospital by way of the Jewish collective action and support. I argue that the 
collective action of Milwaukee Jewish residents gave Mount Sinai a Jewish identity. 
However, changes in funding options for indigent care decreased the Jewish presence at 
Mount Sinai. It decreased as the need for fundraising for direct patient care decreased. 
After the creation of Medicaid and the expansion of Medicare, the direct financial support 
and the volunteer hours donated to Mount Sinai by Jewish residents decreased. As more 
affluent members of the Milwaukee Jewish population moved away, the Jewish 
participation at Mount Sinai diminished. I argue that the announcement about establishing 
a Jewish identity at the former Mount Sinai in 1992 represented an attempt to preserve 
the history of the traditional Jewish presence at the and to remind the residents of 
Milwaukee of the contributions of the Jewish people. 
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INTRODUCTION  
In a September 2, 1988 article, the Wisconsin Jewish Chronicle reported changes at 
the former Jewish hospital in Milwaukee, Wisconsin. Mount Sinai Hospital merged with 
Good Samaritan Medical Center ten months prior. The new facility, Sinai Samaritan, 
remained at the former Mount Sinai Medical Center site, at 12th Street and Highland 
Avenue, in downtown Milwaukee. The post-merger plans included the expansion of Sinai 
Samaritan’s Jewish linkages. To that end, the hospital erected a menorah in the hospital 
lobby during Hanukkah in lieu of Christmas decorations and closed clinics on major 
Jewish holidays. Sinai Samaritan President Albert L. Greene noted that “We have said all 
along that we have intended to maintain Jewish tradition at the Sinai campus.” At the 
same time, the article noted that the Board planned to remove the iconic Star of David 
from the front of the hospital. Sinai Samaritan donated the Star to the Karl Jewish 
Community Center Campus.1 This commitment to “maintain” Jewish traditions at Sinai 
Samaritan Medical Center in 1988 came at a time when much of the Milwaukee Jewish 
population lived outside of the city, taking their synagogues and the Jewish Community 
Center with them. At the time of this announcement, the majority of Sinai Samaritan 
patients were not Jewish. The removal of the Star when hospital administrators 
announced the preservation of Jewish identity for the former Jewish Mount Sinai Hospital 
after it merged with a Christian hospital seemed incongruous and contradictory. Why did 
the commitment to Jewish traditions matter after a merger with a Christian hospital? Why 
                                                 
1 Newspaper clipping, “Changes for Sinai Samaritan,” Wisconsin Jewish Chronicle, September 2, 1988, Box 1, Folder 
7, Mount Sinai Collection, Jewish Museum Milwaukee Archives, Milwaukee, Wisconsin (hereafter cited as JMM 
Archives).  
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remove an iconic part of the building that signified a Jewish identity? I sought an answer 
to those questions. 
The existing literature of the history of the Milwaukee Jewish community did not 
provide a great deal of specific information about Mount Sinai Hospital. Historians Louis 
J. Swichkow and Lloyd P. Gartner published their seminal work, The History of the Jews 
in Milwaukee, in 1963. It described the history of the Milwaukee Jewish population in 
great detail, but only mentioned Mount Sinai Hospital on twelve pages. The information 
included about Mount Sinai did not offer any insight as to why the Jewish people of 
Milwaukee would want to keep a Jewish identity at Mount Sinai when many Jewish 
residents lived outside Milwaukee. In fact, their research noted that Mount Sinai Hospital 
was a nonsectarian hospital from the start. It consistently treated more Gentile than 
Jewish patients.2 The discussion of the hospital in this important work does not delve 
deeply enough to answer the question of identity. It described the history of the hospital 
in terms of dates–when the hospital opened, when the hospital relocated to its current 
location–and pictures of the different structures.3 The question about the importance of 
expanding Jewish identity at Mount Sinai remained unanswered. Historian John Gurda 
grounded his 2009 book One People, Many Paths: A History of Jewish Milwaukee in 
Swichkow and Gartner’s work.4 He included information about an additional forty-five 
years of Milwaukee Jewish history. His work mentioned Mount Sinai Hospital a total of 
fifteen times, but only three references added to the overall history of Mount Sinai. Both 
of these sources contain a great deal of historical information about the Jewish people of 
                                                 
2 Louis J. Swichkow and Lloyd P. Gartner, The History of the Jews of Milwaukee (Philadelphia, PA: The Jewish 
Publication Society of America, 1963), 201. 
3 Swichkow and Gartner, The History of the Jews of Milwaukee, 97. 
4 John Gurda, One People, Many Paths: A History of Jewish Milwaukee (Milwaukee, WI: Jewish Museum Milwaukee, 
2009), 48. 
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Milwaukee, but the history of their hospital is limited to significant changes at the 
hospital. Both works discuss the history of the hospital building. These books place the 
history of Mount Sinai Hospital in the context of the Milwaukee Jewish community. The 
dozen or so mentions of the hospital come tangentially to the overall history Milwaukee 
Jewish community.  
Swichkow and Gartner and Gurda detail a contentious history within the Milwaukee 
Jewish community. East Side and West Side Jewish groups did not form a cohesive 
community in Milwaukee. Conflict within the Milwaukee Jewish population stemmed 
from differences in ethnicity, class and religious observance. Yet, members of both the 
East and West Side Jewish population supported Mount Sinai’s nonsectarian mission for 
eighty-three years and sought to preserve a Jewish identify after a merger. In order to 
answer the question of why Jewish identity mattered for a nonsectarian hospital in 
Milwaukee, I decided to focus on the history of the hospital as it relates to the Jewish 
population in Milwaukee. That is, instead of inserting the history of the hospital in the 
larger Jewish history, I used the history of Mount Sinai Hospital in order to study the 
Jewish contributions to the hospital and the history of the Milwaukee Jewish population. I 
believe that this allowed me to use the work of Swichkow and Gartner and Gurda about 
the Jewish community as a foundation for describing their contributions to the hospital. 
The change in perspective revealed additional information about Milwaukee’s Jewish 
population. 
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SELF, IDENTITY, AND COLLECTIVE ACTION  
It is important to be clear about terminology and meaning; specifically, identity, 
community, and population. For the purpose of this research, the term Jewish identity 
denotes the social, behavioral, and individual understanding of what defines “being 
Jewish.” Jewish community refers to the collective activity of the Jewish population in 
Milwaukee in support of Mount Sinai and other charitable entities. I argue that a 
combined Jewish community effort, first by the East Side Jewish population, sustained 
this hospital through most of its years of operation as a nonsectarian institution. Members 
of the West Side Jewish population also contributed to the hospital. The support from the 
two Jewish populations contributed to the Jewish identity of Mount Sinai, a sense of 
ownership and assumed responsibility that made it their hospital. The term Jewish 
population describes East and West Side Jewish groups living in Milwaukee. Identity 
describes the socially constructed reality, using ethnicity, and norm behaviors and beliefs 
of Jewish individuals to describe and quantify what makes them Jewish. Jewish 
community collective action signifies the efforts of Jewish groups and individuals in 
Milwaukee, and population refers to the geographical location of the different groups. 
The term Milwaukee Jewish identity is defined as the combined collective action of the 
Jewish community, the social characteristics of the Jewish population in Milwaukee, and 
their relationship with the city.  
The literature pertaining to Jewish identity falls into two broad categories: the 
creation of a Jewish self-identity, and the understanding of a collective Jewish identity. 
The two categories overlap in that the literature of both Jewish self-identity and the 
collective identity state the creation of each involves a process of using a set of criteria to 
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establish an understanding of what makes an individual or a collective “Jewish.” The 
Jewishness of individuals is measured using the answers to a selected set of questions 
about personal practices and beliefs, collective Jewish identity is measured by the actions 
of a Jewish population in a specific location.  
The concept of self is the foundation for both individual and collective Jewish 
identity. Sociologist H.S. Himmelfarb used the terms Jewish identity and Jewish 
identification to emphasize the role of self in the matter of identity building. He believed 
that Jewish identity is “one’s sense of self with regard to being Jewish,” as part of the 
overall self-concept. Jewish identification, on the other hand, was defined as “the process 
of thinking and acting in a manner that indicates involvement with and attachment to 
Jewish life.”5 Individuals accepted “Jewish” behavioral and social expectations that they 
identified as “Jewish.” This formed a sense of Jewish identification, defined by 
Himmelfarb as an integral aspect of creating a Jewish identity. This “self-identification” 
simplified the process of creating a working definition of Jewish identity.6  
Sociologists Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann described identity as that which 
is “formed by social processes. Once crystallized it is maintained, modified, or even 
reshaped by social relations. The social processes involved in both the formation and the 
maintenance of identity are determined by social structure.”7 That is, in order to answer 
the question as to why a Jewish identity mattered for Mount Sinai after a merger with a 
Christian hospital, the term Milwaukee Jewish identity must be defined. I argue that the 
relationship with the hospital sustained and maintained a sense of an individual’s Jewish 
                                                 
5 H.S. Himmelfarb, “Research on American Jewish Identity and Identification: Progress, Pitfalls, and Prospects,” in 
Understanding American Jewry, ed. Marshall Sklare (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1982), 56-57. 
6 H.S. Himmelfarb, “Research on American Jewish Identity and Identification,”, 56. 
7 Peter Berger and Thomas Luckman, The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge 
(New York: Random House, 1966), 173. 
 6 
 
identity through Mount Sinai Hospital by way of their collective actions.  
Collective action stems from a sense of group identity. Scholars have defined 
collective Jewish identity in the context of measuring the strength of an individual’s 
attachment to predetermined attributes and participation in their communities for Jewish 
causes and concerns. The literature revealed that one of the more common goals of the 
process of assessing an individual’s Jewishness was creating a scale that measured how 
“good” a Jew the individual was using the scale of any number of statements and 
questions, rather than the individual’s understanding of being a good Jewish person. 
These scales also used questions about Jewish collective action in charitable and religious 
groups to measure the strength of the attachment and commitment to Jewish collective or 
group identity. The various lists of rating one’s Jewishness included many of the same 
items including religious traditions, participation in Jewish organizations, and Jewish 
education. Sociologist Ralph Segalman noted that the use of scales is problematic in that 
the definition of who is a “good Jew” depends heavily on the interests of those creating 
the list of desirable Jewish attributes. Scales have used facial features, dialect, manner of 
dress, and ethnicity to determine whether a respondent was, in fact, a good Jew. Other 
scales measured religiosity, political affiliation and created lists of various beliefs and 
behaviors which were considered essential traits for an individual to have in order to be 
considered Jewish.8 Those lists are influenced by the author and any sponsoring groups 
or interests, resulting in a list of carefully selected parameters that often measure a 
specific aspect of Jewish identity, namely religious, cultural, social, organizational, or in 
some cases, a combination of these and any other theme or themes each author selects to 
                                                 
8 Ralph Segalman, “Self Hatred Among Jews: A Test of the Lewinian Hypothesis of Marginality of Jewish 
Leadership,” (PhD diss., New York University, 1966), 93. 
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measure identity.9 Segalman explained that one weakness of using scales of any kind to 
measure Jewish identity is the assumption that a single scale, no matter how exhaustive, 
could in fact definitively measure an individual or collective sense of Jewishness.10 
Sociologist Simon N. Herman rejected the notion that Jewish identity could be measured. 
He believed that such studies measured an individual’s sense of Jewish identification, and 
not a comprehensive sense of Jewish identity. The scale score of any individual in a 
research project highlights “the process by which an individual comes to see himself a 
part of the Jewish group. . .But very few of them are studies of Jewish identity, of what 
being Jewish means, of what kind of Jew and what kind of Jewishness develop[sic] in the 
majority culture.”11 Like Himmelfarb, he advocated for research that does more than 
attempt to measure an arbitrary strength or weakness of individual identity. His research 
defined Jewish identity using two distinct contexts: either a pattern of attributes 
characterizing the Jewish group, or the relationship between the Jewish individual and the 
Jewish group and the “reflection in him of its attributes.”12 In the case of Milwaukee’s 
Jewish population, a sense of identity came from the hospital, Mount Sinai represented 
the contribution of the Jewish population to the city. 
Research on community collective action contributes to the creation of group identity 
by studying the participation of Jewish people in specific social institutions or activities. 
Sociologists Marshall Sklare and Joseph Greenblum evaluated the Jewishness of 
“Lakeview,” Illinois by measuring participation at synagogues, Jewish day schools, and 
                                                 
9  Ralph Segalman, “Self Hatred Among Jews,” 92. 
10 Segalman, “Self Hatred Among Jews,”, 98. 
11 Simon N. Herman, Jewish Identity: A Social Psychological Perspective (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications 1977), 
28. 
12 Herman, Jewish Identity, 30. 
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support for the state of Israel.13 Sociologist Herbert J. Gans measured suburban 
Jewishness using the availability and knowledge of Jewish food, and creation and 
membership in formal and informal Jewish organizations as criteria for Jewishness.14 
Using predetermined scales or lists of characteristics limits, and in some cases, excludes 
members of the population studied. What of the Jewish families not sending their children 
to a Jewish day school? How can one account for the Jewish members of a community 
that do not attend services?  
The answer to the research question about the Jewish identity of an institution comes 
from an understanding of the Jewish identity of the population that created it. The 
complexity involved in the formation of individual and group identity definitions noted 
above is important when considering the task at hand, that is, how to measure the Jewish 
identity of a hospital. Mount Sinai Hospital was the collective achievement of the 
Milwaukee Jewish population. The answer to any questions about the Jewish identity of 
Mount Sinai Hospital have to come from the history of the Milwaukee Jewish population 
and an understanding of their Jewish identity. They established the hospital and supported 
its mission.  
I viewed the existing literature on the history of Milwaukee Jewish population as a 
guide. The definition of Milwaukee Jewish identity for this dissertation started with the 
history of original Jewish immigrants and an understanding of what made an individual 
Jewish. Philosopher Michael Krausz noted two specific considerations about the 
construction of Jewish identity, descent and assent. He defines Jewish descent as the 
                                                 
13 Marshall Sklare and Joseph Greenblum, “The Friendship Pattern of the Lakeville Jew,” in American Jews; A Reader, 
ed. Marshall Sklare (New York: Behrman Inc. Publishers, 1983), 176-78.  
14 Herbert J. Gans, “The Origin of a Jewish Community in the Suburbs,” in American Jews; A Reader, ed. Marshall 
Sklare (New York: Behrman Inc. Publishers, 1983), 158-64. 
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means of ascribing a status upon an individual as Jewish, either by birth, born to a Jewish 
mother, or conversion regardless of any beliefs or religious practices. Descent makes an 
individual inherently Jewish, but does not describe what being Jewish is in practice. 
Assent is the means to characterize an individual as Jewish based on the acceptance of 
Jewish identity by an individual.15 Assent is the social and behavioral aspects that reveal 
the lived Jewish life. These traits are integral to the creation of a definition of Jewish 
identity. Krausz believed that the search for a definition of Jewish identity can only be 
understood in terms of an individual or collective understanding and acceptance of 
“constellation” of traits, beliefs, practices and features that exist over time.16 It was 
assent, rather than descent, that defined Jewishness. Because of the various experiences 
of Jewish communities, Krausz posited that there is no single historically correct Jewish 
identity discourse. There is no definitive scale, list, or history as to what ultimately 
defines Jewishness and Jewish identity.17 Psychologists Perry London and Allissa 
Hirshfeld described scales as incomplete in the understanding of Jewish identity in that, 
“So, we cannot know from them what bearing Jewish background has on aspects of 
personal identity that are not consciously Jewish but may have been profoundly 
influenced by being Jewish, albeit unconnected to the Jewish community.”18  
The concept of a Milwaukee Jewish identity then, requires an understanding of the 
history of the city’s Jewish immigrants. This dissertation examines the “constellation” 
created by the founding members of the Jewish population and carried on by Jewish 
residents in Milwaukee today. I constructed three core traits of Milwaukee Jewish identity 
                                                 
15 Michael Krausz, “On Being Jewish,” in Jewish Identity, ed. David Theo Goldberg and Michael Krausz (Philadelphia, 
PA: Temple University Press, 1993), 268. 
16 Michael Krausz, “On Being Jewish,”, 272 
17 Michael Krausz, “On Being Jewish,”, 273. 
18 Perry London and Allissa Hirshfeld, “The Psychology of Identity Formation” in Jewish Identity in America, ed. 
David M. Gordis and Yoav Ben-Horin (Los Angeles, CA: Wilstein Institute, 1991), 46-47. 
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using the literature of the history of the city of Milwaukee, namely Swichkow and 
Gartner. Jewish immigrants in Milwaukee are assumed to be Jewish by descent. However, 
they differed in religious practice and ethnic customs. They arrived in Milwaukee from 
different European regions. Their differences led to conflict between the two groups. That 
conflict is one of the defining features of Milwaukee Jewish identity. It should be noted 
that this definition of Milwaukee Jewish identity is limited in that Swichkow and 
Gartner’s work is almost exclusively from the perspective of the original immigrant 
population arriving from Western Europe in the nineteenth century. However, the conflict 
between the two groups is also a defining feature of Milwaukee Jewish identity. Social 
stratification is an integral part of Milwaukee Jewish history. The East Side Jewish 
population established themselves in business and in the professional class. The West 
Side Jewish population settled on the West Side and was initially poor. The differences 
between the two led to social distance between them. East Side and West Side did not 
socialize. They did not live together and they did not pray together. This early segregation 
had a profound effect on Milwaukee Jewish identity. To be from the East Side was 
desirable; it was not advantageous to claim a West Side status. These statuses were so 
strong that they remain a part of Milwaukee Jewish identity in the twenty-first century.19  
The creation of the hospital also represented the second and third attribute of 
Milwaukee Jewish identity-philanthropy and sense of commitment to the city of 
Milwaukee represented by the support for the health care for the indigent. I argue that at 
the time of announcement of a continuing Jewish identity at Sinai Samaritan, the goal 
was to an attempt to preserve Jewish history, or heritage rather than identity. That is, the 
hospital represented their historic support of the hospital as Milwaukee Jews for 
                                                 
19 Pat and Joan Kerns, Interview by author, Mequon, Wisconsin, May 24, 2011. 
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themselves and their fellow citizens. 
 
MILWAUKEE JEWISH IDENTITY: THREE HISTORIC TRAITS  
I have identified three core components of Milwaukee Jewish identity; ethnic origin, 
defined as either East and West Side Jewish population, philanthropy, defined as 
collective action in charity work, and a sense of commitment to the city by way of 
maintaining Mount Sinai Hospital for eighty-four years even after many Jewish residents 
moved away. These three traits form the foundation for a sense of what constitutes a 
sense of Milwaukee Jewish identity. These traits are not meant to impart any sense of 
being a “good” Milwaukee Jew based on any predetermined scale. Instead, they are an 
attempt to describe the traits that Jewish residents of Milwaukee socially constructed and 
maintained to express and define their Jewish identity. I used data from interviews with 
members of the Milwaukee community, both Jewish and Gentile. This allowed for a more 
diverse understanding of Milwaukee Jewish identity; Himmelfarb noted that many Jewish 
identity research projects often excluded Gentiles. The inclusion of the perspectives of 
Gentile nurses in particular provides insight about how they viewed the Jewish 
contributions to Milwaukee through the work at Mount Sinai.20 Interviews with members 
of the Milwaukee Jewish population revealed that of these three components, the East and 
West side labels were both ascribed on those born in the city21and achieved by those who 
moved to the city.22 Current members of the Jewish community in Milwaukee applied 
these statuses to new community members. In the 1970s and 1980s, new immigrants from 
                                                 
20 H.S. Himmelfarb, “Research on American Jewish Identity and Identification,”, 66-67.  
21 Dr. Harry Kanin, Interview by author, Milwaukee, Wisconsin, July 14, 2011. 
22 Pat and Joan Kerns, Interview by author, Mequon, Wisconsin, May 24, 2011; Dr. David Amadari, Interview by 
author, Milwaukee, Wisconsin, July 14, 2011. 
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Soviet Russia were called Russian Jews and West Side Jews by some of those 
interviewed.23  
The Milwaukee Jewish population originated from distinct regional groups; Western 
and Central Europe, commonly referred to as German, and Eastern European, which in 
Milwaukee refers to Russian. Cultural differences between the two resulted in a 
segregated Jewish population. The first wave Western Jews arrived first, and formed a 
social identity among themselves. The second wave arrived and found that some of their 
cultural practices and religious traditions did not fit with the socially constructed Jewish 
identity in Milwaukee. 
Like other urban areas, these cultural and religious differences between Milwaukee’s 
Jewish populations divided the group. The issue of nomenclature for the two immigrant 
waves is important. There were two large waves of Jewish immigration to the United 
States in the nineteenth century; one started in 1848, the second in 1888. For this research, 
I refer to the groups as first and second wave immigrant groups. The history of the first 
wave of Jewish immigration to America is linked with Milwaukee’s Germanic 
immigration. Jewish and non-Jewish immigrants from the Germanic regions in Western 
and Central Europe arrived together and established a neighborhood on the East Side of 
the Milwaukee River.24 The economic opportunities available to Jewish immigrants in 
Milwaukee made Mount Sinai possible. The wave of Jews arriving in the recently 
established city the late 1840s and early 1850s joined a familiar Germanic culture.25 The 
first wave of immigrants to arrive in Milwaukee left Europe after supporting a failed 
                                                 
23 Pat and Joan Kerns, Interview by author, Mequon, Wisconsin, May 24, 2011. 
24 Bayrd Still, Milwaukee: The History of a City (Madison, Wisconsin: The State Historical Society of Wisconsin, 
1948), 112. 
25 Swichkow and Gartner, The History of the Jews of Milwaukee, 110. 
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revolution in Europe.26 The immigrants who settled in the German neighborhoods of 
Milwaukee were from Germanic regions that had failed to unify a German nation and 
secure civil rights in the revolution. The histories of the Jewish and non-Jewish German 
immigration are so connected in much of the scholarship that the initial wave of 
immigration in the 1800s is colloquially known as the “German” wave of “Jewish” 
immigrants.  
     The first wave Germanic Jewish immigrants in Milwaukee are identified here as 
East Side Jewish immigrants. This label continues to be salient in Milwaukee as a means 
of tracing family history and country of origin. In interviews, members of the Milwaukee 
Jewish community used these terms to describe their family histories as well as members 
of the current Jewish community.27 Many of the East Side Jewish immigrants were 
secular in their education and eventually adopted American Reform Judaism once in 
Milwaukee. Sociologist Calvin Goldscheider argued that in the case of these first wave 
immigrants, “Their socioeconomic background, social mobility, and prior exposure to 
secularization resulted in rapid integration in American society.”28 These immigrants 
were from urban areas and sought to acculturate in their countries of origin. The accepted 
the social norms and mores of the dominant culture, and many practiced a less traditional 
form of Judaism. They did not want to live apart from their Gentile neighbors: they 
wanted to live as European Jews, not as Jewish Europeans. To assume Jewish immigrants 
in Milwaukee wanted to assimilate is erroneous, despite living in Germanic 
neighborhoods, they did not intermarry, nor did they stop identifying themselves as Jews. 
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Once they arrived in Milwaukee, many were able to acculturate quickly with their 
fellow immigrants, greatly facilitated by the fact that many of their Gentile cohort 
accepted them as fellow Germans in manner and dress.29 Several of those interviewed 
refer to the East Side Jewish immigrants as "assimilated" but this was not the case. It is 
true that those first wave Jewish immigrants that settled alongside Gentiles in German 
neighborhoods were almost indistinguishable from their neighbors, but the fact that they 
retained their Jewish sensibilities indicates that they did not fully assimilate. Sociologist 
Milton M. Gordon uses two hypothetical groups, the “Sylvanians” and the “Mundovians” 
to illustrate his concept of assimilation. The Sylvanians are citizens of the “host country” 
and Mundovians, new immigrants. Gordon believed that the new immigrant, in a series of 
stages, eventually accepted the dominant cultural practices of the host country and thus 
underwent both structural assimilation by accepting entering primary groups with 
Sylvanians, and identification assimilation, where they took on a shared sense of being 
Sylvanian.30 Sklare and Greenblum argued that by taking their place in German 
neighborhoods and remaining almost indistinguishable from their Gentile neighbors, they 
were “assimilated.”31 I argue that in the case of the first wave of Milwaukee Jewish 
immigrants, those who settled in German neighborhoods did so without adopting 
different religious beliefs. Members of the East Side Jewish population settled with 
Gentile German residents without converting. The most salient indicator of the 
importance of retaining Jewish religious practices in the Milwaukee East Side Jewish 
population is the ongoing attempts to establish synagogues. East Side Jews lived among 
                                                 
29 Swichkow and Gartner, The History of the Jews of Milwaukee, 187. 
30 Milton M. Gordon, Assimilation in American Life: The Role of Race, Religion, and National Origin (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1964), 68-71. 
31 Sklare and Greenblum. “The Friendship Pattern of the Lakeville Jew,”, 176-78. 
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Gentiles, but they did not convert to the dominant Christian religion; rather, they 
eventually created houses of worship in order to practice their Jewish faith.32  
The three core characteristics of Milwaukee Jewish identity– the ethnic origins of the 
East and West Side Jewish populations– collective philanthropic action– and a 
commitment to the people and city of Milwaukee– are the foundation for the Jewish 
identity of Mount Sinai. Sociologist Calvin Goldscheider noted that in the study of the 
value of living in an area with strong Jewish institutions and networks, the characteristics 
of Jewish identity in smaller Jewish populations are largely absent from the existing 
literature. He stated that scholars have yet to ask whether living in areas with Jewish 
institutions enriches Jewish solidarity and kinship. He questions the use of traditional 
scales to measure Jewish identity and advocates the study of collective Jewish action on 
their cities.33 I argue that Mount Sinai did have a positive impact on the lives of both 
groups of Milwaukee Jews. The East Side Jewish financial support, their commitment to 
relief work, and service to Milwaukee are all at the heart of Mount Sinai’s mission. 
Members of the West Side Jewish population received care at the hospital. The hospital 
received support from both groups as the West Side Jews gained upward socioeconomic 
status. 
The original Jewish population of Milwaukee came from Western Europe, many 
from regions now known as Germany. These Germanic East Side Jews established the 
cultural foundation for later Jewish immigrants. By virtue of being the first Jewish settlers 
in Milwaukee, the Germanic Jewish immigrants created a system of beliefs and behaviors 
that they imposed on later arrivals. I argue that this group established a basis for the city’s 
                                                 
32 Swichkow and Gartner, The History of the Jews of Milwaukee, 179. 
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Jewish identity. The second wave of Jewish immigrants arriving in Milwaukee had little in 
common with the first wave.34 Many of those interviewed referred to these immigrants as 
Russian Jews. In fact, however, many Jewish and Gentile immigrants came to Milwaukee 
at this time from all over Eastern Europe, not just Russia. They created the West Side 
Jewish community in the Haymarket neighborhood. However, unlike the East Side Jews, 
the West Side Jewish immigrants arriving in Milwaukee did not settle in a Russian 
neighborhood, or a Polish neighborhood with non-Jewish immigrants. They arrived after 
1888 and established a Jewish Eastern European enclave because of the anti-Semitic 
feelings of the other Eastern European immigrants in Milwaukee. The Jews who started 
arriving in the late 1880s were more observant and less secular than the first wave. Many 
came from shtetls in Eastern Europe and Russia.35  
The West Side immigrants experienced anti-Semitism from other Gentile immigrant 
groups. They also suffered the disdain from the East Side Jewish community. The 
differences between the two Jewish groups and the establishment of a sense of Jewish 
identity by the East Side Jews led to conflict. Interviews with members of the Milwaukee 
Jewish population revealed that many of them believed that the East Side Jewish 
population attempted to “assimilate” new arrivals.36 The more traditional religious 
practices and different manner of dress of the West Side immigrants led to efforts by East 
Side Jews to transform the new arrivals, but assimilation did not include conversion to 
Christianity. East Side Jews themselves did not so much assimilate, as they did they did 
acculturate with Gentile Germanic immigrants in many ways, but remained Jewish, albeit 
American Reform. After the arrival of the West Side Jewish immigrants, the East Side 
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Jewish residents, in fact, attempted to acculturate the new arrivals and impart a sense of 
Milwaukee Jewish identity upon them.37  
The relative poverty of many of the West Side Jewish population led to the creation 
of another important historic characteristic of Milwaukee Jewish identity: philanthropy 
and relief institutions. The East Side Jewish population established the Hebrew Relief 
Association in order to assist the West Side Jews. In addition to charitable assistance, they 
also established a Settlement and offered education and lessons that sought to educate the 
new arrivals on the Milwaukee Jewish norms. The first wave immigrants acculturated, 
and created an American Jewish culture. They then, in turn attempted to teach second 
wave immigrants their cultural understandings to the next wave. Historian Jonathan Sarna 
uses the term “Cult of Synthesis” to describe the attempts of first wave Jewish 
immigrants to impart American Jewish values and norms to the second wave. This term is 
defined as an understanding of "the belief that Judaism and Americanism reinforce 
one another, the two traditions converging in a common path."38 He notes that the cult of 
synthesis "reflects an ongoing effort on the part of American Jews to interweave their 
'Judaism' with their 'Americanism' in an attempt to fashion for themselves some unified, 
'synthetic' whole. Anyone even remotely connected with American Jewish life is familiar 
with this theme, which has elsewhere been described as a central tenet of American 
Jewish 'civil religion.”39 Synthesis defines the actions of the East Side Jews more 
accurately than the term assimilation and is more akin to acculturation; the new 
immigrants were expected to embrace Milwaukee Jewish identity traits, created largely 
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by the first wave. Sarna’s use of synthesis defines the process of acculturating Eastern 
European Jews in that they should adopt the dominant American Jewish population’s 
behaviors and religious observances in the areas that they settled. They did not have stop 
being Jewish; they should become American Jews. 
   The East Side Jewish population had expectations of the new immigrants, and they 
had the social resources to enforce those expectations. They possessed considerable social 
and economic advantages. Sociologist Pierre Bourdieu used the term “creating cultural 
capital” to describe the process by which individuals form preferences for cultural 
practices and activities, including religion. He identified primary social groups like 
family and schools as agents of socialization, especially for children. Those that practice 
the preferred cultural activities are more likely to gain social acceptance.40 Cultural 
capital could and often did lead to the creation of social capital. Sociologist Robert D. 
Putnam defined the core idea of social capital as the benefits of connections among and 
between individual members and the advantageous effects that can occur. Individuals 
form connections in their own self-interest and can result in “public good” through the 
actions of “well connected” people.”41 The status of East Side Jew could be achieved 
through adopting the socially acceptable norms and behaviors, which included the 
socially acceptable religions practice. Both Jay Larkey and Pat Kerns were born to 
Russian parents. Both were raised in the Reform tradition, and both identify themselves 
as East Side Jews. Each used their cultural capital to achieve upward social mobility.42 
The second trait, the collective act of philanthropy, also frames the relationship 
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between Milwaukee Jewish identity and Mount Sinai Hospital’s Jewish identity. The 
hospital was a direct response of the relief efforts in the Milwaukee East Side Jewish 
community to increased Jewish immigration from Eastern Europe. The more affluent East 
Side Jewish men contributed their money and time to create Mount Sinai. That historic 
contribution remains an important part of Jewish identity for members of the Milwaukee 
community.43  
Tzedakah is often translated as “charity,” but is more accurately defined as an act of 
“loving kindness.”44 The concept of loving kindness includes specifics act on the part of 
individuals and groups designed to assist the poor. Donating money, volunteering and 
visiting those in need are all examples of tzedakah.45 The collective action to create a 
hospital defined the Milwaukee Jewish community and Mount Sinai embodied their 
commitment to those in need. Rabbi Joseph Telushkin cites Deuteronomy 15:7-8: “If 
however, there is a needy person among you. . .do not harden your heart and shut your 
hand against your needy kinsman.”46 This commandment led to the earliest philanthropic 
efforts on the part first wave Jewish immigrants. Many first wave Jewish immigrants 
adopted Reform Jewish practices and many had embraced Reform Jewish practices in 
their countries of origin.47. The later immigrants arrived from Eastern Europe and did not 
share those practices. This led to the creation of two distinct Jewish groups in Milwaukee. 
The East Side Jewish population adopted American Reform Jewish practices and lived on 
the east side of the Milwaukee River. The West Side Jewish group retained religious 
practices from Eastern Europe and settled on the west side of the river.  
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The first wave Jewish immigrant population accepted the responsibility to establish 
and sustain operations of Mount Sinai Hospital for the poor Jewish immigrants who 
arrived starting in 1888.48 That responsibility and the commitment to Mount Sinai 
Hospital represented an important trait for Jewish identity for Milwaukee’s East Side 
Jews. In contrast to the community’s struggles in establishing multiple synagogues that 
met their religious needs, Mount Sinai Hospital thrived because it was the only Jewish 
hospital in the area and received the full support of the Jewish community, through their 
collective actions on its behalf. Their dedication to Mount Sinai was an expression of 
their acceptance of the Jewish commandment of tzedakah, one more salient than specific 
religious observance at any one synagogue. Members of the West Side Jewish population 
eventually joined the East Side Jewish population in supporting the hospital. Sociologist 
Harold Polsky noted that by the 1950s, Jews from both sides of the Milwaukee River 
contributed to Mount Sinai. The historically impoverished “Russian” Jews from the West 
Side embraced the importance of philanthropy and assumed one of the most important 
traits of Milwaukee Jewish identity.49  
A third core trait of Milwaukee identity is the historic Jewish commitment to the city 
of Milwaukee as a whole. The hospital offered care for Jewish and Gentile patients. The 
nonsectarian mission of Mount Sinai represented the sense of gratitude for the perceived 
acceptance the first wave Jewish immigrants felt in Milwaukee. They shared cultural and 
ethnic traits and spoke the same language as Milwaukee’s non-Jewish Germans.50 The 
fact that the Jewish population in Milwaukee was so similar to the non-Jewish 
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immigrants arriving with them had a profound effect on the mission of Mount Sinai. At a 
time where urban hospitals were usually established as either nonsectarian or religious, 
Mount Sinai was created with the distinct dual mission of serving not only the Jewish 
community of Milwaukee, but all in need in Milwaukee. Mount Sinai Hospital in New 
York and Beth Israel eventually developed nonsectarian missions, but Mount Sinai 
Hospital Milwaukee was founded with one.51 This dual identity was one reason that 
Mount Sinai was able to serve the City of Milwaukee for over eighty years and why 
hospital leaders decided to keep Mount Sinai downtown in the face of Jewish community 
outmigration. The founders of the hospital developed a strong commitment to the city of 
Milwaukee, not only to the Jewish residents. That commitment strengthened the 
relationship between the Jewish community and the city of Milwaukee.52 Pat Kerns, the 
owner of a successful flooring company in Milwaukee, was a Board Member at Mount 
Sinai. He related his understanding of the history of the hospital in terms of Jewish 
philanthropy and gratitude on the part of the Jewish population for Milwaukee. He 
believed that the hospital began as a response to the needs of indigent Jewish immigrants 
in Milwaukee. The reason Mount Sinai leadership agreed to the 1987 merger that kept the 
hospital in downtown was, in part, a formal recognition of the gratitude felt by the Jewish 
people for the city of Milwaukee and its acceptance of the first wave Jewish 
immigrants.53 
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THE FOUNDING OF MOUNT SINAI HOSPITAL  
Mount Sinai Hospital opened on June 7, 1903. Members of the Milwaukee 
community, Jewish and non-Jewish, listened to speeches and accolades from some of 
Milwaukee’s most prestigious citizens. Local newspapers reported the event, as the 
hospital was declared open to treat those in need of care, no matter what religion, race, or 
creed.54 Hospitals in American cities in the early twentieth century were transforming 
both their services and their public image, and Mount Sinai reflected these changes. 
These hospitals replaced the county almshouses, which housed rather than treated the 
indigent sick– often in deplorable conditions. Hospitals of the early twentieth century 
were designed as modern institutions of scientific healing.55 Other cities in the United 
States opened hospitals that were larger and served more patients than Mount Sinai. 
Specifically, these larger urban hospitals served more Jewish patients. New 
York,56Newark,57Boston,58 and Chicago59 had large Jewish populations and with the 
exception of Michael Reese Hospital in Chicago, were private Jewish hospitals.60 There 
were hospitals in Milwaukee established by other religious groups, yet Mount Sinai was 
distinctive in that it was founded to be simultaneously nonsectarian and Jewish. Mount 
Sinai Hospital served the greater Milwaukee community and was dedicated to the 
nonsectarian principle of treating all in need.  
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The hospital cared for the large Jewish and Gentile immigrant population that arrived 
in Milwaukee beginning in the late 1800s and early 1900s. The hospital’s Jewish identity 
originates not from any specific practice or formal religious tradition. The hospital was 
Jewish because of the support of the Milwaukee Jewish population. It also contributed to 
the establishment of the Jewish medical profession in Milwaukee. The hospital also 
served the latent function of providing a place for Jewish men to practice medicine. 
Jewish doctors in Milwaukee had no place to establish their practices. Despite the relative 
acceptance of Jewish businesses, Milwaukee hospitals did not allow Jewish doctors on 
staff. Mount Sinai Hospital created opportunities for the Jewish members of the 
Milwaukee community. The doctors of Mount Sinai described the history of the hospital 
in terms of what the Jewish hospital offered them, namely the opportunity to achieve 
upward social and economic success. In 1903, Christian hospitals in Milwaukee were not 
open to Jewish doctors. Mount Sinai Hospital served as a means for the establishment of 
the Milwaukee Jewish medical profession.61 The doctors established their livelihoods 
because of the availability of a Jewish hospital at a time when antisemitism prevented 
them from practicing elsewhere in Milwaukee.62 Being a board member conferred a 
positive social status on those who contributed time and money for fundraising.63 Jewish 
businessmen were able to serve on the hospital board and achieve the status of leaders at 
their hospital.64 
The decision to be both a Jewish and nonsectarian hospital guided and challenged the 
Milwaukee Jewish community through decades of medical and social changes. As early 
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as 1904, hospital leaders noted that Mount Sinai was serving more Gentiles than Jews. 
The nonsectarian mission of the hospital encouraged non-Jewish patients to seek care at 
Mount Sinai, and they did use the hospital. Yet, the number of Jewish patients was 
consistently lower than the number of non-Jewish patients.65 Mount Sinai treated more 
non-Jewish patients than Jewish throughout its history. However, members of the 
collective Jewish community provided leadership at Mount Sinai. It was Jewish because 
of that participation. From 1903 through the 1960s, the Jewish Board members of Mount 
Sinai, Jewish doctors, and volunteers staffed and funded the hospital to aid Milwaukee’s 
growing population. 
For the majority of Mount Sinai’s history, fundraising by the Jewish community 
covered the costs of caring for the poor in Milwaukee. Support for Mount Sinai Hospital 
was an important aspect for two of the three attributes of Milwaukee Jewish identity. The 
philanthropic efforts of the Jewish collective community enabled Mount Sinai to treat the 
poor in Milwaukee, regardless of their religious affiliation. Despite the long term support 
of the Jewish population, the hospital merged in 1987. The relationship between the 
Jewish community and Mount Sinai changed beginning in the 1970s.  
The literature offers various theories as to why long standing private religious 
hospitals closed, relocated, or merged. Many immigrant groups established hospitals in 
American cities. Catholic, Protestant, and Jewish hospitals served patients for decades. 
Historian Rosemary Stevens glossed over the loss of community funding and focused on 
a larger discussion of insurance plans and health care costs.66 I believe that the decrease 
in support from their communities starting in the late 1970s and early 1980s was 
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significant to private urban community hospitals. Why did so many private religious 
hospitals close or merge with other hospitals? Some scholars attribute the closing to 
changes within the communities themselves. Many sociologists contributed to the large 
body of literature on the concept of community. Some of the earliest works came from 
Tonnies, Durkheim, Marx, and Weber. Each offered views on the effects of 
industrialization on community groups and its members. Tonnies used the terms 
gemeinschaft and gesellschaft to describe communities before and after the industrial age. 
Gemeinschaft defined pre-industrial community life as a way of life consisting of close 
community ties between individuals living in close proximity and including the 
importance of religion and religious unity between community members.67 Gesellschaft, 
seen after the establishment of an industrial economy and larger urban environments, 
represented a distance between community members in their personal lives. The rise of 
industry brought individuals together for the shared purpose of earning a living and 
weakened the more personal relationships through social and physical distance within the 
community.68  
Durkheim’s concepts of mechanical and organic solidarity and the theory of a 
community’s “conscious collective” also examined the effects of industrialization on 
community members. Mechanical solidarity described the close ties between members of 
a community as a “collective consciousness” which facilitated the cooperation of 
individuals toward accepted goals. These goals, adopted by the community members, 
served as a means of creating a sense of all for one and one for all within small communal 
                                                 
67 Rick Tillman, “Ferdinand Tonnies, Thorstein Veblen and Karl Marx: From Community to Society and Back?,” 
European Journal of the History of Economic Thought 11, no. 4 (Winter, 2004): 585-86. 
68 Tillman, “Ferdinand Tonnies, Thorstein Veblen and Karl Marx,” 584-85.   
 26 
 
spaces.69 Organic solidarity represented the less personal, more individual community 
model. He argued that as community members industrialized, the struggle to earn and 
maintain livelihood led to an increase in social interactions based not on religious 
observance or shared kinship, but on economic necessity. Wage earning increased. The 
interactions between tradespeople, artists, and other community small businesses and 
their customers decreased as more people sold their labor and their time.70  
Sociologist Karl Marx studied the impact of capitalism on communities. He noted the 
inequality between two broad groups: the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. The bourgeoisie, 
those in possession of the means of production in an industrialized economy, affected 
community ties through the exploitation of proletariat labor. He argued that capitalism 
divided the members of the working class into separate groups, often competing for the 
same goals, namely wages. This was what he called divide and conquer. Marx believed 
that social distance between community members was not an effect of capitalism, it was a 
specific goal of the ruling class.71 
Sociologist Max Weber introduced the term socioeconomic status (SES) into the 
discussion of community. He described SES as a social position within an agreed upon 
hierarchy, beginning with wealth and economic gain. He argued that those with more 
wealth achieved higher social statuses based on their assets. They lived in neighborhoods 
with high SES. This created distance within communities. Wealth afforded individuals 
both material gain and social capital. The lower SES did not live with those in the upper 
echelons: economic disparity changed the community relationships.72  
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While the theories noted above illustrate the changes between members of a 
community with the creation of an industrialized economy, Jewish collective action in 
support of Mount Sinai continued even after many of the more affluent members of the 
Jewish population moved from the city. The history of the collective actions of the Jewish 
community in Milwaukee in the creation of Mount Sinai Hospital revealed the 
importance of both high SES and wealth in establishing the hospital. The more affluent 
members of the Milwaukee community, Jewish and non-Jewish, listened to speeches and 
accolades from some of Milwaukee’s most prestigious citizens at the June 1903 
dedication ceremony. The fact that Mount Sinai received support and acknowledgment 
from the Gentile population is a testament to the success of the first wave Jewish 
immigrants in Milwaukee. The theories above do not fully explain the decrease in the 
Jewish collective action at Mount Sinai. 
By the 1960s, many Jewish families had moved away from Milwaukee. However, 
these families, especially the doctors and their wives, continued to support the hospital. 
Jewish doctors admitted their patients to Mount Sinai. I argue that the creation of 
government insurance programs, more so than changes brought on by industrialization, 
changed the way hospitals provided care for the poor and changed the relationship 
between collective communities and their established hospitals. Immigrants founded 
community hospitals in urban areas. One crucial event in the history of Mount Sinai was 
the War on Poverty, established by the Lyndon Baines Johnson administration in 1965. 
Over the course of the War on Poverty, new in health care programs, health care payment 
options, and even the attitudes about care for the indigent in the United States 
transformed the way urban hospitals did business. Mount Sinai’s actions and reactions in 
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the wake of funding changes reveal how hospitals treating a large number of poor patients 
began to lose large amounts of money. The support for hospitals through donations and 
volunteer hours diminished. In 1965, Medicaid, or Title 19, provided money for the care 
of poor patients at many private religious hospitals, including Mount Sinai. At first, 
Medicaid provided full reimbursement for patient care. In 1982, the Medicaid program 
underwent a series of changes, including the decrease of reimbursements to hospitals for 
patient care. The hospitals had to absorb the costs. This created financial difficulties for 
many hospitals around the United States, including Mount Sinai. Community fundraising 
efforts continued after 1965, but the money was redirected to other Jewish institutions in 
new Jewish residential areas. The Ladies Auxiliary continued to raise money for Mount 
Sinai, but the funds were used for medical libraries, redecorating projects, and other 
improvements instead of costs of patient care.73 In an attempt to compete with other area 
hospitals, Mount Sinai expanded their facilities, medical research, and specialties, and 
established a teaching program with University of Wisconsin-Madison. These changes 
were insufficient to stop the losses, however, leading to the 1987 merger with Good 
Samaritan Medical Center. Good Samaritan was created after a 1982 merger between 
Deaconess Hospital and Lutheran Hospital (also known as Passavant Hospital).74 
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SUBURBAN JEWISH POPULATION AND IDENTITY 
Demographic changes in the Jewish population and the development of new 
government insurance programs for the care of the poor created distance between the 
hospital and Jewish community support. The Jewish community moved out of downtown 
Milwaukee starting in the 1950s and began to establish Jewish organizations in the 
suburbs. As Krausz noted, the concept of identity evolves, and it did in Milwaukee.75 The 
Milwaukee Jewish population established themselves in the city. The more affluent 
Jewish population moved out of downtown Milwaukee starting in the 1950s and began to 
establish Jewish organizations in suburbs. Social changes, namely the decrease in 
discrimination in light of the Civil Rights Act of 1965, created new opportunities at 
Milwaukee hospitals. Jewish doctors obtained privileges to practice and their patients 
followed them. The symbiotic relationship between Jewish doctors and patients and their 
hospital became less vital, but did not end.76  
The East Side Jews moved to the suburbs, while Mount Sinai remained downtown. 
The relocation of the East Side population altered two of the three core traits of the 
original Milwaukee Jewish identity. The collective efforts to the city were replaced by the 
need to establish and sustain suburban Jewish institutions in their new neighborhoods. 
Philanthropic collective action continued, but in support of institutions outside the city 
limits. The historic East Side and West Side Jewish identities should have weakened as 
Jews moved out of the city, but they did not. The historical divide between the two groups 
remained, still defined by location, between those who remained in Milwaukee, and those 
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that moved out.77 Suburban Jewish populations invested a great deal of time and money 
in their local Jewish entities. Synagogues, Jewish day schools, and neighborhoods grew 
outside of the city. Jewish doctors began practicing at other Milwaukee hospitals, and 
their patients followed them. The racial composition of the neighborhood surrounding 
Mount Sinai changed as well.78 
 Some interview subjects reported perceptions that the location of Mount Sinai was 
unsafe, which may have kept some patients and even long-time volunteers from outlying 
areas away. The downtown location, just north of the area sometimes called the “inner 
city,” contributed to the belief that Mount Sinai was a hospital for the indigent.79 Many 
Interviewees reported that the decrease in the Jewish involvement and support facilitated 
the merger with Good Samaritan. That merger was considered a painful loss by members 
of the community.80 However, by this time, the hospital had merged. The result of the 
merger was that, as one doctor summed it up, “The only thing Jewish about Mount Sinai 
now is its history.”81  
 
POLICY, FUNDING CHANGES, AND DEFICIT 
One of the main reasons for the loss of Jewish sponsorship and the decreased 
participation stemmed from the changes in the American hospital system: specifically, 
how it financed indigent care. Mount Sinai did treat a large number of patients using 
Medicaid and Medicare. Decreased reimbursement changes to those programs created an 
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increasing financial burden at the facility.82 Changes in funding for indigent care resulted 
in loss of revenue for many hospitals. The creation and expansion of Medicaid and 
Medicare in 1965 began to replace fund raising in funding medical care for the poor. The 
Milwaukee Jewish population believed that these new programs would provide for those 
in need of care. It was a misguided belief. Funding cuts to both programs beginning in the 
1970s led to a fiscal crisis. Both programs fell short in covering the cost of care and led to 
financial problems at many hospitals, including Mount Sinai. By the time hospitals felt 
the full effects of policy change, the support of their founding communities had all but 
ended. 
Historian Charles Rosenberg stated that, “Policy is a familiar term. But like many 
indispensable words, it is not easily defined.” In one sense Rosenberg believed that policy 
is descriptive of practice in the public sector but also notes that “policy” has a variety of 
meanings: it may imply a sense of responsibility for the planning and strategic unity 
between goals and outcome. Policy should plan for the possibility of conflict, negotiation, 
and compromise in policy changes.83  
Rosenberg believed that some types of policy had the potential for consequences, 
labeled “cumulative” in that each decision and its significance interact over time to define 
a new yet historically structured reality, one that is usually unintended and can be missed 
by those who did not plot the policy steps completely. He wrote, “The system moves 
through visible decision points, elaborated by subsequent administrative practice–with 
that specific experience along with other relevant variables shaping the next visible shift 
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in public policy.”84 The changes in health care policy and procedure for the indigent at 
Mount Sinai illustrated the cumulative effect. The shift in policy, from a community 
based and funded support system for private religious hospitals to a governmental 
program, vulnerable to changes in political support, left hospitals struggling to provide 
care with less money. By placing the responsibility for charity care with the government, 
funding became vulnerable to the political positions and attitudes over time. Changes in 
the political climate translated into changes in the social program. Historian Jonathan 
Engel discussed the political changes since the creation of Medicaid in the context of his 
belief that the government’s responsibility to provide charity care is considered 
permanent by the majority of citizens. While the debate about how much to spend and 
who deserves coverage continues, he argues that no serious attempt to return to collective 
community funding for health care.85 His conclusion was that Medicaid, although flawed, 
has been successful. At the time of its creation, the data about health care utilization 
among the urban poor was dire. Prenatal care, dental care, well child care, and many 
other medical services were anomalies for the poor American population prior to the 
1960s. The rates of service to the poor in these low income areas were very low, until the 
poor were able to pay for the care that wealthier Americans were buying for themselves 
using Medicaid. This program, Engel argued, worked as it was designed to, although not 
perfectly.86 
Others supported Engels in his conclusions about the new programs, but issued a 
warning about the future. At a medical conference held in Philadelphia in 1981, David 
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Rogers, Robert Blindon, and Thomas W. Moloney presented an article they had written 
for the New England Journal of Medicine examining the effectiveness of the Medicaid 
program. Their findings showed that while Medicaid was working as intended, and that 
the poor were being helped, “A worsening national economic situation has led the public 
to place a much lower priority on the provision of health services particularly tax 
supported services to our low income citizens.” In short, the popular opinion was 
changing and the program was up against the growing economic worries of the public. 
The call to safeguard tax dollars from waste was affecting the support for a successful 
program.87 They warned that the issue of cost should not be ignored; they feared the 
development of a conventional wisdom framing tax dollars spent for the poor to get care 
as a “waste.” Medicaid, they argue, was at risk, due to the relative ignorance of the 
general public about the assistance program. They were correct. Medicaid costs drew 
criticism while being associated with the negative attitudes about social welfare programs. 
The public believed that along with cash, food stamps, and housing assistance, Medicaid 
was just another example of wasteful government spending.88  
Contrary to this emerging conventional wisdom of wasted tax dollars on a broken 
program, the authors noted that Medicare benefits were serving exactly the population it 
was supposed to: the elderly, the disabled, the mentally ill, and poor children. In fact, the 
program was costing so much because it was doing exactly what is was designed to do, 
provide health care for those in need. Nursing homes were receiving half of their funding 
from the Medicare program. Teaching hospitals, which served a large urban poor 
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population, received 10% of their funding from Medicaid.89 
Changes in health care also affected hospitals. Medical advances, the creation and 
expansion of specific specialties and the creation of health care networks increased the 
cost of medical care. Prior to the July 30, 1965 signing of the Title 19 Act, also known as 
Medicaid, the Jewish community supported Mount Sinai and assumed responsibility for 
the hospital and supported its operations with time and money. The community sustained 
operations even during the Great Depression and World War II, when money and 
resources were limited.90 The national recession of the early 1980s revealed the 
decreased financial contributions to from the Jewish collective to Mount Sinai Hospital. 
While volunteer opportunities remained through the 1980s, the fundraising events that 
had supported hospital renovations, innovations, and patient care for decades decreased 
dramatically. Contributions decreased as private donations were erroneously considered 
obsolete in the wake of Medicare and Medicaid by the Jewish community.91 Hospital 
administrators understood the fiscal ramifications of changes in Medicaid and Medicare 
reimbursement, but the community at large did not donate funds as they once had.92 The 
hospital began to struggle when funding for Medicaid and Medicare were cut at the start 
of Ronald Reagan’s first term as president in 1981. The majority of the patients treated at 
Mount Sinai were using those programs. Mount Sinai served a large number of patients 
who could not pay for their care at all, or who had their services reimbursed at rates lower 
than the actual costs.93  
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Before the new government programs, the Jewish people in Milwaukee held events 
like a charity ball and an annual Donation Day or some other funding drive to offset fiscal 
losses. By the 1980s, the historic fundraising on the part of the Jewish community had 
essentially ended. There are two strong explanations for the lack of fundraising for Mount 
Sinai. First, the donations stopped because the work was deemed no longer necessary in 
light of the government programs. The belief that the government programs paid for the 
care the donations used to cover may have undermined the drives.94 In addition, an 
overall decrease in female volunteers at the hospital explains why fundraising ended. 
Jewish women in the 1980s did not replace the aging volunteers from the 1950s and 
1960s. Fundraising efforts abated because there were simply not enough volunteers to 
continue.95  
The hospital faced closure in the early 1980s until a merger with another hospital, 
Good Samaritan, was approved in 1987. Two Milwaukee hospitals, Passavant and 
Deaconess, merged to create Good Samaritan Medical Center. They, like Mount Sinai, 
relied on community donations for operations. Financial support for the two also declined. 
The creation of a regional medical center necessitated a merger under new regulations 
established by changes in the Medicaid program. The merger attenuated decades of 
financial support and volunteerism. It also severed the community relationship between 
members of the Jewish community and the city of Milwaukee, a relationship that had 
lasted thirty years after many of the Jewish families started moving beyond Milwaukee’s 
borders. The creation of government insurance programs changed the way hospitals 
provided care for the poor. Immigrants founded community hospitals in urban areas. The 
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communities supported hospitals through donations and volunteer hours. In 1965, 
Medicaid, or Title XIX, provided funds for the care of poor patients at many private 
religious hospitals, including Mount Sinai. At first, Medicaid provided full 
reimbursement for patient care. In 1982, the Medicaid program underwent a series of 
changes, including the decrease of reimbursements to hospitals for patient care. This, 
combined with the end of patient care fundraising, and almost bankrupted many hospitals, 
including Mount Sinai. After the creation of Sinai Samaritan, Jewish leaders announced 
plans to preserve a “Jewish identity” at the new facility. However, what was actually 
preserved was a symbol of the core traits of Milwaukee Jewish identity; East and West 
Side Jewish history, philanthropy, and service to the city. 
 
ORGANIZATION AND CHAPTER OUTLINE 
Chapter One of this dissertation discusses the history of the city of Milwaukee and 
Jewish immigration. It examines the history of the first wave Jewish population, the 
foundation of Milwaukee Jewish identity, and their relationship with other Milwaukee 
immigrant groups, including the relatively small West Side Jewish population that settled 
outside of the Germanic neighborhoods. The chapter examines upward social mobility 
experienced by the founders of Mount Sinai and the planning stages of creating the 
hospitals and those organizations and individuals who were instrumental in bringing the 
hospital into being. I include a discussion of the early years of operation, including the 
dedication of the hospital and the board members and volunteers who served. The 
foundation for Jewish commitment to Milwaukee is discussed. In Milwaukee, many first 
wave Jewish immigrants obtained civil rights, something denied to them in their countries 
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of origin. The 1848 European Revolutions failed to secure basic rights of suffrage and 
freedom from punitive taxes for Jewish men.96 This chapter describes the early 
interactions between the East Side and West Side populations in Milwaukee and the 
contentious attempts to establish Jewish houses of worship. The differences in ethnic and 
religious traditions and the actions of the first wave Jewish immigrants toward 
compelling second wave immigrants to adopt an American civil religion led to the 
creation of several synagogues in Milwaukee. The struggle to establish religious 
traditions and congregations cemented the animosity between East and West Side Jewish 
populations. The increased SES of West Side Jews did not automatically remove the 
stigma of being from the West Side. Increased SES, due in part to the business 
opportunities in Milwaukee, made philanthropy possible. This chapter explains the 
history behind the three main traits of Milwaukee Jewish identity.  
Chapter Two details the arrival of the second wave Jewish population, mainly 
Eastern European. This chapter explains how charitable efforts in Milwaukee grew in 
response to the large number of Jewish immigrants, most of them very poor. Mount Sinai 
Hospital and other Jewish organization began during the late 1890s and early 1920s. This 
chapter illustrates the early interactions between East and West Side Jewish populations 
through the charitable efforts created. The history of philanthropy, a Milwaukee identity 
trait, is an integral part of this chapter. The hospital board members and noteworthy 
supporters of the hospital also led relief associations. The important events during these 
years, namely the establishment of the annual Donation Days in 1904 show the strength 
of Jewish contributions to the new hospital.   
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Chapter Three discusses the creation and expansion of Mount Sinai’s Dispensary. 
The literature pertaining to the dispensaries at Mount Sinai New York, Beth Israel in 
Newark, Beth Israel in Boston, Mount Sinai-Chicago, and Michael Reese-Chicago reveal 
the differences and the similarities of urban hospital dispensaries. The contribution of the 
Ladies Auxiliary and the establishment of community ties with other hospitals at the 
Mount Sinai Dispensary created and sustained community health services and training for 
doctors and nurses. Mount Sinai’s leadership attempted to weather the fiscal difficulties 
associated with a worldwide economic downturn by creating a membership program for 
the hospital. The program ended due to the objection of the doctors in Milwaukee.  
Fundraising efforts lagged during this time. The decrease in fundraising activity for 
the hospital in the Jewish community concerned leaders at Mount Sinai. Chapter Four 
takes up the complex merger negotiations between The Passavant and Deaconess, two 
Christian hospitals in Milwaukee. The history of the merger is significant. The two 
hospitals considered merger in order to remain open. The financial problems related to 
changes in both the American hospital system, namely the increase in costs of care, and in 
how care for indigent patients, specifically the creation of Medicaid and Medicare, 
stretched hospital resources. The new government funding programs replaced the historic 
community fundraising at many urban hospitals, including those in Milwaukee.  
The creation of government resources for urban hospitals led to massive renovations 
at many Milwaukee hospitals and also spurred the idea of a regional medical center. 
Local political leaders and groups, namely the GMC, utilized these resources in order to 
build the center. The merger was the result of the political efforts of Milwaukee County 
civic groups to that end. Local leaders parlayed their knowledge of federal and state 
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regulations to gain funding for the project. They also secured state approval for 
construction by facilitating the merger between Passavant and Deaconess. Their plans 
hinged on that merger. Good Samaritan Medical Center, the hospital that Mount Sinai 
merged with in 1987, opened after a merger between The Passavant and Deaconess. The 
protracted process revealed the difficulties associated with the merger process in the early 
1980s. The leadership at the merging hospitals were at odds with the new medical center 
leaders and a great deal of acrimony delayed the final merger decision.  
The creation of the Regional Medical Center in Wauwatosa, Wisconsin occurred 
during the merger of The Passavant and Deaconess. The teaching hospital and a medical 
college located in Wauwatosa competed with Milwaukee hospitals at a time when the 
city’s hospitals needed more patients. The Milwaukee County Hospital moved to the 
grounds of the medical center, leaving Mount Sinai to treat more indigent patients. The 
limitations associated with new government regulation on hospital construction and 
pricing after the creation of the Medicaid program left Mount Sinai with few options after 
the creation of Good Samaritan. 
Chapter Five details the efforts of leaders at Mount Sinai Medical Center to remain 
open after deficits in patient care reimbursements and debt caused by the 1972 expansion. 
Between 1974 and 1979, hospital leaders experimented with the idea making Mount Sinai 
more religiously Jewish as a marketing strategy. The Executive Vice President behind the 
initiative, Raymond Alexander, left Mount Sinai abruptly in 1976, and the initiative was 
tabled. The Regional Medical Complex in Wauwatosa ended plans for establishing Mount 
Sinai as a teaching hospital, so in 1976 leaders established a teaching partnership with the 
University of Wisconsin-Madison. The program was both a blessing and a burden. A 
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blessing in that it allowed Mount Sinai Medical Center to remain in downtown 
Milwaukee and a burden in that the university doctors resulted in conflict between Jewish 
doctors at the hospital and university doctors. This weakened the relationship between the 
hospital and the local doctors. 
 This chapter also describes the circumstances that led to the creation of the 
suburban Milwaukee Jewish population. Jewish families moved to the suburbs, and many 
of their institutions moved with them. These new suburban organizations benefited from 
the time, effort and funds donated by Jewish families. Mount Sinai did not receive the 
time, money and attention it had once enjoyed, but the Jewish population continued to 
support the hospital, but not to the extent it had in the past. The charity balls continued 
into the early 1980s, but the money was redirected from patient care to additions and 
departments at Mount Sinai. Hospital board members continued to serve, despite moving 
away from the city. The Suburban Jewish population did not completely sever their 
relationship with Milwaukee, Mount Sinai remained their responsibility. 
Chapter Six describes the severe financial shortfalls at Mount Sinai and the merger 
decision. One of the most profound changes came in the aftermath of the PL 93-641, 
federal legislation passed in 1974 as part of the Hill-Burton Act. This legislation gave the 
U.S. government the power to set reimbursements on the medical care of Medicaid 
patients through state agencies. The legislation led to Rate Review Boards and state 
control over hospitals in matters of construction and charges for patient care. Hospitals 
did not collect the total cost of care from these programs. Secondly, in 1982, federal 
regulations on Medicare patients automatically disallowed two percent of the total cost of 
care, leaving the care provider responsible for the balance. And finally, the creation of 
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Diagnostic Related Groups (DRGs) and standardized medical coding in the health care 
industry lowered the amount of reimbursement for Medicare patients further. The 
combination of reimbursement deficits and the remodeling debt was unsustainable. The 
1987 merger of Mount Sinai and Good Samaritan took far less time that the 
Passavant/Deaconess agreement. By 1987, Mount Sinai’s leaders sought to keep the 
hospital open, even if it meant merging with another religious hospital. Hospital leaders 
realized that the location of Mount Sinai made it an integral facility for many of 
Milwaukee’s poor patients. The goal was to remain open, not to remain Jewish, and to 
that end, Sinai Samaritan replaced Mount Sinai and Good Samaritan in 1988.97 
The conclusion examines the Milwaukee Jewish community today, and efforts to 
establish a sense of identity. The Milwaukee Jewish Federation held a Jewish Summit in 
2011. The two-day event, held at the Milwaukee Public Museum, sought to bring Jewish 
groups and individuals from the state of Wisconsin together in order to set goals for the 
future of the Jewish population. Accommodations were made to foster the contribution 
and participation of all branches of Judaism, Shabbos and kashrut observance in 
particular, to maximize community input. I include the idea of revisiting the history of the 
Jewish contributions in creating community health care initiatives in Milwaukee. The 
history of the 1935 Dispensary provides an example of how cooperation between 
organizations and agencies, Jewish and Gentile, provided health care for a growing 
number of indigent patients during The Depression. The Affordable Care Act did not 
result in universal health care. The issue of coverage and care for those without is a 
possible avenue for the efforts of the Milwaukee Jewish Federation to encourage Jewish 
collective community action.  
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SOURCES AND METHODOLOGY 
  Archival resources from the Jewish Museum Milwaukee and Golda Meir Library at 
the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee are crucial to understanding this history. The 
Sinai Samaritan Collection and the Jewish Social Services collection provided details 
about the Jewish hospital and Jewish charity efforts in Milwaukee. These two archives 
contain newspaper articles, meeting minutes, and reports. Newspapers in Milwaukee 
provide a context for the actions of the hospital. The Milwaukee Journal, The Milwaukee 
Sentinel, and The Wisconsin Jewish Chronicle published many articles about Mount Sinai 
during its eighty-four year history. The Sinai Samaritan Collection at the Golda Meir 
Library at the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee provided a great deal of data about the 
relationship between the Jewish population and the city of Milwaukee. Newspaper 
clippings, hospital reports and memos, press releases, and a variety of pamphlets 
illustrated the relationship between the decisions made by Mount Sinai’s leaders. They 
acted to continue the hospital’s contribution to the people of Milwaukee, the merger was 
their last act toward continuing the mission of Mount Sinai. The Mount Sinai Collection 
and the archival resources from the Jewish Museum Milwaukee and Golda Meir Library 
at the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee provided a great deal of information about the 
historic relationship between Mount Sinai Hospital and the Jewish community of 
Milwaukee. In particular, this collection includes documents about the attempt to 
establish Mount Sinai as a Jewish hospital, led by Raymond Alexander, between 
1971-1976.  
A special note about the Wisconsin Jewish Chronicle belongs here. This publication 
provided a means to examine the attitudes and positions held by some members of the 
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Jewish community in Milwaukee. During the years of Mount Sinai’s operation, this 
paper’s editors were some of Mount Sinai’s most vocal supporters. Established in 1921, 
the newspaper’s very first editorial stated that it was not interested in solving anything; it 
was created to report on the lives and experiences within the Jewish community in 
Wisconsin. The Chronicle remains in publication and continues to provide information to 
the Jewish community of Wisconsin.98 It reported many of the high and low points of the 
history of Mount Sinai and the efforts to continue on as a Jewish hospital. The Jewish 
Museum Milwaukee Archives holds every edition of the newspaper. 
In addition to the oral histories, the dissertation of sociologist Howard Polsky, The 
Great Defense: A Study of Jewish Orthodoxy in Milwaukee, provided information about 
characteristics of the West Side Jewish population in Milwaukee. Polsky provides a voice 
for the West Side Jewish population. Swichkow and Gartner provided a great deal of 
history about the East Side Jewish experience. Polsky picks up the history of the more 
Orthodox West Side Jewish immigrants.99 The addition of the West Side narrative 
augments the history of the Jewish immigrant experience in Milwaukee. 
The sources listed above were very helpful in providing a great deal of historical data 
for this research. However, oral histories provided by the members of the Milwaukee 
Jewish community, former employees of the hospital, and volunteers offered a contextual 
component to the archive holdings. The voices of the respondents enhance the existing 
archival information. The experiences of those who were kind enough to participate in 
this study reveal the interactions and reactions that elaborated upon the facts reported in 
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newspaper articles. In addition, these histories included information not reported 
elsewhere. They relate the history of community interaction and activism from their 
perspective. The voices of the community complement the archival holdings and allow 
for the community members to elaborate on the printed history.  
Mount Sinai was a Milwaukee nonsectarian Jewish hospital, founded and strongly 
supported by the Jewish population, for the city of Milwaukee Jewish and Gentile alike. It 
served as a symbol of the Jewish value of Tzedakah, operated from a sense of 
benevolence, and a source of community pride in its growth as an innovative and 
respected hospital. For decades, the men and women of the Jewish community raised 
large sums of money through a variety of donation drives, gala events and community 
wide fund raising; served on the Hospital board; and advocated for the hospital through 
their business ventures and contacts. The history of the Jewish contribution to Milwaukee 
begins with the arrival of the first wave East Side Jewish population. 
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CHAPTER 1 THE JEWISH POPULATION IN MILWAUKEE 
This chapter analyzes the creation and relationship between the two separate Jewish 
populations in Milwaukee leading up to the creation of Mount Sinai Hospital in 1903. 
The distinction between them contributed to the creation of the East Side vs. West Side 
populations. The two groups were split along ethnic, socioeconomic, and religious 
differences. However, the differences between the two did not prevent the creation of 
Mount Sinai; rather, they inspired it.  
Milwaukee was a city poised for growth in the 1850s. Jewish immigrants on the East 
Side of the Milwaukee River established businesses and lived among the non-Jewish 
Germanic immigrants. Historian Kathleen Neils Conzen noted that Milwaukee attracted 
both farmers and artisans, lured by the stories of a great deal of economic opportunity for 
those willing to work hard.1 Some of the more prosperous members of this Jewish 
community established Mount Sinai Hospital. Initially, a small West Side Jewish 
population, those that arrived with the East Side Jews in the 1840s and 1850s, were less 
likely to embrace a more American style of Jewish worship and did not settle with the 
others. They created their own congregations apart from the other group. After the arrival 
of the Eastern European immigrants, starting in the late 1880s, the new West Side 
immigrants created one of the largest Jewish neighborhoods in Milwaukee. This chapter 
describes the foundation of the first core characteristic of Milwaukee Jewish identity: 
namely the significance of which side of the Milwaukee River on which immigrants 
settled.  
A discussion detailing the foundation for the strong commitment of the Jewish 
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population to the city of Milwaukee is also included. The demographic characteristics of 
Milwaukee, a large Germanic population chief among them, and civil rights offered to 
certain immigrants in Milwaukee at the time of the arrival of the East Side Jewish 
population fostered a sense of belonging and gratitude within the East Side Jewish 
population. The first wave of Jewish immigrants capitalized on economic opportunities 
and civic freedoms in Milwaukee and founded the East Side Jewish population. The 
success in business ventures created social and cultural capital for members of the East 
Side Jewish population. The increase in SES in the German Jewish immigrant population 
was very important for Mount Sinai.  
Many of these immigrants gained rights and freedoms not available to them in 
Western Europe. The failure of the 1848 revolution did result in a great deal of German 
migration to many American cities, Milwaukee included. Historians Louis J. Swichkow 
and Louis P. Gartner noted that in Milwaukee, support for those involved in the 1848 
revolution in Germany attracted immigrants. They stated, “Another factor [explaining the 
large number of German immigrants in Milwaukee] was the publicized sympathy of 
Milwaukee’s German community for the revolutionary movement in Germany. This 
attracted ‘Forty-eighters’ to Milwaukee in great numbers.”2 John Gurda explained, “The 
famed Forty-Eighters, [sic] many of them well-educated and all of them decidedly liberal, 
suffered exile for their assault on the established order, and Milwaukee became one of 
their American strongholds.”3 The founding members of the East Side Jewish population 
arrived with their Gentile counterparts after the revolution. They settled in Milwaukee 
                                                 
2 Louis J. Swichkow and Louis P. Gartner, The History of the Jews in Milwaukee (Philadelphia, PA: The Jewish 
Publication Society of America, 1963), 10. 
3 John Gurda, One People, Many Paths: A History of Jewish Milwaukee (Milwaukee, WI: Jewish Museum Milwaukee, 
2009), 6. 
 47 
 
and joined the German community. They established many successful businesses in 
Milwaukee because they shared many cultural traits with Gentiles in the city. German 
Jewish businesses grew rapidly, and many East Side Jews experienced a great deal of 
upward economic and social mobility. Swichkow and Gartner noted that “Jews actively 
participated in Milwaukee’s commercial life and contributed heavily to the early 
commercial and industrial development of the city. They were represented among the 
grain dealers and were pioneer Great Lakes shippers. As elsewhere on the Western 
frontier, Jewish peddlers and merchants were prominent, while Jewish manufacturers 
clothed most of Milwaukee and its outlying districts.”4 Both Bourdieu and Goldscheider 
described this experience as the means to both create social and cultural capital, which 
gave a sense of agency to this population to create acceptable cultural standards for 
anyone wishing to achieve upward social mobility and higher SES.5 The fact that they 
arrived first and many enjoyed economic success also established the East Side 
population as the creators of certain norms and acceptable traits within the Jewish 
population. Sociologist Hanni M. Holzman wrote that by virtue of being in Milwaukee 
first, “They could set up their own society where they made the rules.”6 Holzman posited 
that in Milwaukee, East Side Jews found what they had hoped to create in their countries 
of origin: freedom to live among Gentiles and equal rights.7 She noted that as many in 
the East Side population attained wealth and high social status, these traits were included 
to a growing list of certain qualifications that led to acceptance in the German Jewish 
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community as an East Sider.8  
However, what Holzman calls “assimilation” is in fact something quite different. The 
German Jewish East Side population was not assimilating so much as they were both 
acculturating and creating the social norms and mores for their own subculture. The Cult 
of Synthesis, as described by Sarna, best illustrates the early history of Milwaukee’s 
Jewish population. Affluent East Side Jews synthesized Americanism and Jewish identity 
in the context of the city of Milwaukee and created the earliest cultural understandings 
about being a Milwaukee Jew.9 They could acculturate, in part because many of the 
Gentile Germans living in Milwaukee at the time they arrived supported the 1848 
Revolutions taking place in Europe. They were likeminded in the matters of suffrage and 
civil rights.10 However, they did not intermarry in Milwaukee in large numbers or feel 
the need to change their names.11 They focused a great deal of time and effort creating a 
Jewish subculture that allowed them to define and create and later, enforce rules about 
being Jewish in Milwaukee, particularly East Side Milwaukee Jewish status.12  
Economic opportunities allowed the East Side Jews to create Mount Sinai Hospital, 
not just for Jewish patients, but for all those in need.13 The nonsectarian mission of 
Mount Sinai Hospital signified, in part, a commitment to the city on the part of the first 
Jewish immigrants. This commitment represents the second of the three aspects of 
Milwaukee Jewish identity, contributions to the city of Milwaukee. Max Landauer, the 
first president of Mount Sinai Hospital and successful East Side Jewish dry goods 
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businessman, dedicated the hospital in June, 1903, saying, “The urgent necessity of a free 
hospital for the poor and suffering of our city came to us in a practical way as members of 
the Hebrew Relief Association.”14 The commitment to treat all in need in Milwaukee at 
Mount Sinai emanated from a sense of gratitude on the part of the East Side Jews. It was 
an acknowledgment of the rights and opportunities Milwaukee offered to them upon 
arrival. The decades of fundraising efforts and donations of money and volunteer hours 
on the part of the Jewish community continued after many Jewish residents moved from 
Milwaukee. The 1987 merger kept the hospital in the city as a sectarian hospital in order 
to continue the mission of caring for the poor in Milwaukee.15 
The third facet of Milwaukee Jewish identity, the history of philanthropy, is grounded 
in the arrival of the West Side Jews. Milwaukee Jewish philanthropy must include the 
discussion of early Jewish religious practices in Milwaukee. The question of how best to 
describe the religious differences between the first and second wave Jewish immigrants is 
complicated. The sheer number of arrivals challenged relief organizations as well. The 
Jewish relief efforts available in Milwaukee at the turn of the twentieth century grew as 
more Jews from Eastern Europe arrived. The large number of Eastern European 
immigrants in Milwaukee spurred the growth of relief organizations in Milwaukee. The 
creation of relief programs and Mount Sinai Hospital in the early twentieth century was as 
much about acculturating to the accepted synthesis of Jewish and American practices as 
they were about assistance. 
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AMERICAN JUDAISM: CONGREGATIONS AND CONFLICTS 
In 1654, the first group of Jewish immigrants arrived in America. They established 
themselves in New Amsterdam, now New York.16 Two large immigrant waves, the first 
starting in the late 1840s and the second, in the 1880s, established the foundation for the 
Milwaukee Jewish population. I use the terms first and second wave Jewish immigrants 
to describe immigration to Milwaukee during those two periods. The first wave refers to 
the 1840 immigrant members of the Jewish population, the second to those who arrived 
in the 1880s. Religious practices between these first and second wave Jewish immigrants 
were very different in Europe. Those differences created divisions between them after 
they arrived in America. The literature revels that these divisions were not primarily 
about religious observance: many of the issues that led to discord between the groups 
centered on ethnicity and class. These differences often manifested themselves in 
religious terms. The early use of the term “Orthodoxy” in some sources used for this 
research took on various social meanings, some quite pejorative. At the time of the 
meeting of first and second wave Jewish immigrants in American cities, in the late 1800s 
and early 1900s, the term Orthodox tended to describe immigrants from the smaller cities 
of Central and Eastern Europe and the less secularized. That is, the term often reflected 
where that person was from and any secular education they had before arriving in 
America. There were social implications stemming from that particular status. In this 
sense, historian Jeffrey S. Gutrock found that the term Orthodox became synonymous 
with Yiddish speaking immigrants with little formal education outside of the synagogue. 
Members of American Reform congregations believed that secular education and 
acculturated religious practice increased the likelihood of social and economic upward 
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mobility.17 Historian Avaham Barkai believed that the earlier the arrival in America, the 
more likely the Jewish immigrant would eventually practice a form of Reform Judaism.18 
This form of Jewish practice differed from that of those arriving from Eastern Europe. 
When large numbers of Eastern European Jews began arriving between 1880 and 1914, 
Barkai noted that American Jewish communities acted to acculturate the new arrivals if 
possible, “The now urgent aim was to wean the newcomers, or at least their children from 
their alien ways.”19 He stated that there was a fear among those in the first wave Jewish 
population that the Eastern European Jewish arrivals threatened their social status and 
achievements in their communities.20 The first wave Jewish American feared the loss of 
their hard earned social and cultural capital. That fear influenced relief efforts for the new 
arrivals.  
Barkai noted that these new immigrants did not quickly adopt the trappings of 
American Jewish life, “The new immigrants did not share the German’s passion for rapid 
Americanization. They gathered in ethnic neighborhoods and tried to benefit from what 
America had to offer without relinquishing their traditions.”21 However, Gurock found 
that for many of the immigrants in the second wave, the decline in traditional observance 
began well before they actually considered leaving Europe. Many Jews living in Eastern 
Europe worked on the Sabbath, despite social pressure against such actions.22 He 
observed that for some second wave Jewish immigrants, their desire to look and act like 
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other Americans led to their decision to change their dress and appearance.23 Men shaved 
their beards and payes, married women removed their head coverings, sometimes 
throwing them overboard as their ship docked at Ellis Island.24 
Historian Eli Faber wrote that the earliest Jewish immigrants realized their freedom to 
follow whatever religious traditions they wish, indeed, they were free to create their own. 
This applied to both Reform and Orthodox practices. In America, no central Rabbinical 
court or leader dictated the religious traditions, as they did in Europe,  
Moreover, it was the complete lack of need for a universal Jewish community that 
undermined all claims to hegemony. The authority of the autonomous kehillah 
(community) of Europe arose from its function as intermediary between the 
Jewish population and the government and from its responsibility to provide for 
the welfare of a population burdened with civil disabilities. In the tolerant 
atmosphere of English North America, in contrast, the Jewish population was 
neither required nor ever instructed to provide an official entity to represent it and 
to which all Jews must consequently be subordinated. The Jewish colonist was 
free to associate voluntarily with the Jewish community or not, whatever its 
pretensions to universal authority may have been.25  
 
This situation also limited the amount of power any single congregation could expect 
to hold in a given city. This freedom reduced the amount of control any religious leader 
could expect over his congregation.26 In New York, there were congregations founded by 
Dutch, Bohemian, English, German immigrants by the 1850s. They opened when 
immigrants could not or would not join the Sephardic and Ashkenazic congregations 
established by America’s earliest Jewish immigrants.27 In Boston, two congregations 
developed in the South and North End neighborhoods, the more affluent original 
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synagogue in the North, and the more “traditional” congregation in the South.28 In Fort 
Worth, Texas, the relocation of the more traditional orthodox shul, Ahavath Sholom to 
the center of the city to attract new members inspired the creation of a Reform 
congregation, Beth-El.29 In Chicago, an Orthodox shul was established by a former 
peddler turned successful businessman, Abraham Kohn, in order to provide kosher meat 
for his elderly mother, who refused to eat anything trafe .30  
The term Orthodox is used by sociologist Howard W. Polsky, in his dissertation about 
Milwaukee, to describe the traditional mostly Eastern European Orthodox religious 
observance of Judaism.31 That specific type of Judaism was not a large part of the early 
Jewish immigrant experience in Milwaukee. Gurock noted that “Amidst the multitude of 
immigrants who made partial peace with Jewish tradition as they strove to adjust and 
succeed in America, there was a coterie of deeply devoted Jews who rigorously kept the 
commandments.”32 There were more traditional European Jewish immigrants in the 
second wave of the late 1800s, but they did not settle in Milwaukee. 
Scholars have noted that the Jewish immigrants arriving between 1880 and 1920 were 
possibly less likely to remain Orthodox in America. Historian Eli Faber noted that many 
European Orthodox Jews heeded the warnings of their rabbis about the dangers to 
Orthodox traditions in the Trafe Medina (unclean country) of America. The more Orthodox 
Europeans likely remained in Europe.33 Historian Jonathan Sarna remarked that “All Jews, 
to be sure, did not join the leftward swing [to Reform Judaism]. Every major Jewish 
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community continued to maintain one or more traditional congregations.”34 The Jews that 
arrived in Milwaukee and labeled Orthodox by Polsky did not retain many of their religious 
customs once settled. The histories of Congregation B’ne Jeshurun on the West Side and 
Emanu-El on the East Side of the Milwaukee River, illustrate the relatively brief period of 
time some immigrants of the first wave Jewish population practiced a more traditional 
form of Judaism. Swichkow and Gartner explained that “Although B’ne Jeshurun had left 
Orthodoxy by the later 1860s, its brand of Reform Judaism was very halting. As the sole 
congregation, it was an arena for contests between traditionalists and proponents of 
completely Reform belief and practice.”35 The Reform minded Milwaukee Jews broke 
from the congregation and formed the Reform synagogue Emanu-El.36 Gurock 
mentioned B’ne Jeshurun, describing it as a congregation that had “surrendered” to more 
American Reform Jewish practices by the late 1850s. The influence of Rabbi Isaac Wise, 
proponent of the American Reform Movement, spurred changes at what was once 
considered Milwaukee’s Orthodox synagogue. Wise viewed the adoption of mixed 
seating [men and women sitting together] and music played on Shabbos as indications 
that the dissenters had seen the advantages of adopting “modern” views on the issue of 
Jewish rituals.37 Gurock noted that by 1870, almost all Americanized congregations had 
turned away from European Orthodoxy.38 The arrival of the second wave Jewish 
immigrants challenged these newly established religious traditions of first wave 
immigrants in American cities. By the time the second wave arrived, many members of 
Milwaukee’s Jewish population achieved upward social and economic mobility. This was 
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made possible by the favorable economic climate for Jews in the city and the religious 
freedom to define their Judaism.  
 
A CITY OF OPPORTUNITY 
In 1839, the two original settlements, Juneautown and Kilbourntown, after a series of 
conflicts between founders Solomon Juneau and Byron Kilbourn over political decisions, 
together formed the Town of Milwaukee.39 Until 1840, white migrants from New York 
State or New England, known as Yankee-Yorkers, represented the majority in 
Milwaukee.40 Historian Bayrd Still described a demographic shift Milwaukee at this time: 
“In the middle forties, Teutonia began to challenge Yankee-dom and European 
migration.”41 A large number of Germanic immigrants arrived in Milwaukee. These 
immigrants began to “transform the tone of what had been predominantly a 
Yankee-Yorker village; by 1843 a Germanic influence that was to reach its peak by the 
end of the century had already begun to make itself felt.”42 The new immigrants from 
Germanic regions of Europe arrived in Milwaukee and established a large ethnic enclave 
in Milwaukee.43 Historian Bayrd Still noted, “By 1843 it was evident that the 
increasingly numerous German-Americans were going to assume a positive role in 
developing village culture.”44 The result of this immigrant wave was the creation of one 
of the largest Germanic settlements in America. The influence of the immigrants on the 
city’s landscape and the association between Milwaukee and German immigrants resulted 
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in the nickname Deutsche Athens (German Athens) for the city, signifying a city in 
America where German culture met American democracy and freedom.45 
The fact that a large number of Germanic immigrants settled in Milwaukee was not 
happenstance. An outreach program established by both the town of Milwaukee and the 
State of Wisconsin advertised the industrial and agricultural opportunities in Wisconsin in 
order to draw immigrants. Bayrd Still recorded that pamphlets and circulars written in 
German to attract immigrant workers were distributed in many European countries.46 
Still noted that the outreach to Germanic immigrants was so successful that, “As a result, 
in many parts of Germany more was known about the Badger State than about an 
outlying Prussian province.”47 Milwaukee’s German immigrants wrote to relatives in 
Europe about the opportunities in Milwaukee and urged them to emigrate. Still reported 
the results of the outreach in term of increased immigrant numbers: “The earliest German 
immigrants began to arrive in 1835, and the remainder of the decade saw scattering 
arrivals, among them a party of German carpenters, who had come at the solicitation of 
Juneau; Matthias Stein, whom Juneau induced to stay; and Louis Trayser, whom the 
shipbuilder George Barber persuaded to build an inn for his workers: ‘Zur Deutschen 
Little Tavern.’48 However, Still concluded that during this time, a “push/pull” dynamic 
brought more immigrants to America. The failed revolutions in Europe and the expanding 
economic opportunities in America increased the number of immigrants. Still found that 
in the North Central sections of the United States the number of arrivals totaled 280,000 
by 1850.49 Immigration numbers rose in Milwaukee. Still that between 200 and 300 
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German immigrants were arriving weekly in the 1840s; and soon young Germans from 
Chicago were visiting Milwaukee to find themselves brides.50 In the summers of 1843 
and 1844, the numbers grew to 1,000 to 1400.51 The city of Milwaukee and the state of 
Wisconsin encouraged German immigration after the European Revolutions in 1848.52 
Many European Jews immigrated to Milwaukee in order to escape the severe restrictive 
laws passed after the revolution ended. Milwaukee offered civic freedoms and the 
outreach efforts of the region brought the founding members of what became the East 
Side Jewish residents to Milwaukee.  
 
REVOLUTION AND RELOCATION 
 The European Revolutions of 1848 began when revolutionaries deposed French 
King Louis-Philippe in Paris on February 25, 1848. Revolts in Vienna quickly followed 
the Paris unrest. Historian Eton Amos notes that “It had started in Paris and Vienna, and 
from there it was now leaping with remarkable speed to the main German cities. Across 
Europe, the declared aim of the rebels was to put an end to despotism and to the 
inequalities under the law.”53 In May of 1848, a revolution nicknamed a “spring of 
nations” sought, among other goals, civil rights for Jews in some European regions. 
Initially, some governments granted suffrage rights for Jewish men. Some leaders passed 
new edicts which lifted restrictions on Jewish students at universities, in order to avoid 
losing political power. The Jewish male population held equal rights for a brief time. 
However, leaders rescinded the rights granted during 1848 revolution after the revolution 
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ended. By December 1848, the revolutions ended and the new Jewish suffrage rights 
were revoked. Jewish government participation ended, and new edicts limited their 
opportunities even more than before the revolution.54 These losses increased Jewish 
emigration. 
Wisconsin’s liberal suffrage rights encouraged foreign immigrants by giving them the 
right to vote after one year’s residence.55 The right of suffrage was established in 1847 for 
immigrants who were “one-year residents, including white males, twenty-one years of 
age, who had declared their intention to become citizens.”56 The outreach efforts of civic 
and business interests in Milwaukee and the state of Wisconsin to German settlers in the 
1850s and 1860s, combined with the failed revolutionary movement in Europe in the late 
1840s drew many “Forty-eighters” to Milwaukee. Still explained, “The impact of the 
Forty-eighters on the developing urban society was chiefly significant for the cultural and 
intellectual ferment which they stirred up in the already cohesive German community.”57 
The first wave immigrants created debating societies, lodges, schools, and newspapers in 
addition to their businesses. They created an intellectual subculture in Milwaukee, but they 
were held in beer gardens than in European style salons, a reflection of the acceptance of 
Milwaukee German cultural practice.58  
The early East Side Jewish community was part of that immigration population. They 
settled in neighborhoods with other like-minded Gentiles, many of whom supported the 
1848 revolutions.59 The fact that the city of Milwaukee had a large Germanic influence at 
the time the first wave Jewish immigrants arrived is noteworthy. The fact that some first 
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wave Jewish immigrants spoke German and considered themselves assimilated Jews in 
Europe made their experience in Milwaukee vastly different from that of the second wave. 
The first wave Jewish immigrants were able to establish their homes and themselves in 
Milwaukee’s Germanic neighborhoods because they shared common cultural traits with 
Germanic Gentiles. This allowed them to join the community and facilitated their 
entrance into German neighborhoods. Swichkow and Gartner noted that, “These Jews 
came during the heyday of German immigration to the United States between 1845 and 
1857.”60 They cited the restrictions placed upon Jews in German and a depression in 
1850, coupled with reprisals from the failed 1848 revolution as explanation for the 
increase in German immigration to America.61   
The East Side Jews settled in a neighborhood established by the 1840 immigrants that 
Still described as “German town” which was a “self-contained and self-conscious 
community centered in the Second, Sixth, and Nineteen wards” founded in cultural and 
civic solidarity.62 The East Side Jews lived among the Second Ward’s non-Jewish 
population. The neighborhood grew and eventually included areas in the Second, Sixth, 
and Ninth wards, where German-style houses, German signs, and the German people made 
their homes and businesses and political parties.63 Milwaukee Germans created 
associations, lodges, clubs, as well as beer halls and taverns in the city. They established 
businesses, places of worship, and schools. Still notes that immigrants born in German 
regions made up one third of Milwaukee’s population by 1870 and concluded, “As a 
result, the coordinate German society within the developing city was in many ways the 
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most distinctive feature of mid-century Milwaukee.”64  
The Milwaukee East Side Jewish community arrived at a time when the city wanted 
immigrants. The large number of arrivals from Germanic regions after 1848, both Jewish 
and Gentile, spoke German in their homes and places of worship and business concerns.65 
The East Side Jewish population established themselves in business ventures due in great 
part, to the characteristics of Milwaukee described previously and three fortuitous factors 
in Milwaukee after 1848. First, they arrived in Milwaukee with a large, culturally-similar 
non-Jewish cohort. Second, many Jewish immigrants acculturated themselves in 
Milwaukee by learning English. Finally, Milwaukee did not restrict their civil rights and 
provided them with the opportunities denied in their countries of origin. Harry Kanin 
described the situation as “a perfect storm” for the East Side Jewish immigrants. 
Milwaukee was a city open to secular and educated immigrants. Kanin explained, “They 
came together with other Germans and were able to succeed.”66 The civic freedoms for 
Jewish immigrants in Milwaukee afforded them the opportunities to build successful 
businesses and establish professional practices. The economic opportunities in 
Milwaukee in the later 1840s facilitated the growth of the Jewish upper class.  
 
BUSINESS OPPORTUNITIES  
The East Side Jews synthesized their Jewish practices so thoroughly that they were 
almost indistinguishable from non-Jewish immigrants in their work, habits, language and 
enterprises. They joined the earlier German immigrants in their established neighborhoods. 
Indeed, they were often identified most readily with the German community as a whole. 
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Swichkow and Gartner noted that the Wisconsin State Census of 1855, which listed 
residents by wards, showed that most Jews lived alongside Gentiles in the Second Ward.67  
Many of the East Side Jewish immigrants started their own businesses. Sociologist 
Hanni M. Holzman noted that many of these first wave Jews were from the European 
middle class, hoping to secure permanent civil rights and the freedom to establish 
businesses without government restrictions.68 Historian John Gurda noted that in 
Milwaukee, “Jews showed an unmistakable preference for independent business. In a 
sample of eighteen immigrants who came to Milwaukee between 1845 and 1850 and lived 
in the city for at least five years, all eighteen were operating their own businesses in 1855, 
selling groceries, clothing, dry goods, liquor, tin ware, and even ice, often in association 
with relatives.”69 The historic European restrictions on Jewish economic activity explain 
the prevalence of Milwaukee Jewish businesses. Gurda noted, “The Jewish predisposition 
to business was the product not of genetics but of history. After experiencing the 
capriciousness and often the viciousness of their host societies for hundreds of years– the 
Spanish Inquisition and the English and French expulsion decrees come to mind– Europe’s 
Jews had learned self-reliance the hard way.”70 Jewish families established businesses 
which offered jobs to new arrivals. Children grew up in the family enterprises. They staffed 
clerking positions in stores and piecework in clothing factories. Their economic success 
was a source of community pride. Jewish businesses in the dry goods, grocery, clothing and 
textiles flourished in Milwaukee.71 The success of Jewish businesses was such that 
Swichkow and Gartner noted, “of the 196 businesses exceeding $200,000 in 1894, eighteen 
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of them were Jewish. Four of the 62 in the $200,000 were Jewish. Six of the 50 in the 
$300,000 bracket– Landaur, Smith-Mendel Scheftels, G. Patek, H.S Mack and National 
Knitting Company– were the property of Jews. The Gimbel Brothers and Henry Stern, 
were the only Jewish businesses among the 25 with net worth over $400,000 and the 
Pereles Brothers and J.E Friend belonged among the 25 enterprises in the $500,000 
group.”72 These businesses included clothing and textile factories, dry goods and groceries, 
and retail shops. Sons of immigrant founders continued the family tradition of business 
ownership.73 By 1895, most clothing factories in Milwaukee were Jewish-owned. In 
addition, Jewish families opened department stores and groceries and dry goods stores 
throughout the city. Gimbel’s Department Stores in particular grew rapidly in Milwaukee 
and spread into other cities in Wisconsin. Swichkow and Gartner noted, “Local merchants 
could hardly keep pace the seven Gimbel brothers who advertised their wares.”74 Henry 
Friend and David Adler were among those local merchants, each of them successful. 
Adler’s corporation employed 800 by the 1890s and had sales in excess of one hundred 
thousand dollars. It employed many Jewish workers for manufacturing and sales 
positions.75 Julius Lando was a jeweler as well as a merchant in the optical trade. He was 
joined by his brother, Max, an optician, and established an eye-wear business in 
Milwaukee.76 
Jewish men also held elected public offices in Milwaukee. Baruch Weil was elected as 
a Democratic State Senator in 1853. He remained in office until 1857. Jewish Aldermen 
held office in Wards 1, 2, 4, 6, 8 and 9, Lewis Mack, Isaac Neustadtl, Louis Rindskopf, 
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Fred Adler, Bernard Leidersdorf and M. Heiman respectively.77 Leopold Hammel, a 
founding member of the Mount Sinai Hospital Board, was elected as District Attorney in 
1892. The Jewish contribution to Milwaukee politics increased in the twentieth century.78 
The Jewish professional class in Milwaukee did not grow as quickly as the business 
class. The position of lawyer was one of the few professional careers open to Jews. One of 
the first professionals was Nathan Pereles, a lawyer in the investment business.79 Jewish 
doctors in particular struggled to establish practices in Milwaukee. There were few Jewish 
doctors educated in the United States by 1880, only two Jewish doctors practicing in 
Milwaukee, Dr. Louis Adler and Dr. Jacob Mendel, were both educated in Europe. The lack 
of opportunities for Jewish doctors in Milwaukee was a problem.80 Jewish doctors were 
barred from practicing medicine at existing hospitals in Milwaukee. Milwaukee’s Jewish 
doctors needed a hospital to establish medical practices. However, despite the large number 
of Jewish businesses, Milwaukee Jewish institutions, namely synagogues, took longer to 
establish. The Jewish population in Milwaukee created charitable organizations in the late 
1880s that led to the creation of Mount Sinai Hospital. In addition, Milwaukee Jews 
established several congregations, each representing the cultural differences within the 
Jewish population. 
Jewish businesses grew quickly, but the establishment of formal Jewish religious 
practices and institutions in Milwaukee proved difficult. This process took more time. 
Before any synagogue was built, Milwaukee’s Jewish community purchased a burial 
ground, Imanu-Al Cemetery, which indicated an intent to establish a community.81 
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Historian Hasia Diner noted,  
Nearly all of the congregations that served the nearly American Jews began as informal 
groups. It took time for the Jews to decide that they were staying in America and needed 
permanent institutions. This decision often took place when the Jews of a community 
realized that they needed a cemetery. While all that was required to conduct Jewish 
prayer services was a space and a minyan (ten men to pray together), a Jewish cemetery 
signified the desire to stay.82  
 
Jewish burials were recorded in Milwaukee as early as 1848. Swichkow and Gartner 
explained that, “While land was probably not purchased before 1854, arrangements must 
already have existed in 1848 for the ultimate acquisition of that land.”83 The Jewish 
residents of Milwaukee had a communal burial ground but did not have a synagogue.  
The early Jewish services were informal. The first communal Jewish service recorded 
in Milwaukee was on Yom Kippur in 1847. It was held in a room in Isaac Neustadtl’s 
home.84 The Imanu-Al Cemetery Association spurred the creation of the first Milwaukee 
Congregation, Imanu-Al, in 1849. However, no building was built or purchased; the 
congregation initially met in a room over the grocery of Nathan Pereles.85  
There were differences between members of the first wave Jewish immigrants in 
matters of religious observance. Diner noted that these differences are often obscured by 
the overly broad strokes applied to first wave Jewish immigration. There were distinct 
differences in cultural understandings and religious traditions within the first wave Jewish 
cohort. These differences resulted in conflict when building congregations.86 The 
contention over established religious observance in Milwaukee stemming from those 
differences was such that Milwaukee’s Jewish community eventually supported several 
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congregations to meet the religious needs of the relatively small Jewish community. 
 
BUILDING JEWISH CONGREGATIONS IN MILWAUKEE 
The process of creating Jewish congregations in America was often quite contentious. 
The social, economic, and religious differences, often along ethnic lines, made any broad 
consensus about Jewish practice and prayer almost impossible. Nomenclature was a matter 
of great concern. The difference between establishing a “temple” as opposed to a “shul” 
signified an ethnic, and often, socioeconomic divide. The term temple denoted a 
congregation that was predominantly German Jewish, and usually more affluent. Shuls 
were created by more traditionally practicing Jewish immigrants.87 In contrast to Europe, 
American cities, including Milwaukee did not have civil restrictions preventing Jews from 
creating synagogues. The city of Milwaukee was accepting of religious diversity. 
Swichkow and Gartner noted that, “Religious diversity marked Milwaukee from its earliest 
years. During its village era, about twelve different church organizations were born.”88  
The lack of religious oversight by a central religious figure or governing body in 
Milwaukee led to the creation of a number of synagogues before the second wave West 
Side Jewish immigrants arrived. Small congregations, split primarily by ethnic differences, 
sprang up in Milwaukee, starting in the 1850s. In fact, the sheer number of individual 
congregations came as a surprise to Jewish visitors. Rabbi Isaac Mayer Wise, a major 
leader in the American Reform movement, noted that in 1856, 200 families supported three 
congregations. He hoped to unify the Milwaukee Jewish population by establishing a 
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single Reform congregation.89 The first wave Jewish population in Milwaukee established 
small congregations before 1880. Some sought to Americanize Jewish practice and others 
incorporated rituals based on their ethnic practices. Most did not last long.  
By the time the West Side Jewish immigrants arrived in Milwaukee there were two 
main synagogues in Milwaukee. Emanu-El was considered more American in its services 
and B’ne Jeshurun retained some European practices. Neither practiced Judaism in the 
ways of the second wave West Side Jewish immigrants. Sociologist Howard W. Polsky 
noted that      
Rarely has the dialectic of religious change manifested such clear-cut lines 
as in the German Jewish community of Milwaukee in the years stretching 
from 1847-1927. At first there were only Orthodox synagogues. The usual 
splits and combinations took place until in 1860 there emerged a united 
synagogue with modern tendencies. When the next split took place (the 
antithesis) in 1869, a complete break was made with the Orthodox ritual 
by a small dissident group.90 
 
The “usual splits” refers to the differences within and between synagogues in Milwaukee. 
These occurred when members left congregations in protest of any changes they did not 
support. In the case of Milwaukee, the “small dissident group” described by Polsky 
eventually broke from B’ne Jeshurun and formed the East Side “Reform Congregation 
Emanu-El,” which eventually became the largest and wealthiest synagogue in 
Milwaukee.91 
As the Milwaukee Jewish population increased, the small, informal congregation 
meetings in rooms above stores could no longer accommodate worshipers. Some Jewish 
individuals began to plan for a facility of their own to conduct services. However, the East 
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Side Jewish population as a whole did not quickly build a single central synagogue. 
Swichkow and Gartner remarked that, “A few of the ‘most spirited,’ Jewish citizens 
believed that the time had arrived to erect a synagogue. They subscribed a sum to buy a site, 
hoping that Jews elsewhere in the city would also come to their aid. However, more 
cautions members preferred to renovate an existing building for several hundred dollars. A 
contemporary criticized the ‘nonchalance’ which retarded the progress of this pioneer 
congregation, and the absence of ‘the vital spark’ to enliven and enlarge it.”92  
The delay in building a formal synagogue in Milwaukee is noteworthy in that in 
Europe, the synagogue was integral to Jewish life. Polsky writes, 
 
The synagogue was the gathering place for all extended family celebrations. 
After the religious service marking the bris, (circumcision rite) and engagement, 
wedding, a bar mizyah, [sic] a graduation, and so on, the people of the shtetl 
would gather in the hall, usually in the back of the synagogue. There they 
performed the blessings over food, and consumed the gefillte [sic] fish, chaleh 
[sic], sponge cake and wine and whiskey, sang songs, and conversed. The 
synagogue was the chief dispenser of honors in the community. Individuals of 
high status sat against the Eastern Wall of the synagogue. They would be called 
up to the Torah reading at preferred times. Such persons would be called upon to 
utter special prayers during the major holidays, and would assume the important 
offices in the synagogue and the various associations connected with it.93 
 
Historian Ewa Morawska observed that in the Eastern European shtetls, the shul was 
central to the whole community.94 The diversity within the Jewish immigrant population 
led to a great deal of contention and many shuls. Sarna noted that in large Jewish urban 
population centers, those Jews that did not wish to worship at any of the available 
congregations formed one to their liking.95 Gurock noted that the many early American 
shuls, established from the 1850s and into the next century, represented a place where some 
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European immigrants found spiritual and social sustenance upon arrival to cities with 
diverse religious traditions. He called them “Landsmanshaft synagogues” and described 
them as “small storefront congregations” that incorporated familiar rituals and practices 
along ethnic lines.96 The term Landsmanshaft, as defined by Sarna, refers to the 
organizations and associations formed by immigrants from the same area. He noted that the 
goal of these Landsmanshaft groups was to unite the Jewish population based on shared 
ethnic ties.97 The Landsmanshaft shuls sought to do the same. These congregations served 
the needs of Jewish immigrants in American cities, including those in Milwaukee. They 
prayed as they had in Europe, and in doing so, recalled the traditions of their country of 
origin. In these early congregations, immigrants from all over Central and Eastern Europe 
established social ties that extended to life outside the shul.98  
Neighborhoods provided the foundation for many of these smaller congregations.99 
They also, inadvertently, linked the traditional European prayers and rituals with a lower 
SES. By 1920, the descendants of the first Eastern European Jews established religious 
practices different from their fathers. Gurock remarked that, by this time, the early 
Landsmanshaft congregations had given way to more Americanized institutions. He 
identified a specific type of synagogue, the Proto-American Synagogue of the 1890s, using 
Kehal Adath Jeshurun on New York’s Lower East Side as an example of the rapid change 
in some immigrant congregations. He considered such institutions as “halfway houses” in 
the history of American Jewish synagogues. They represented the holding place for 
American Jews at a time of increased upheaval cause, in part by differences in religious 
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traditions between first and second wave Jewish populations. These halfway houses of 
worship sustained their Jewish congregations as they made the transition from Eastern 
European traditional worship to a form of Judaism that reflected the acceptance of 
American social behaviors.100 Services included sections held in English, conducted by 
rabbis that, more often than not, had been trained in America, “There, while sitting still 
during services and participating, they could taste the world of their parent’s religious past 
through familiar hymns and the unchanged basic prayers without doing violence to their 
growing identities as Americans.”101 Members of these types of congregations concerned 
themselves with public perceptions of their services as well as the content of the services. 
Proper behavior was strictly enforced; worshipers were to remain quiet in order to avoid 
giving the wrong impression to any Christians that may have passed by during services.102   
This was certainly true in Milwaukee synagogues. Creating any synagogue was a 
complicated process. Before any decision was made to create a synagogue, the first step 
was to decide what kind of Judaism would be practiced. That decision took a bit of time. 
The attempt to create a synagogue in Milwaukee in the late 1840s revealed that while it is 
true that many of the immigrants in this wave, Jews and Gentile alike, did share many 
aspects of German culture, some Jews in this wave that were more traditionally religious 
and less secular that the “Reform” Jews associated with the East Side immigrant wave.103 
Historian Hasia Diner writes, “Complications emerge as historians look more closely at 
who migrated and why [in the first wave]. Many of the ‘German’ Jews who left for 
America before 1880 came from Polish provinces like Silesia and Posen, which had been 
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annexed by Prussia and later incorporated into Germany. On paper, these Jews seemed to 
be German, and indeed many described themselves that way. But the term does little to 
convey their poverty, their religious traditionalism, and the kinds of Jewish communities 
they left behind. Even their language [Yiddish] linked them to the later group of 
immigrants.”104 That was certainly a factor in the difficulty between Jewish immigrants in 
Milwaukee in the 1840s and 1850s. The differences between members in the first wave of 
Jewish immigrants became evident when the Jewish community tried to establish a 
synagogue.  
There was a more religiously traditional segment in the first wave Jewish population in 
Milwaukee. They arrived with Jews who identified themselves as Reform and made their 
religious observance part of their Jewish identity. In response, the more traditional 
members of the Jewish population created a number of small congregations along ethnic 
lines. However, they were not as traditional in religious observance as the second wave 
Jewish immigrants. The most observant Jewish people in Milwaukee before 1888 were still 
not as traditional as the second wave immigrants.105 What is significant about this 
difference within the first wave is that the differences in observance within the first wave 
disappeared rapidly. Himmelfarb described this process as self-identifying, a means of 
accepting and practicing social behaviors.106 The more traditional Jews arriving in the first 
wave adopted cultural practices of the more Reform Jews as part of their identity at a faster 
pace than the later arrivals. 
Establishing a congregation was a complex process, prone to conflict between 
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founding members. One of the more important and potentiality contentious decisions to be 
made was what kind of Minhag, or regional religious customs, to use for services in the 
new congregation in Milwaukee. It was an important decision. Swichkow and Gartner 
explained that, “The adoption of a particular Minhag implied the predominance of 
immigrants from that European region, and thus was a matter of pride for each group.”107 It 
is because of these distinct ethnic differences within the first wave Milwaukee Jewish 
population that the Minhag decision was difficult. Some members “insisted on the Polish 
Minhag, and organized Ahabath Emuno (Love of the Faith) in January, 1854, for ‘the 
promotion of a love and knowledge of our religion.”108 These Jews were part of the 
German immigration wave but ethnically Polish, thus considered different from the 
Germanic Reform Jews; often the term Orthodox signified those differences. They were 
distinct in matters of dress and many of the men wore beards, unlike the members of the 
Reform Jewish congregation. Ahabath Emuno lost some congregants after adopting the 
Polish Minhag; advocates of the German Minhag seceded and formed a third religious 
group, Anshe Emeth (Men of Truth) in 1855.109 
According to Swichkow and Gartner, the East Side Jews felt the use of the Polish 
Minhag showed these first wave Jews to be “stabile [sic] Orthodox Jews. . .all they wish for 
is to repeat the same Piutim (liturgical poems) in the same order exactly, as their fathers did. 
The criticism itself hints at the Reform tendencies not far beneath the surface.”110 
Members of East Side Jewish community adopted Reform Judaism that was in fact, 
brought to America from Europe. Diner noted, “In Berlin, Hamburg, and other German 
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cities, beginning in the second decade of the nineteenth century, groups of laypeople and a 
growing number of university-educated rabbis launched reforms that would in time 
become the Reform Movement. This movement, aided by the relative freedoms from 
rabbinical restrictions in America, meant that religious reform from strict Orthodoxy to a 
less observant form of Judaism was not only possible, but in some cases, preferable.”111 
Reform Judaism was the religious tradition of the East Side Jewish community. They 
established Congregation Imanu-Al in 1850. The effect of these religious ethnic 
differences was that by 1856, 200 Jewish families were supporting three Milwaukee 
synagogues.112 The East Side Jewish community solidified their commitment to Reform 
Judaism with the assistance of Rabbi Isaac Mayer Wise, a strong advocate of the Reform 
Judaism Movement in America.113 In the 1880s, Milwaukee’s East Side Jewish practices 
were more Reform than European traditional, but a few small congregations continued to 
serve the more traditional members in the city. 
 
REFORM JUDAISM IN MILWAUKEE 
 Rabbi Isaac Mayer Wise was a strong proponent of the Reform Movement. He was 
raised in a European Jewish environment in his native Bohemia. Once in America, “he 
quickly fell in step with the American zeitgeist, one that saw the creation of hundreds of 
new denominations and that asserted the right of Americans to create the religious practices 
they wanted.”114 The absence of any central rabbinical authority in America facilitated his 
movement to create an American Reform Jewish tradition. Rabbis in America acted as 
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representatives of Jewish congregations, not authority figures. They did not have authority 
to make binding unilateral decisions. They lacked the power conferred upon them in 
Europe. Rabbis in Europe were appointed as leaders and acted as emissaries between 
Jewish populations and government officials. American rabbis did not have that 
authority.115 Wise advocated for the Reform movement in America, but he did not have the 
resources to establish Reform as the accepted form of Judaism for any population. 
Wise’s actions at his first congregation, Beth El in Albany, New York, revealed his 
interpretation of and vision for American Reformed Judaism. He added music to the 
service, something forbidden in Orthodox Judaism. The music was performed by a mixed 
male-female choir at a time when men and women did not even sit together. When his lay 
board fired him in 1850, he and a group of his followers in Albany founded a Reform 
congregation, Anshe Emeth, the first in America to do away with sex-segregated seating.116 
The East Side Jewish population in Milwaukee adopted Reform Judaism as a means of 
Jewish observance that allowed them to define their Jewish practice, without looking or 
acting very differently from Gentile Germans.117 Until the immigration wave of the 1880s 
began, Reform Judaism represented a form of Jewish religious observance that 
acculturated Jews adopted as part of a larger Gentile European immigrant group.118 It 
became part of Milwaukee’s East Side Jewish identity through the adoption of American 
Reform Jewish rituals.119 Their particular form of Jewish practice allowed them to 
maintain their social status and social capital while remaining Jewish, effectively 
synthesizing their American and Jewish traits. 
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The support of Rabbi Wise profoundly affected the Milwaukee Jewish Reform 
movement. According to Sociologist Howard J. Polsky, Wise believed that more Orthodox 
Jewish rituals and traditions brought to America from Europe stymied American Jews.120 
Wise told one audience, “As severely as I have attacked the impertinence and wickedness 
of Atheism, I have also rebuked the benumbed and senseless conservatism which not only 
gives birth to atheism, but also tears into fractions the house of Israel.”121 Polsky believed 
Wise inspired the Reform movement in Milwaukee: “His appearance [in 1856] was 
Milwaukee Jewry’s first contact with the forthright, persuasive exponent of Reform 
Judaism, and it left an effect.”122 However, Goldscheider noted that the likelihood of 
widespread acceptance of Reform practices by the more traditional members of the first 
wave was high, especially in areas where Jewish populations achieved upward social 
mobility.123    
Swichkow and Gartner believed that Milwaukee Jewish orthodoxy almost disappeared 
between the 1860s and 1880s. They note that only Anshe Emes continued to incorporate 
European traditional rituals. Polsky believes that the history of orthodoxy in Milwaukee 
during that same time period is missing. He noted that  
Before 1859, when the German-Jewish population could not 
have numbered more than several hundred families, three 
separate Orthodox congregations had been started. Each of 
them began in a home, and subsequently moved either to a 
building convertible to a synagogue or to a new structure. In 
1859 the three combined and the. Members conducted services 
in a new synagogue on Fifth Street between Wells and Cedar 
Avenues, near the heart of the business section. This united 
synagogue, now known as B ’ne-Jeshurun, was the only Jewish 
congregation in the city and its membership in 1860 numbered 
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close to one hundred families. The community, comprising 
different national groups -- German, Austrian, Bohemian, 
Hungarian -- was united religiously. The basis of religious 
organization was Orthodox. Prayers were said in Hebrew, led 
by the traditional cantor, the chazan. Meetings of the shul were 
conducted in German. A definite bow was made to 
Americanization with the stipulation that at least one sermon a 
month was to be rendered in English.124 
 
Swichkow and Gartner emphasized the influence of Wise and the Reform Movement as 
having “played a central role in the making of Judaism in Milwaukee. His dynamic 
presence, personal ties with dominant persons in the community, frequent visits, and his 
calls for congregational unity in Milwaukee. . .were largely responsible for the emergence 
of a moderate reformed type of Judaism in the city.”125 Polsky’s opinion about Rabbi 
Wise’s influence on the Milwaukee Reform Jewish movement is noteworthy in that he 
viewed the establishment of Reform Judaism from the perspective of Orthodox Judaism. 
He noted that affluent East Side Reform minded Jewish congregants let their social and 
economic resources overshadow any sense of European traditionalism: 
As the synagogue grew in numbers, the possibility for dissident 
opinion regarding the ritual of the synagogue was enhanced. Dr. 
Isaac M. Wise, the vitriolic and tireless organizer of the Reform 
movement, began to influence many German Jews in 
Milwaukee. A dissident group grew to thirty-five members. 
Unable to influence the others or to reach a compromise in 
ritual and philosophy, the group withdrew to form a separate 
congregation. This new congregation was the Reform Temple 
Emanu-El. Aided by the sum of $4,250 received from 
B ’ne-Jeshurun, a building campaign was begun and a temple 
was constructed on Broadway and Martin streets, east of the 
river and in the heart of the downtown district.126 
 
However, Gurock noted another possible explanation for the decrease in traditional 
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European observance before the arrival of the second wave immigrants: change in social 
status. He theorized that the greatest challenge to traditional observance was economic 
success.127 Many American Jews gathered a great deal of cultural capital and reaped the 
social benefits, not least of which was the higher SES. As members of the Jewish 
population rose toward a middle class status, many were determined to fit it as much as 
possible. This included where and when they worshiped. In America, many formerly 
traditional Jews worked on the Sabbath and prayed in buildings that resembled any local 
church. “In the new world, Jews labored on holy days to both survive and advance.”128  
By the time the second wave of Jewish immigrants arrived, the more “Orthodox” 
synagogue in Milwaukee, B’ne Jeshurun, had installed an organ for services, something the 
Eastern European Jews had not had in their congregations in Europe.129 However, it is 
considered by many in the Milwaukee Jewish population to represent one of Milwaukee’s 
original Orthodox synagogues. 
 
B’NE JESHURUN 
Swichkow and Gartner noted that “Although B’ne Jeshurun had left Orthodoxy far 
behind by the later 1860s, its brand of Reform Judaism was very halting.”130 The East Side 
Jewish population claimed Emanu’El as their Reform synagogue, leaving B’ne Jeshurun as 
an option for Jewish worship that was a bit behind the times compared to Emanu’El.131 
The Orthodox label in Milwaukee signified, most of all, a reluctance to completely 
Americanize worship. Unlike traditional Orthodox synagogues in Chicago, Fort Worth and 
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New York, the congregants at B’ne Jeshurun slowly adopted new practices, and eventually 
assumed a more Reform Jewish tradition. Emanu-El began holding services in English, 
B’ne Jeshurun continued to use German.132 Polsky stated that,  
The German Jews rapidly shed customs and traditions which differentiated them 
from fellow Americans and quickly absorbed American values and forms into 
their lives and institutions. They showed much energy in fraternal, communal and 
philanthropic organizations. A well-organized German-Jewish community was 
already in existence at the beginning of the mass immigration of East European, 
Yiddish speaking Jews.133 
  
Gurock noted that by 1870, almost all American congregations had adopted less 
Orthodox practices. The second wave Jewish immigrants became a Jewish religious 
majority in cities that had no existing shuls in which they felt comfortable and welcome to 
worship.134 In the 1880s, Milwaukee’s Jewish community was a predominantly Reform 
community, albeit with two distinct forms. Swichkow and Gartner wrote that, “Emanu-El 
promptly made it clear that it stood for Reform Jewish practice and ritual. A few members 
who found it difficult to break entirely with traditional practices, and held their own early 
Sabbath service before regular worship, or who worshiped with covered heads during the 
regular service, were discountanced. Emanu-El decided to permit but one Reform service 
on Saturday morning, and prescribed uncovered heads during worship.”135 B’ne Jeshurun 
continued to serve the less affluent, less acculturated Jews left behind after the split, but 
even those services were much more Reform than Orthodox.136  
The second wave Jewish immigrants arrived in Milwaukee and quickly realized their 
religious practices were very different from the established Jewish community. The large 
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number of Jews arriving in Milwaukee in the second wave found their religious traditions 
were not acceptable to many of the Jews already in Milwaukee. In 1880 the number of 
Jews in Milwaukee was estimated to be about 2,000; in 1920 it was estimated at 20,000. 
The German-Jewish community in Milwaukee established relief agencies to assist the 
new immigrants. At the same time, many Milwaukee Jews separated themselves from 
their poor unacculturated Orthodox Yiddish-speaking co-religionists.137 The second wave 
immigrants arrived from Russia, Romania, Hungary and Poland, but are often labeled the 
Russian Jewish immigrant wave. Russian Jews in Milwaukee, as in other cities across 
America during this period, initially established neighborhoods with all the elements of 
the social organization they were familiar with in Europe.138 They settled together in 
some of the poorest areas of the city and established a neighborhood apart from the East 
Side Jews.  
 
THE WEST SIDE JEWS ARRIVE IN MILWAUKEE 
Residential segregation is an important part of Milwaukee Jewish history. When the 
Russian Jewish immigrants arrived in Milwaukee, the established Jewish residents did not 
welcome them into their neighborhoods; the original West Side Jewish population moved 
from their neighborhoods, as did the East Side Jewish residents. One of the most distinctive 
aspects of the Milwaukee Jewish population is the residential migrations of the East Side 
and West Side communities. Polsky wrote, 
One of the most interesting phenomena of the Jewish 
population was that entire Jewish neighborhoods seemed to 
move together. Discrimination from without, traditional norms 
and social structure brought over from Europe, and economic 
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factors account for the geographical distribution of Milwaukee 
Jewry. One of the thorniest problems confronting Orthodoxy 
was that its institutions, amounting to considerable capital 
investments, lagged behind the newer neighborhoods into 
which Jews moved. The area of original settlement of the 
German Jews and the Russian Jews was dictated by economic 
considerations. For the penniless arrivals, work-place, 
synagogue and meeting hall were all within walking distance of 
their places of residence. The German-Jews settled in the 
downtown area and built their first synagogues there. When the 
Russian Jews arrived during the 80s and 90s, the German Jews 
separated themselves from their co-religionists by moving East 
and North. Up to the 1940s, the Northeast section of 
Milwaukee was identified by both Russian and German Jews as 
the more or less exclusive area of residence of the latter.139  
  
Many of the West Side Jews were Eastern European and poor, and were usually 
described as “Russian” Jews. The true composition of this immigrant wave has been 
obscured by the label, much like the first wave and the German label. Historian Hasia Diner 
wrote, “Emigration from the East should not be viewed either merely as a desperate flight 
from terror or as a wholesale transfer of Jews and their communities from places of peril to 
a place of safety.”140 Jews from Central and Eastern Europe did experience violence, 
punitive taxation and exclusion from civic life in their countries of origin. That harsh 
treatment shaped political consciousness in this particular Jewish immigrant wave. Many 
of the Jews of this group were Marxist socialists, and that political consciousness had an 
impact on the places they settled.141 In the history of Milwaukee’s Jewish population, the 
poor, more traditional European immigrants comprised the largest group of West Side 
Jews. 
 After decades of acceptance into the German population, the East Side Jews of 
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Milwaukee viewed the large number of Jewish immigrants as very different from 
themselves and almost unrecognizable.142 Swichkow and Gartner described the opinion of 
East Side Jews, “Reform Jews thought of the immigrants’ worship as uncouth and out of 
touch with the needs of modern society.”143 Harry Kanin described some of the cultural 
differences in terms of class and religion. He noted that the West Side Jews could not afford 
to live with the wealthier East Side Jews when they arrived in Milwaukee. The two groups 
did not socialize because of the cultural differences between them. East Side Jews 
considered the West Side Jews as uncultured and too different from themselves. These 
feelings prevented them from socializing with the new immigrants. Kanin described the 
situation as, “The East Side Jewish people were more secular and less religious. They had 
secular education. The Russians were less secular. They had Talmudic educations, studied 
the Torah, they were not secular.”144 Kanin described other differences between the two 
Jewish groups, “The East Side Jews were well off, and the Russians were poor. They were 
very different. When an East Side household served a meal, the table was set with place 
settings and serving dishes and sat at table. The West Side Jewish meal was such that the 
diners took plates and served themselves. When one had tea at an East Side home, the 
service was more formal; sugar was served in a dish to add to the cup. The West Side tea 
service had sugar cubes, which one could place between their teeth to sweeten the tea as 
they drank it.”145 The differences in customs were framed as which was proper and which 
was not. The East Side Jewish population considered their customs proper etiquette and 
avoided social interaction with the West Side Jews. The socialized in their own 
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neighborhoods and did not often venture to the West Side.146  
The ethnic differences between the two Jewish populations created a social distance 
that defined the relationship between them. East Side Jews avoided the new arrivals. Their 
disdain derived from sense that new immigrants reflected negatively on them. The West 
Side Jews were not the first Jewish immigrants, but they were by far the most distinctive in 
that they stood out from the East Side Jewish population. Their socioeconomic status, 
language, and cultural practices prevented them from settling on the East Side among the 
established Jewish population. Nor did they settle with their fellow immigrants from their 
countries of origin. Instead, they carved out an enclave on the West Side. 
Gentile immigrants from Poland and Russia arrived in Milwaukee in the late 1800s 
and early 1900s, but the Jews within their number did not settle with them. The West Side 
Jews spoke Yiddish, not German. They were from Eastern Europe, not the Western regions. 
They did not possess the knowledge of the cultural practices of the East Side Jewish 
community and could not join the earlier Milwaukee Jewish immigrants. The Gentile 
Russians and Poles brought anti-Semitic attitudes over from Europe. Their hostility toward 
Jews prevented the West Side Jews from establishing Russian or Polish neighborhoods.147 
The West Side Jews established their own Jewish neighborhood in Milwaukee because 
there was no other option available to them. They represented a Jewish population in 
Milwaukee: distinctive from both the East Side Jews and the non-Jewish immigrants with 
whom they arrived. Their arrival created a concentrated Jewish community on the West 
Side of the Milwaukee River, to the blocks around the Haymarket at Fifth and Vliet 
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Streets.148 
The West Side Jewish neighborhood was one of the poorest in Milwaukee. The 
increased number of immigrants and growing poverty necessitated the growth of Jewish 
relief and philanthropy in Milwaukee as a direct response to the needs of the new 
immigrants. Jewish relief organizations in the 1880s were small and unorganized. They 
rapidly grew and expanded to meet the increased requests for assistance. 
 
WEST SIDE JEWISH IMMIGRATION AND CHARITABLE ASSISTANCE 
The first group of Russian immigrants that arrived in Milwaukee was small and 
included skilled laborers and other able-bodied people. The Milwaukee Jewish community 
received word that the immigrants were on their way and had time to gather resources to 
assist them. In October of 1881, Milwaukee’s Jewish leaders were told to expect small 
number of Russian immigrants. The Montreal Committee, located in Canada, worked with 
European organizations, including the Alliance Israelite Universelle, that assisted 
immigrants in relocating.149 Montreal received immigrants from England and sent them to 
American cities, usually by way of New York. The Emigrant Relief Association of New 
York worked to help new arrivals settle in American cities.150 The local Jewish community 
raised funds and found shelter for the new arrivals. There was no recorded opposition to 
providing the aid and the community waited to welcome them. Ten immigrants arrived, 
ranging in age from 20-25. The literature described as them “able bodied” skilled 
tradesman, and they were quickly given assistance.151 The insistence on able bodied status 
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reflected the reluctance on the part of American Jews to encourage the desire for charity. 
European leaders did not want Russian Jews settling in their cities in great numbers. Many 
of the immigrants sent to American cities were not young, skilled, and able to work, despite 
promises from immigration organization in Europe.152 
However, as poorer, unskilled immigrants arrived, a distinct decrease in contributions 
for relief efforts on the part of the East Side Jewish community led to an appeal from the 
Emigrant Relief Association of New York on June 1, 1882. More Jewish immigrants were 
on their way to Milwaukee and they needed assistance. The Association needed funds from 
Jews and non-Jews alike to meet the needs of the growing number of poor immigrants. The 
effort was successful as Christians donated $400 within a few weeks, and Jewish 
organizations donated an additional $300. The immediate relief crisis was resolved. 
A larger challenge for Jewish relief workers loomed. Like many of the American 
Jewish communities of the late nineteenth century, Milwaukee’s Jews did not realize just 
how many immigrants would arrive in this second wave. Sociologist Marshall Sklare 
noted that, “In fact, the new immigrants swamped the older element. The 400,000 Jews in 
the United States in 1888 were joined by 334,338 more by 1896. Thus the ratio of net 
migration to initial population after a mere decade was an astonishing 83 percent.”153  
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By 1898, two settlements of Russian and Polish Jews lived in downtown Milwaukee. 
At least 2,000 lived in these areas which the Milwaukee Sentinel defined as a “jewry [sic], 
or ghetto,” in an article linking Jewish religious observance with poverty and 
uncleanliness:  
These people do not look like desirable acquisitions when they 
first arrive, but it is safe to say that the younger generation of 
them will turn out some valued citizens. . .The racial desire for 
self-betterment is not snuffed out by the filthy environment into 
which their poverty forces them. . .As a rule the Russian Jew is 
more orthodox than the American Jew. This is attested by the 
number of ‘kosher’ butcher shops to be found in the Milwaukee 
ghetto. . .Whatever of bad air and lack of soap may pertain to 
the average kosher shop, one thing is certain, the meat exposed 
for sale did not come from a diseased animal or from one not 
slaughtered according to Mosaic law. . .The members of the 
Milwaukee’s ghetto are not all robust people, yet they maintain 
fair health in spite of their decidedly unsanitary mode of 
living. . .It is well worth the trouble to walk along Sixth Street 
between Vliet and Cherry on a warm summer evening before 
the daylight has entirely vanished. Then may be seen a ghetto 
in full bloom for the sidewalks fairly swarm.154 
 
Relief efforts for the poor Jewish newcomers initially lagged because high number of 
immigrants and the scant amount of resources available. There was also the matter of the 
disdain for them on the part of the East Side Jewish community leaders. The East Side 
Jewish population designed relief assistance to compel the new arrivals to adopt 
appropriate cultural norms. The new immigrants settled in their neighborhoods and tried to 
take advantage of the opportunities available in Milwaukee.155  
Many of the West Side Jews quickly realized that their employment opportunities were 
limited. Sociologists Sidney Goldstein and Calvin Goldscheider observed that for many of 
these immigrants, their efforts to achieve a higher SES was limited because of their overall 
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lack of secular education, “In particular, Jews came to recognize that the amount of formal 
secular education an individual receives is a major determinant of the occupations open to 
him, the income he will eventually receive, and the opportunities he will have to realize 
desired values and to enhance life chances.”156 In their hometowns of Eastern Europe, 
many Jewish men aspired to gain extensive religious knowledge, the accepted cultural 
capital in their old life. The cultural practices in their countries of origin and their pursuit of 
religious education did not have as much value as part of Jewish life in Milwaukee.157 
Religious observance and hours spent in study were not valued by the East Side Jewish 
leaders. New immigrants that insisted on keeping the Sabbath and who suffered from a 
lack of employment did not receive much sympathy from those in charge of charity relief 
programs. Jews who practiced strict religious observance were identified as “Talmudic 
Jews.” Relief organizations viewed religious study and more traditional Jewish practices 
as laziness and sloth.158 Relief assistance included attempts to Americanize the new 
immigrants. Rabbi Moses from Congregation Emanu-El felt so strongly about the need to 
educate the new immigrant that he announced in July 1882, 
It will be necessary to establish a free school for the children 
where, after returning from public school, they will receive 
their Hebrew and religious instruction under the direction of 
the two local rabbis. . .also it will be necessary to form a 
woman’s society whose duty it will be to visit the families and 
activate society. . .and civilize those families so they do not 
succumb in isolation, lest left to themselves, they perpetuate 
their semi Asiatic existence. We believe we are not mistaken in 
maintaining that through such civilizing efforts, we shall be 
averting from ourselves a potential danger which threatens us 
all.159 
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Rabbi Moses viewed the new immigrants as a threat to the East Side population due to 
their unfamiliar habits and poverty. Sociologist Erving Goffman wrote that in society, 
prestige stems from the favorable judgment and “a status may be ranked on a scale of 
prestige according to the amount of social value placed upon it.”160 There was no 
prestige associated with religious study.  
As Russian Jews settled in American cities, they were increasingly associated with 
urban problems and conditions. Historian Eric L. Goldstein noted that “Jews, for reasons 
related to their distinct history and social characteristics, served as a convenient symbol 
for a host of social problems that were of mounting concern to the American public 
during those years.161 Rabbi Moses believed that the new immigrants had to become 
more American in order to avoid any repercussions in the Milwaukee Jewish population 
as a whole. The response from the immigrants to Rabbi Moses’s statement about religious 
observance is unknown. However, resentment toward relief organizations on the part of 
the poor is implied. Rabbi Moses also declared in August 1882 that “Our Russians are 
singing the old song of the dissatisfied. . .we doubt very much whether the majority ever 
had such remunerative jobs in the old country as they have managed to find here.”162 
There were attempts, in the late 1880s and early 1890s, to curtail Jewish immigration 
to Milwaukee. In a telegram to the Montreal Immigration Office, Louis B. Schram, 
secretary of the Milwaukee Russian Relief committee stated, “We demand peremptorily 
that you send no more Russians here. All coming from Montreal hereafter will be returned 
without taking from depot.” He was true to his word. Milwaukee sent back a refugee with a 
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note that read, “Dear Sir, We send a man tonight who is sick and is unable to do anything 
for his support. Please return him to Europe and oblige. Yours respectfully, David 
Adler. ”163 Despite these efforts, immigrants continued to arrive, in even larger numbers. 
Romanian Jews arrived, as did more Russian and Polish Jews. They settled in the West Side 
wards. These Jews did not have the same opportunities available to the East Side Jews. The 
first West Side Jewish refugees found it difficult to work in many of the factories in 
Milwaukee because of their religious practices. Swichkow and Gartner noted that “Early 
Jewish immigrants from Central and later Eastern Europe used petty trade as a stepladder 
to retail and wholesale trade, while artisans or their sons often ended as manufacturers of 
that article. There was considerable anti-Semitism in employment. An observant Jew could 
not work on Saturday and Jewish holidays, as was required practically everywhere.”164 
West Side Jews established street trades to support their families. Rags, scrap iron, and 
produce carts supported many Jewish families.165 Slowly, some of the new immigrants 
began making their own way in Milwaukee through their street trade businesses.166 But the 
wages earned from street trading and peddler carts were low. The Haymarket neighborhood, 
where many lived, was one of the poorest in Milwaukee.167  
Poverty did not prevent the creation of numerous shuls in the neighborhood. The West 
Side Jewish community created several small congregations. There were differences 
among the West Side Jewish immigrants, much like the East Side immigrants before them. 
Members of the West Side Jewish community spoke Yiddish and were more traditional but 
did not share a common Eastern European culture. Jews from Russia, Poland, Lithuania, 
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Hungary, Ukraine, and Romania dressed differently, spoke different dialects of Yiddish, 
and also prayed differently.168 These cultural and religious differences complicated the 
creation of a unified West Side Jewish Milwaukee community much as they did in the East 
Side Jewish experience. 
 
WEST SIDE MILWAUKEE JEWISH  
Compared to Russia, during the latter half of the 19th century Germany appeared 
liberated. Sarna stated that the arrival of rabbis from Europe “only heightened internal 
battles within the American Jewish community. Prior to 1840. . .no ordained rabbi graced 
an American synagogue pulpit.”169 Up until the rabbis settled in America, lay members of 
immigrant congregations conducted services and managed the affairs. The arrival of 
ordained clergy, especially Orthodox, created conflict between traditionalists and 
Reformist Jewish groups. Historian Adam S. Ferziger named one rabbi, Rabbi Moses Sofer, 
who was very much opposed to Reform Judaism. This rabbi believed Reform ideology to 
be the arch-enemy of “authentic Judaism.”170 Rabbi Shmuel Singer observed that 
“Orthodoxy was faced with one central problem from the time of its arrival in America. 
That issue was how to insure the religious education of its native-born children. It was 
because the older generation was unable to pass on their Jewish knowledge and devotion 
to their offspring that Orthodoxy in the past was incapable of perpetuating itself in its 
new home.”171 The process of obtaining cultural capital had made it difficult, if not 
impossible to instill traditional religious lessons and practices in the children of many of 
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the first wave immigrants. 
Polsky described the differences between the two Jewish populations in Milwaukee: 
“Upon their arrival in America the German Jews rapidly shed their Orthodoxy but in 
America Russian Jews carried on the norms, traditions and institutions they had evolved in 
the shtetl.”172 In Milwaukee, Gurda noted that “Although the Haymarket community was 
insular, it was not insulated; young people in particular, absorbed the pulse of American 
society every time they stepped outside the neighborhood.”173 The more traditional 
members of the Jewish population lived in a neighborhood, not a ghetto. They interacted 
with the Gentiles in Milwaukee. The result was that the Haymarket neighborhood was not 
a shtetl; it was a Jewish neighborhood and open to the city at large. The freedom to come 
and go as they chose meant the Haymarket residents could interact with other city 
residents, Jews and Gentiles alike. Gurock observed that the lack of isolation facilitated 
the break from traditional religious practices, and the second generation of Russian Jews 
adopted from birth the cultural norms of the earlier arrivals.174 
The West Side Jews also established synagogues. As more Eastern European Jews 
arrived in Milwaukee more shuls, most of them Landsmanshaft, opened. Almost a dozen 
shuls were established between 1882 and 1914. The issue of religious observance 
complicated the creation of a unified West Side Jewish religious community. Polsky noted, 
In Russia and Poland, Jews constituted a community within a 
community. Talmudic law was the law, the norm by which life 
was guided, not only intellectually, but socially. Why? The 
manifold restrictions in the land they were living in forced the 
Jewish people to turn upon themselves, and the ancient 
tradition with its manifold restrictions served as an inside 
restraint upon the Jews as they exhausted the ancient 
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commentaries in study and the ritualistic patterns in minutest 
detailed practice. It was not the Mosaic law alone– but its 
embeddedness in the folk practice of the people which gave it 
enduring vitality and really maintained and shaped it.175 
  
He contextualized the Milwaukee Eastern European experience in terms of a social 
environment that did not exist in the city. There was no large traditional population in 
Milwaukee. The one Orthodox congregation available to them practiced Judaism with 
different rituals. In addition, Milwaukee offered West Side Jewish immigrants some 
degree of economic, civil, and religious freedom in their daily lives not available in 
Europe. These freedoms allowed the West Side Jews to create livelihoods and communal 
organizations. Polsky noted that, 
The constant petty quarreling and personality conflicts in the 
early days of the Orthodox community were overlaid with old 
country differences. Many of the synagogues had factions 
within themselves and there were numerous resignations, 
coalitions, combinations and alliances of the various members 
as they changed synagogue affiliations. Beth Hamedrosh 
Hagodel was started when the chairman of one synagogue 
arose at a meeting and referred to a group in the synagogue as 
Russian scoundrels. This group walked out and began its own 
synagogue along with dissidents from the other Orthodox 
congregations.176 
 
In Milwaukee, the West Side Jewish community created congregations and left them as 
they saw fit. The freedom to interact with the residents of other neighborhoods and the lack 
of restrictions on their religious expressions allowed the West Side Jewish residents to 
establish their own form of religious expression.  
   The increase in poor immigrants strained the existing charitable efforts in Milwaukee. 
They did not have the resources to assist all in need. Jewish relief organizations in 
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Milwaukee were small, disorganized, and also limited in resources. They could not meet 
the needs of the growing population of poor immigrants. The East Side Jewish community 
in Milwaukee believed that charity was a community responsibility, their responsibility. 
However, some members of the East Side community donated funds grudging and did not 
always respect the dignity of the poor.177  
The belief that economic stability came from hard work guided those who dispensed 
aid for many relief agencies, including the ones in Milwaukee. Many individuals founded 
private charitable agencies in American cities to assist the poor. They helped the people 
who were willing to work.178 In Milwaukee, the disjointed group of private charity 
organization consolidated efforts and created The Hebrew Relief Association. This 
organization expanded services in order to provide for the poorer immigrants.  
The prevailing attitude toward poverty relief at the end of the nineteenth century 
emphasized the role of individual moral failings. As historian Walter Trattner explained, 
“Most Americans continued to believe that, since the nation offered unlimited natural 
resources and opportunities for success, poverty resulted from individual moral 
failure--idleness, intemperance, immorality, and irreligion. Such shortcomings could be 
countered only by bringing contrary forces to bear, ‘by inculcating religion, morality, 
sobriety, and industry’ into the poor. If malign influences could be eliminated and 
beneficent ones substituted, the better nature of the needy would assert itself and the 
problem would be solved.”179 Poverty was a result of moral deficiency and a lack of 
responsibility. The poor needed to remedy their own moral flaws. Once that was 
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accomplished, poverty would no longer be a problem. The role of relief work included 
more than funds. The indigent needed education and training to address their faults. 
West Side Jews faced a difficult situation. East Side Jewish relief leaders scorned some 
of the tenets of their more traditional Jewish religious practices: especially those that 
interfered with their ability to work. At a time when conventional wisdom considered 
religion and morality a remedy to the moral causes of poverty, West Side Jewish 
immigrants committed to Jewish religious observance and scholarship received harsh 
criticism from the members of Hebrew Relief Association. The more traditional Jewish 
immigrants did not work on the Sabbath. They kept kosher, which restricted their food 
choices. Many of the West Side Jewish men grew up spending a great deal of their time to 
studying the Torah and the Talmud. The East Side Jewish population discouraged the 
traditional clothing and beards worn by West Side Jews.180 Many East Side Jewish 
benefactors made a concentrated effort to change the religious practices of the more 
observant Jews, in particular observing the Sabbath and keeping Kosher. They did not 
consider the traditional practice of religious study as important as working for a wage. 
Some leaders stigmatized such behavior as lazy. Rabbi Moses of Milwaukee’s Emanu-El 
stated that, “The Sabbath and the dietary laws form no obstacle for those among them who 
are decent and willing to work. And here and there emerges from among them a 
self-impressed ‘Talmudic Jew’ who would have the roasted doves that expects to fly 
directly into his mouth, not only Kosher-slaughtered, but also Kosher prepared.”181 
Religious study, valued in the shtetls, became sloth, and refusing work on the Sabbath was 
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laziness.182 Strict religious observance marked one a “Talmudic Jew” and was a barrier and 
affront to the relief efforts of the less devout on their behalf. The animosity between the two 
Jewish populations grew as more immigrants arrived. The number of applicants for 
assistance overwhelmed the existing Jewish charity organizations in Milwaukee by the 
mid-1880s. The relationship between the poor and the affluent Jews in Milwaukee became 
more strained with the establishment of scientific charity, a topic taken up in the next 
chapter. Scientific charity, also known as the charity organization movement sought to 
address issues related to poverty in a rational and efficient way.183 Swichkow and Gartner 
explained that “Aside from a few dozen conscientiousness ladies, charitable needs so little 
preoccupied the Jewish community that the Hebrew Relief Society met great difficulty in 
merely perpetuating itself during its first 25 years of existence.”184 
As the 20th century began, three facets of Milwaukee Jewish identity, the East and West 
Side divide, a foundation of civic commitment to the city, and philanthropic efforts 
supporting the network of Jewish charities in Milwaukee took root in the Jewish population. 
Jewish relief efforts grew in response to the increased poverty of the new immigrants. 
Jewish charity workers began to reorganize their operations and efforts to meet the needs of 
the increased indigent immigrant population. Swichkow and Gartner noted that “However, 
the 1890s were a decade of radical change. Milwaukee Jewry by then had an immigrant 
majority, requiring extensive services over a prolonged period to augment the immigrants’ 
own widespread self-help. At the same time, charity in America was slowly recognizing 
the social problems that were generated by decades of untrammeled urban growth.”185  
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This led to the consolidation of the existing Jewish charitable efforts. The Hebrew 
Relief Association absorbed some of Milwaukee’s other Jewish relief organizations. The 
efforts were part of spirit of tzedakah, which is part of an act of Gemilut chesed (loving 
kindness).186 But, more often than not, the charitable hand was extended only after the 
relief organization investigated applicants and determined the case was valid and the 
applicants worthy. This harsh treatment resulted from the social divide between the groups. 
Swichkow and Gartner observed that the East Side Jewish relief workers felt the West Side 
Jews lacked a sense of gratitude for their efforts. West Side Jews may have believed that 
acts of loving kindness, rather than intrusive investigations, were needed.187 The higher 
social status of many on the East Side, and the initial disdain they felt for the immigrants 
settled on the West Side of the Milwaukee River continued to affect relations within the 
Jewish population into the next century.  
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CHAPTER 2 IMMIGRATION AND CHARITY ORGANIZATIONS 
Prior to the 1880s, charity work in Milwaukee consisted of a fragmented network of charity 
associations in the city. After the number of immigrants from Eastern Europe increased, existing 
charity efforts in Milwaukee began to consolidate. This chapter describes the history of Jewish 
relief efforts and organizations in Milwaukee. The East Side Milwaukee Jewish population 
initially created assistance institutions using two different approaches to poverty relief. One 
being a Settlement and one founded on the principles of the scientific charity organization model, 
namely the Hebrew Relief Association.    
Jewish women in Milwaukee contributed a great deal of support for relief work, starting 
with sewing circles and direct donations. The Sisterhood of Personal Service and the Milwaukee 
Jewish Mission, two groups that visited the poor to offer advice and educational opportunities, 
eventually merged and established the Jewish Settlement in Milwaukee.1 It opened in 1900 in 
the West Side Jewish neighborhood to assist the local Jewish population.2 After the creation of 
Mount Sinai Hospital, its Ladies Auxiliary supported the hospital for its entire history, ending 
only after the 1987 merger.3 
The Settlement movement was a national relief movement, part of the larger Progressive 
movement. Settlements included a deliberate policy of assimilation in exchange for assistance. 
Workers believed that by living among the poor, they could address the core reasons for poverty. 
The poor neighborhoods offered practical information about the lives of the poor. The residents 
collected demographic information about the residents and used the data to address the needs of 
the neighborhoods.4 One of the most well-known settlement houses was located in Chicago, 
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Hull House.5 
The Charitable Organization Movement provided a framework for the efforts of the Hebrew 
Relief Association after the Russian Jewish population arrived in Milwaukee. This movement 
advocated the practice of “scientific charity,” a philosophy of organization and rationality in 
relief efforts for the poor. Proponents of scientific charity believed that giving aid to “unworthy” 
people created dependency and a sense of entitlement for support. Sociologist Theda Skocpol 
noted that this was a departure from earlier relief efforts. Political corruption caused a backlash 
against poverty relief programs. Some reformers advocated the creation of regulatory boards to 
oversee relief efforts. This approach did not dispense a great deal of assistance, but did gather a 
great deal of information about applicants.6 The early Jewish charitable efforts in Milwaukee 
used this approach. The president Interviewed applicants, conducted investigations, and 
dispensed aid. The large number of appeals from Milwaukee’s poor Jewish immigrants 
overwhelmed the president and the scientific charity method of poverty relief offered a means of 
efficiently distribute aid.  
Scientific charity emphasized coordinated relief efforts and investigation of all applicants. 
Upper class women, called “friendly visitors” advised the poor about the importance of hard 
work and sobriety.7 This philanthropic approach was part of a national trend starting 1877, but 
Milwaukee did not adopt it until the late 1890s.8 It was a direct response to the political 
corruption that led to widespread fraud in American relief efforts.9 Historian Linda Gordon 
noted that a “historical transformation” regarding the meaning of welfare occurred during the 
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Progressive Era between 1890 and 1935. She posited that during this time, concern for all 
mothers and children ended. Mothers were separated into categories: those that needed assistance 
because of circumstance, and those suffered from weakness in their character.10   
The Settlement residents created poverty relief efforts that were different from the scientific 
charity workers’ approaches. Walter Trattner explained the difference:  
Settlement house residents sought to improve these conditions, to 
promote social and economic reform so that those who had dreams 
about getting ahead would have the opportunity to do so. Where their 
predecessors had emphasized the individual and moral causes of 
destitution, drawing distinctions between worthy and unworthy poor, 
settlement house workers looked upon all the indigent alike, stressing 
the social and economic conditions that made and kept them poor. 
While charity workers were interested in dependency, settlement house 
residents were concerned with poverty. Whereas the philosophy of the 
charity organization movement led to private charity and spiritual 
uplift, the philosophy of the settlement house movement led to social 
and economic change.11  
 
Volunteers were vital, “especially well-motivated people of the privileged classes who, for one 
reason or another, felt impelled to do something about the class divisiveness.”12 However, Trattner 
noted that “the settlement and charity organization movements were in many ways the very 
antitheses of each other. While not all social settlements were alike, most exemplified the 
democratic ideal in principle and in action, while the organized charities were the very opposite -- 
the embodiment of inequality in theory and in practice.”13 Milwaukee’s East Side Jewish women 
established many of the early charity programs. Their motivation for doing so resembled the 
efforts of many other charity workers in other cities. They worked to alleviate the negative effects 
of poverty on families. They focused attention on improving the daily lives of the poor through 
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home visits and education. The women began to centralize relief efforts through cooperation 
between members of an historically divided Jewish population in Milwaukee. 
One of the more contentious aspects of the Settlement Movement concerned the role of 
“assimilation” in relief work. The services provided to families included lessons in English, as well 
as religious classes and vocational training and homemaking. Not all scholars accept Trattner’s 
somewhat positive view of the settlement movement in America. Historian Rivka Shpak Lissak 
noted that settlement movement members considered the more assimilated immigrants more 
worthy of assistance. Those applicants who acquiesced to Americanization efforts were more 
likely to receive assistance. She wrote that “Immigrants were not treated as equals and their culture 
was not respected. Hull Houses brought the cultural elite to the slums to work toward educating 
and assimilating the ‘neighbors. They lead and the poor follow.”14 The settlement movement in 
Milwaukee adopted a model for charity relief founded in Reform Jewish practices and German 
cultural lessons and created its own network of programs. It first functioned as a community center, 
and offered a variety of services and programs. John Gurda noted that Abraham Lincoln House and 
the Settlement “were, in fact, the direct ancestors of today’s Jewish Community Center.”15 The 
creation of these charitable organizations led to the creation of Mount Sinai Hospital in Milwaukee. 
The cost of food, housing, and other basic staples for the poor left very little for medical care. 
Relief workers referred poor patients to a small Dispensary, which closed between 1889 and 
1892.16 Rabbi Victor Caro of Congregation B’ne Jeshurun formed the Jewish Hospital 
Association 1902 to create Wisconsin’s first Jewish hospital.17 Relief agency leaders wanted to 
direct more resources toward hiring social workers to assist the poor. Rabbi Caro believed that the 
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15 Gurda, One People, Many Paths, 72. 
16 Dr. Harry Kanin, Interview by author, Milwaukee, Wisconsin, July 14, 2011. 
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medical needs of the poor needed urgent attention and that Jewish immigrants needed a Jewish 
hospital. Mount Sinai Hospital historically treated more Gentile charity patients than Jewish. They 
made up a large bulk of the hospital’s caseload right from its founding. The history of the hospital 
reveals that one of the major contributors to the hospital, Abraham Slimmer, insisted that Mount 
Sinai adopt a nonsectarian mission. The hospital established itself as a resource for the poor of 
Milwaukee, whether Jewish or Gentile. The nonsectarian mission represents the commitment on 
the part of the Jewish population to Milwaukee. As early as 1904, hospital leaders questioned the 
overall lack of Jewish patients. Other American Jewish hospitals treated a far greater proportion of 
Jewish patients than Mount Sinai Milwaukee.  
 
JEWISH IMMIGRATION AND CHARITY RELIEF 
The arrival of a large number of indigent immigrants in the late 19th and early 20th century 
strained the existing resources in many American cities. Many immigrants settled in the poorer 
urban areas and were increasingly associated with the city’s problems and concerns. Historian 
Eric L. Goldstein noted, “Jews, for reasons related to their distinct history and social 
characteristics, served as a convenient symbol for a host of social problems and that were of 
mounting concern to the American public during those years.”18 The fear of being associated 
with urban problems led to action on the part of the native Jewish population. Their main priority 
was to educate the new arrivals, or at the very least, their children, in the American Jewish way 
of life. Native Jews sought to protect the social status, prestige, and the civic achievements of the 
whole community by quickly helping the immigrants through a variety of social programs.19 
                                                 
18 Eric L. Goldstein, “The Unstable Other: Locating the Jew in Progressive-Era American Racial Discourse American Jewish 
History: A Review Essay” American Jewish History 86 4 (2001): 383-409.  
19 Avraham Barkai, Branching Out: German- Jewish Immigration to the United States 1820-1914 (New York: Holmes and 
Meyer, 1994), 205.  
 100 
 
They established organizations and groups to address the needs of new arrivals. Some programs 
included those intended to compel new Jewish immigrants to accept German cultural norms. 
Marshall Sklare noted that by the time the Eastern European Jewish immigrants arrived in 
America during the 1880s, many German Jews had experienced a great deal of upward social 
mobility, which resulted in prestigious social statuses. He commented “Geographical spread, 
while necessary to establish the predominance of the German Jews, would not have been 
sufficient [to explain the extent of German cultural influence]. It was the spectacular rise of the 
German Jews into the upper reaches of the middle class, and particularly into the upper class, 
that brought them into positions of authority.”20    
This was certainly the case in Milwaukee. There were two formal relief programs in 
Milwaukee when the Russian Jews arrived: The Hebrew Benevolent Society and the Hebrew 
Relief Society. The Hebrew Benevolent Society was a mutual aid association established in 1873 
to provide members with sick and death benefits. Many of the members became self-sufficient 
but continued to pay their memberships fees. Surplus funds were used for poverty relief, 
including medical services.21 It was a small organization and did not have a great deal of 
money.22 The Hebrew Relief Association began as the Hebrew Relief Society on August 1, 1867. 
Members contributed five dollars a year for poor relief. A board of three trustees and officers 
comprised its leadership. The Society provided financial assistance to the poor for mainly coal 
and food. In 1880, the Hebrew Relief Society became the United Hebrew Relief Organization 
and in May of 1889 it was renamed the Hebrew Relief Association.23  
The Hebrew Relief Association referred only the worthy recipients of aid to the appropriate 
                                                 
20 Marshall Sklare, America’s Jew’s (New York: Random House, 1971), 7. 
21 Swichkow and Gartner, The History of the Jews of Milwaukee, 221. 
22 Swichkow and Gartner, The History of the Jews of Milwaukee, 225. 
23 Swichkow and Gartner, The History of the Jews of Milwaukee, 221. 
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relief institutions after investigating the applicants.24 The worthy received assistance; the 
slothful did not. Scientific charity organizations addressed poverty in their communities by 
monitoring relief services as well as supervising the recipients. Historian Alice O’Connor 
documented how upper class morals and judgments on the poor influenced poverty relief efforts. 
She argued that in placing the blame for poverty on the poor, relief workers focused on allocating 
help to those who met certain cultural criteria, instead of assisting those in need without regard 
for their social position reified the labels of deserving and undeserving poor. These labels have 
fallen away, but the ideas behind them endured.25  
The acceptance of the validity that the labels deserving and undeserving poor continued with 
the political changes in American government structures. Historian Michael B. Katz observed 
that this type of assistance model solidified the acceptance of the notion that some poor people 
were undeserving. That is, it sanctions the denial of aid for a segment of the poor population that 
does not meet the approved criteria, no matter how deep their destitution.26 Sociologist Herbert J. 
Gans explained the power relief agencies and programs held over the poor with those labels. He 
believed that the labels kept the undeserving poor from aid and also attached blame to them as 
the cause of their poverty. In addition, the continued poverty in society became somewhat 
acceptable because of the belief that some people did not deserve help.27 This mindset allowed 
relief workers to compel the poor to adopt acceptable norms as a condition for receiving aid. A 
streamlined method of administering charitable resources and investigating applicants provided 
Hebrew Relief Association leaders with the means to provide relief in good conscience by 
ensuring worthiness and denying aid when necessary. The elimination of the threats of creating 
                                                 
24 Swichkow and Gartner, The History of the Jews of Milwaukee, 93. 
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dependency and encouraging sloth ensured charity assisted the worthy people and rejected the 
undeserving. The Association sought the means to create a comprehensive and universal means 
of addressing poverty. Association leaders and “friendly visitors” evaluated and assessed the 
homes of the poor in order to make the correct decision.28 Some of poor received assistance, but 
as Katz and Gans noted, denying aid to the unworthy was another important part of relief efforts. 
The East Side Jewish residents created relief organizations that reflected their desire to 
acculturate the West Side Jews, withholding assistance from applicants not willing to comply 
with their goals of socialization to American ways. The end result was that the two Milwaukee 
Jewish populations remained segregated for much of the early twentieth century. Their efforts to 
acculturate the new immigrants did not include plans to welcome them into their neighborhoods.  
The relative poverty of the new immigrants affected existing charity groups and spawned 
new ones. Relief organizations in the Jewish community in Milwaukee before the 1880s are 
described by historians Louis J. Swichkow and Lloyd P. Gartner as an “ad hoc affair, providing 
assistance to cases as they arose.”29 After the second wave, Milwaukee’s East Side Jews created 
a large relief organization by reorganizing many of these ad hoc groups into a central charity 
association in response to the large Eastern European immigrant population.  
On June 29, 1882, 218 Eastern European Jews arrived in Milwaukee. Historian John Gurda 
writes,  
When the German Jews of Milwaukee met their eastern European counterparts at the train 
depot in June, the event marked, on one level, a reunification of two peoples who had been 
separated for centuries. It did not, however, feel remotely like a family reunion. A gulf had 
opened between the two Ashkenazic communities in Europe, and it had grown 
significantly wider on the American side of the Atlantic. The eastern European refugees 
looked, behaved, and even smelled different from the German Jews who greeted them, 
and their economic circumstances could hardly have been more dissimilar.30 
                                                 
28 Trattner, From Poor Law to Welfare State, 93. 
29 Swichkow and Gartner, The History of the Jews of Milwaukee, 111. 
30 Gurda, One People, Many Paths, 40-41. 
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.    
This lack of similarity between the new immigrants and the earlier arrivals created a social 
distance between the two groups. First wave Jews held a marked animosity toward the new 
immigrants. It was so strong that when the Hebrew Relief Association denied a charity recipient, 
one possible reason noted was because the applicant was “Russian.”31 The new immigrants did not 
settle in the German areas with the East Side Jews. Instead, they lived on the West Side of the 
Milwaukee River and established the foundation for the West Side Jewish neighborhood. Existing 
Milwaukee Jewish charities organized their efforts and solidified their mission statements to 
reflect their cultural understandings about poverty relief and the poor in response to the arrival of 
a relatively large immigrant population. Two entities, the Chevra Bikur [sic] Cholim (the Hebrew 
Benevolent Society)32 and the Hebrew Relief Association provided charity in the Milwaukee 
Jewish community.33 They consolidated their efforts and implemented a new system of 
providing relief.  
 
THE HEBREW BENEVOLENT SOCIETY AND HEBREW RELIEF ASSOCIATION 
 The relief workers were members of the higher social class in Milwaukee. They maintained 
a sense of superiority implied through the actions of charity workers. Sociologist Marvin E. 
Gettleman believed that the scientific charity movement was, in fact, class privilege used to 
impose moral judgment to determine worth and prevent assistant to the unworthy. He described 
the process as a means by which “Social programs gathered private information and sought to 
protect the upper class from worthless beggars. Wanton benevolence and charity promotes the 
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survival of the unfit.”34 The belief that the affluent understood the difference between the 
deserving and undeserving created a system of charity that did not respect the poor. In fact, the 
upper class had a moral duty to impose their moral code onto them in exchange for help.  
The upper echelon in Milwaukee were firmly in charge of relief efforts. Initially, the 
President of the Milwaukee Hebrew Relief Association personally determined which cases 
received aid. He was responsible for “distinguishing between impostors who want to live without 
work by cunningly begging and appealing to sympathy and the really deserving who are poor by 
no fault of theirs.”35 Relief applicants performed a labor test in a wood yard. President Morris 
Miller implemented the test in 1899 as a means of “separating cheaters from the meritorious.”36 
Despite these new requirements, the president soon found he could not keep pace with requests. 
The Association Board hired a paid agent to investigate cases in order to expedite requests.37 A 
memo from a meeting in 1899 reported that, “The innovation of engaging a paid agent to assist 
the President in the discharge of his duty has proven a step in the right direction. Certain 
dependents were eliminated from our books and aid was denied to a class of dependents whose 
need might be supplied from private sources.”38 The Relief Association conducted routine 
investigations of the poor to ensure their eligibility for assistance. Leaders kept a ledger with 
notations about applicants that included labels such as a schnorrer or goniff.39 These terms 
provided the means to describe and track those denied assistance.40 The 1899 Annual Report of 
the Association stated that “Poverty is one thing, pauperism is another, a quite a different matter. 
The poor, says the Scripture, you shall always have with you. The poor is [sic] the result, the 
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product of social conditions. The pauper is of our own creation, and charity so far from fulfilling 
its purpose, defeats it by creating instead of abolishing pauperism.”41 The poor received help, 
the pauper received none. The paid investigator determined the difference.  
This form of relief continued until 1902. At that time a new organization, the Federated 
Jewish Charities, combined the efforts of the Hebrew Relief Association and other relief 
organizations, including the True Sisters, the Ladies’ Relief Sewing Societies, the Widows and 
Orphans Society, and the Sisterhood of Personal Service under one name. The new agency 
represented a new period in Milwaukee Jewish philanthropy, as emphasis shifted from 
emergency aid to systematic social service. The Hebrew Relief Association changed its name to 
the Jewish Social Service Association in 1921 to signify the change in charitable perspective.42 
Federated Jewish Charities became the Milwaukee Jewish Federation in 1956.43 Both of these 
organizations continue to serve Milwaukee in the 21st century. Howard Polsky noted that  
The Federated Jewish Charities was organized to unify fund raising in the community. 
The Hebrew Relief Association became the largest constituent member, receiving over 
one-half of the money allocated to local and national organizations. The director of the 
Federation became the superintendent of the Association. Before the Federation, the 
maximum amount raised never exceeded $1800. With unification and systematization of 
collection the Fund’s totals steadily increased to more than $5,000 in 1908, $15,000 in 
1916, and $25,000 in 1921. The Federation was largely controlled by the East Side 
Reform and Conservative German Jews.44  
 
This merger gave the East Side Jewish leaders almost total control over a great deal of relief 
funds. It also provided relief workers with the resources to create and sustain a Settlement House 
in Milwaukee. These houses were part of a national movement designed to provide well 
organized and appropriate assistance for those worthy of it.  
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SETTLEMENT HOUSE MILWAUKEE 
Prior to the 1902 merger of several charitable groups noted above, the new Milwaukee 
Settlement also established programs designed to assist immigrants in Milwaukee and create 
better living conditions in the Haymarket neighborhood, the home of the West Side Jewish 
immigrants.  
Jewish women in American society in the late nineteenth century participated in a variety of 
social causes. Historian Jonathan D. Sarna wrote that “In response to the manifold crises of the day; 
particularly assimilation and immigration, responsibility for ‘saving Judaism’ came to increasingly 
rest upon the shoulders of women. The home, they synagogue, and philanthropic social work came 
increasingly to be seen as part of women's domain.”45 Historian Idana Goldberg believed that the 
weakening of traditional religious social structures led the philanthropic efforts of affluent Jewish 
Americans, with women assuming positions of social service.46 The Settlement in Milwaukee 
began in 1900 with the consolidation of three different Jewish programs established by women: 
The Council of Jewish Women, Sisterhood of Personal Service, and Jewish Mission.47 Upper 
class Milwaukee Jewish women created these groups and united in order to offer poverty relief 
services under the leadership of an East Side Jewish woman named Lizzie Black Kander.48 
Gurda described the relationship between members of the Milwaukee Jewish community. “There 
was an obvious chasm between the local German-Jewish establishment and the eastern European 
Newcomers, he wrote “and no one bridged that gap more enthusiastically–or more 
effectively–than Lizzie[Black] Kander.”49 Her visits to the poorer Jewish homes in the 
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Haymarket neighborhood convinced her that in order to help the indigent, material relief was not 
enough. She was a driving force in the Milwaukee East Side Jewish community.  
Lizzie Black Kander was born on May 28, 1858 in Milwaukee. She was middle-class, 
German Jewish woman and a member of the Reform Congregation Emanu-El.50 She endeavored 
to educate the new immigrants in the East Side way life, including Milwaukee Reform religious 
traditions. Trattner noted that most settlements were religious missions. Beyond their 
proselytizing activities, they adopted a derogatory view of ethnic traditions and assumed that 
their proper role was that of Americanizing the immigrant with all possible speed.51 While the 
Milwaukee Settlement did not proselytize among the Gentile population, it did offer religious 
education for the more traditional Jewish European immigrants. Around 1907, the Milwaukee 
Settlement welcomed a new resident from Hull House in Chicago, “Plans for great activity at the 
settlement are being made, and will become effective upon the arrival of the new head resident, 
Miss Stella A. Loeb, who comes up from Chicago November 1 to go into residence at the 
settlement. Miss Loeb, who is teacher of music at the Avondale school in Chicago, has worked 
for eight years with Jane Addams at Hull house, teaching evening classes, and is conversant with 
the needs of settlement work. The settlement is now open for the cooking and sewing classes and 
the girls' clubs. The boys' clubs will begin next week.”52 
The Milwaukee Settlement residents sought to establish the accepted American cultural 
practices in the West Side Jewish immigrant population. The new immigrants received a great 
variety of lessons toward that goal. Settlement programs included instructions in the ways of 
Reform Judaism. Settlement house residents also believed that their middle-class values 
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improved the lives of the poor. They encouraged new immigrants to seek out volunteer work and 
adopt American values.53 While the settlement house movement may have not been democratic 
and progressive in its social reform policies, Trattner believed that: 
even their most ardent critics would agree that, despite some similarities, the 
settlements were significantly different from the organized charities and that 
many were mechanisms for reform that made invaluable contributions to the 
movement for social welfare and justice in late nineteenth- and early twentieth 
century America. To the extent that settlement house residents advocated or 
practiced social control, it was because they realized (as did public health 
crusaders and others as well) that social cohesion and justice in modern society 
depended upon purposeful planning and the curtailment of some individual 
liberty.54  
 
The Settlement movement in Milwaukee succeeded in that, as Trattner points out, “The 
settlements, then, embodied the neighborhood ideal– the desire to create an organic community 
among the people and institutions of a specific location.”55 The Settlement worked to improve 
the Haymarket neighborhood, and the lives of the West Side Jewish population. Lizzie Black 
Kander and her fellow volunteers created Sabbath School classes, gave instructions about 
keeping a clean house, and offered English language classes.56 There were tangible benefits 
from Settlement efforts for the poor. 
However, measuring the success of the Settlement efforts are a matter for debate by 
historians. Historian Rivka Shpak Lissak points out that if the definition of success included the 
realized goal of assimilation, then the settlement movement met that goal. She noted that 
Progressive ideology included an emphasis on social reform and cultural issues. Assimilated 
Americans were more worthy and less repugnant to residents.57 She points to Jane Addams and 
her work at Hull House in Chicago to illustrate the link between immigrant behavior and 
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assistance. Lissak described Hull House as a “salon” where residents worked to bring the cultural 
elite to the slums to work toward educating and assimilating the “neighbors” and create a “better 
element” within the slum.58 Settlement House efforts did lead to a measure of improvement in 
the lives of the poor. Lissak argued that these efforts were motivated, in part, by a sense of 
superiority on the part of the Settlement House residents. Their efforts to improve the lives of the 
poor were not purely altruistic. Historians Hasia Diner and Beryl Lieff Benderly remarked that 
“For all of the useful education they provided, for all the crucial assistance they rendered, for all 
the compassion they felt, many of the well-to-do helpers could not mask their condescension 
toward their less-favored brethren.”59 Conditional assistance, not acceptance or respect, was the 
legacy of the Settlement in the minds of these scholars. 
In the case of Milwaukee relief efforts before the Settlement House opened, there was at 
least on program that appeared to instruct Jewish women in on traditional skill: Kosher cooking. 
Called the “only ‘kosher’ cooking school this side of New York,” the school attempted to teach 
women to cook Kosher meals. The headline reads, “Only Kosher Cooking in the West: An 
Interesting Class of Jewish Girls are being taught to Cook by the Milwaukee Jewish Mission-- 
Miss Alida Pattee Is the Teacher, but She Finds it Difficult to observe the Kosher Laws.”60 The 
article notes that while Jews of a “higher class” may not keep Kosher, the Jews of the “lower 
class, especially the Russians” are “particular” about such matters.61 However, the article goes 
on to describe the teacher as one who trained at the Boston Cooking School, but until coming to 
Milwaukee “her ideas of ‘kosher’ cooking were rather vague.” It was noted that she made 
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mistakes in the kitchen that “horrified the children.” One example cited was the incident where 
she accidentally placed red edged napkins, signifying a “fleischdig” [meat] meal on a “milchdig” 
[dairy] tea table.62 Another example described how, when Miss. Pattee “forgets” and uses a dairy 
mixing spoon in a meat based soup, “there is always a small girl with large dark eyes and a 
wealth of coal black hair to point out the mistake.”63  
The Milwaukee Settlement initially created programs for children and met on the East Side, 
in the basement of Emanu El. In 1895, Kander Black led a group of volunteers in the Keep Clean 
Mission at Temple B’ne Jeshurun. The mission focused on hygiene; the children of immigrants 
were taught lessons about the importance of keeping clean and children were required to have 
“well-scrubbed hands and faces” at the meetings.64 After a year of operation, the group became 
the Milwaukee Jewish Mission. It began offering more educational and vocational programs. It 
also served as a community center for Jewish residents. They added cooking, sewing and 
embroidery classes for girls and woodcarving and painting lessons for boys in 1898.65 
In 1900, the Mission moved to a house called the Settlement on Fifth Street, one block away 
from the orthodox West Side shul, Beth Hamedrosh Haggodol.66 Gurda notes that “Nearly every 
Haymarket resident could find something to do at The Settlement, and it quickly became a 
community hub much like Chicago’s famed Hull House, which Jane Addams had established in 
1889.”67 In her obituary, it was noted that Lizzie Black Kander was “Called the ‘Jane Addams of 
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Milwaukee,’ Mrs. Kander was also affectionately known as the "Mother" of the Jewish Center. 
Through her work years ago at the Abraham Lincoln settlement house, old Jewish Center, she 
saw the need for other community meeting places for the foreign born, and the growth of the 
Milwaukee social center system is due partly to her efforts.”68 
The Settlement House offered educational programs, many centered around the kitchen and 
home and founded in East Side cultural norms and practices. The cooking lessons provided some 
of the recipes published in the Settlement Cookbook. Kander Black published them in 1896 as a 
fundraising experiment. She raised the eighteen dollars needed to publish the book through 
advertisements.69 This “experiment” sold out year after year, and became nationally recognized. 
Proceeds from book sales provided a “substantial portion” of money used to build a new facility, 
named Abraham Lincoln House.70 The money from sales supported The Settlement’s programs. 
Sociologist Howard W. Polsky posited an alternative perspective about the notion that the 
Settlement was a community hub. The opinions of the West Side Jewish community about the 
charitable efforts of East Side Jews are largely unknown, but Polsky believed that the West Side 
Jewish population saw the settlement movement in general and the Milwaukee Jewish Mission in 
particular as  
A group of ladies on the East Side, afforded leisure by the prosperity 
of their merchant-husbands, turned their efforts from study and the arts 
to what was called at that time ‘good and welfare’. For the most part 
members of the Reform Temple Emanu-El and the Council of Jewish 
Women, these ladies decided to come to the aid of their fellow Jews. It 
is a well-known observation among minority groups that recent 
converts to an outgroup's way of life can be more enthusiastic about 
‘showing the way’ to other minority members, still unacculturated, 
than natives themselves. The Reform group as a whole was to serve as 
a catalyst and harbinger of change to those Jews who arrived later on 
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the American scene. This was not always done tactfully. As a result of 
these ladies’ efforts the Milwaukee Jewish Mission was organized. It is 
worth recording the reaction of the immigrants. This title (Milwaukee 
Jewish Mission) was unfortunate and later was abandoned because of 
intense opposition of the immigrants themselves, who while realizing 
their need for assistance from their more fortunate American folk, 
resented the ‘mission idea’ applied to them.71 
 
Polsky believed that West Side Jews resented the charity efforts of the East Side Jewish 
community. He acknowledged that differences in socioeconomic status and the limited 
interaction between the East and West Side Jewish communities outside of charity work 
explained that resentment: 
Social and economic classes sought their own level. One of the most significant 
demonstrations of the vitality of social and economic class stratification can be found 
right within the Jewish community. Almost from the very beginning the poor man’s rich 
cousins sought to isolate themselves from their less fortunate relations. Contacts on a 
charity basis were frequent but seldom indeed for many years did relationships mature on 
the basis of equality.72 
 
 
However, historian Jonathan Sarna noted that the possibility of increased social status led to 
many second wave Jewish immigrants to Americanize as a means to an end, specifically, 
economic prosperity. He noted that as they adopted American Jewish cultural practices, they 
found better employment opportunities. Many curtailed their more traditional religious practices 
in order to take advantage of opportunities for upward mobility. Sarna allowed for the possibility 
that the second wave immigrants had some degree of agency in the decision to embrace more 
American Jewish practices.73 Polsky may have underestimated the importance of cultural capital 
and the advantages that come with it. It is also possible that the second wave Jewish immigrants 
considered themselves “Jewish” by birth and felt a sense of agency in defining their Jewish 
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practices. Philosopher Michael Krausz noted the contribution of descent to the construction of an 
individual’s Jewish identity. The ascribed status by way of an individual being born or converting 
to Jewish either by birth conversion created an established sense of a Jewish self. The West Side 
Jewish that did embrace East Side cultural norms and practices may have done so as a matter of 
personal choice, that is by assent.74 
Despite the criticism, the Settlement and later, Abraham Lincoln House, succeeded in 
providing a common meeting place for West Side Jews under the guidance of the East Side 
workers. Historians Swichkow and Gartner remarked that, “Like similar institutions in American 
Jewish communities during this age, the Milwaukee Jewish Settlement was also a meeting 
ground for native and immigrant young people.”75 The Settlement offered a variety of social and 
vocational programs and provided the opportunity for some East and West Side Jews to socialize, 
albeit in the context of charity. Abraham Lincoln House provided immigrants with public baths, a 
library, and classes in American history and civic lessons.76 In 1913, an article in the Milwaukee 
Sentinel announced the formation of a “new league” intent on helping “foreigners” in Milwaukee, 
“to give legal aid” to those that wanted to become citizens. The new entity was affiliated with the 
national organization called the American Foreign Aid league, which had branches in New York, 
Philadelphia, Boston, and Baltimore.77  
Despite the efforts of both the Federated Jewish Charities and The Settlement, the majority 
of indigent immigrants in Milwaukee, Jewish and Gentile, lacked access to health care. Some of 
the most successful men from the East Side Jewish population in Milwaukee established a 
Jewish hospital for the medical needs of indigent immigrants. The Federated Jewish Charities 
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began operations in 1902. It represented a new period in Milwaukee Jewish philanthropy, as 
emphasis shifted from emergency aid to systematic social service. The Jewish Hospital 
Association began to plan Mount Sinai in the same year. The hospital opened less than one year 
later. 
 
PLANS FOR MOUNT SINAI HOSPITAL  
Rabbi Victor Caro formed the Jewish Hospital Association in 1902 to create a Milwaukee 
Jewish hospital. Rabbi Caro led the B’ne Jeshurun congregation on the West Side and was 
dedicated to serving the original West Side Jewish community and the city of Milwaukee.78 
Rabbi Caro spoke out against his fellow Jews who criticized the new immigrants for being too 
religiously observant. His willingness to criticize other Jews made him controversial, a status of 
which he was aware. He stated “I know I have not pleased many of you because I have spoken 
often in forcible and bold language. I have done so because I will be held responsible at the bar 
of justice.”79  
Caro believed that Milwaukee needed a hospital for Jewish patients. The Hebrew Relief 
Association provided some medical care assistance at a small clinic before joining Federated 
Jewish Charities.80 After the merger, the Hebrew Relief Association created a new mission of 
social service. Swichkow and Gartner note that, “The founding of the Federated Jewish Charities 
opened a new period in Milwaukee Jewish philanthropy, as emphasis gradually shifted from 
emergency aid to systematic social service.”81  
At this time, health care assistance was considered emergency aid. Members of the Jewish 
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Hospital Association assumed responsibility for the creation of the hospital. Raising money was 
the biggest obstacle. Through his role in the Hospital Association, Rabbi Caro solicited financial 
support from the Milwaukee community, but he fell short. At about this time, a wealthy Jewish 
philanthropist from Iowa provided an initial donation that led to the creation of Mount Sinai 
Hospital. He continued to support the hospital even after death. His name was Abraham Slimmer. 
 
ABRAHAM SLIMMER: PHILANTHROPY AND RELIGIOUS IDENTITY 
The existing archival information about Abraham Slimmer indicates that he believed it was 
his religious duty to donate money to worthy causes. He supported Mount Sinai Hospital from 
the start. Historians differ in their descriptions of the man; Swichkow and Gartner describe him 
as “a Jewish millionaire who lived nearly in seclusion in Dubuque, Iowa.”82 His donations to 
Mount Sinai Hospital “indulged his hobby of endowing Jewish hospitals.”83 Gurda describes 
Slimmer as “a non-observant Jew and confirmed bachelor [who] developed a second career as a 
philanthropist, giving away millions to hospitals and homes for the elderly across the Midwest, 
with a particular fondness for institutions run by Catholic nuns and Jewish businessmen.”84 
Historian Stanley Bero described him as “Iowa’s humblest and best citizen, and described his 
actions in a positive manner.85 These interpretations are not definitive. It is true that Slimmer 
was rich, but felt it was his religious duty to give his money away. Philanthropy was not a second 
career; it was his self-described expression of Jewish religious beliefs.86 
The early life of Abraham Slimmer remains, for the most part, a mystery. Interviews he gave 
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to reporters at the time revealed attitudes about his charitable activities, but details about his 
upbringing remain unknown. He was born in Prussian Poland “about four miles from Posen” and 
in the words of one Interviewer he “prefers to be silent about this period of his life.”87 He 
emigrated from Poland and settled in New York when he was fifteen. He moved to Little Rock, 
Arkansas until the Civil War. He claimed to be inspired by the passage in Isaiah about making 
swords into plowshares and decided to start a farm.88  
Slimmer settled in Waverly, Iowa, and founded a cattle farm. Bero described the event in 
Slimmer’s life that shaped his philanthropic philosophy. When Slimmer’s first shipment of cattle 
arrived before he could pay for delivery, he approached a local banker for a loan. When asked what 
collateral he could offer to secure the loan, he replied “my word.” The banker refused the loan and 
went home to lunch. The banker’s wife urged her husband to accept Slimmer’s word after he 
related the exchange, and the banker did extend the credit and Slimmer repaid the loan.89 This 
experience shaped his rationale for contributing money. When asked about how best to help the 
poor, Slimmer was quoted as saying, “To put the honest and poor on their own mettle by giving 
them credit without interest so they might be able to compete with those whom fortune has favored 
more liberally has been his method of promoting good citizenship and of guaranteeing for himself 
the comfort of their friendship.”90 He believed that assistance created a sense of community spirit 
for the poor. The requirement that the community match his donation fostered a sense of gratitude 
on the part of the receiver.  
Slimmer gave money to a variety of causes, but all had to meet two conditions. The 
community had to match his donation in order to receive the donation, and the cause had to be 
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nonsectarian.91 He was committed to giving funds wisely to causes that were open to all worthy of 
need, consistent with the emphasis on worthiness touted by the scientific charity movement. Bero 
explained, “He does know what to do with his wealth and accomplishing his purpose in life. This 
purpose is a two-fold. One that the giving away of vast sums of money but without working a 
hardship in place of a benefit.”92 He wanted the funds he donated to improve the lives of the poor; 
he did not want to replace the hardship of poverty to be replaced by the hardship of dependence in 
keeping with the tenants of scientific charity. In a response to a question about why he gave away 
his money, Slimmer answered, “I regard my wealth as God given. I am merely the temporary 
custodian of the money with which I am blessed. It was ordained that I should have this money to 
use and Providence will hold me to account for my stewardship.”93 Slimmer believed the indigent 
would not and could not improve their lives without assistance from the more affluent in their 
communities and the community at large. His requirement for a matching donation from the public 
was a means of verifying the commitment of the population toward the goal of addressing the 
economic inequalities that led to poverty.94  
 Rabbi Caro approached Slimmer in 1902, at the start of the Jewish Hospital Committee’s 
efforts. Slimmer may have visited the early Dispensary operated by the Hebrew Relief Association, 
in disguise in order to determine Mount Sinai’s worthiness. He had done that in the past when 
approached for contributions.95 He pledged five thousand dollars to the hospital in early 1903 on 
two conditions: the community had to match his gift and the hospital must be nonsectarian. With 
the five thousand dollars from Slimmer, and the five thousand from donations by the Milwaukee 
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community, the Jewish Hospital Association planned their hospital.96 It took them less than a year 
to open Mount Sinai Hospital. 
Historian Rosemary Stevens describes the expectations placed on hospitals in the early 
twentieth century. Stevens notes that the charitable hospital functioned as a “household,” each one 
establishing “portals” of entry and rules for those lucky enough to gain entry. Patients seeking 
charity care had to abide by the house rules during treatment. Institutions ensured the patient did 
not become too comfortable with charity. The institution instilled the rules in their patients. 
Hospital staff monitored patients’ signs of dependency and educated them about the perils of 
charity.97 The investigations required before the impoverished received care were often less 
stringent than for cash or food. Historian Michael B. Katz illustrated the difference between poor 
relief and health care needs using the case of Mrs. B, an elderly woman denied help for food after 
the investigation determined she was slothful; once discovered deathly ill she was brought to a 
hospital, where she died 2 days later.98 Mrs. B received assistance only after becoming very ill. Up 
to that point, the goal of preventing dependency and denying the undeserving remained an 
important objective. 
Some charitable association leaders in American cities at the time worried that too many 
organizations depressed overall relief resources. For example, in Boston, in 1909, Jewish and 
non-Jewish citizens opposed plans for a Jewish hospital. They accused hospital organizers of 
“highway robbery” and of “fleecing” the Jewish community for more charity; they felt their 
community could not sustain existing programs and a new hospital.99 In Newark, New Jersey, it 
took years for the Jewish community to establish Beth Israel Hospital, despite a much larger 
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Jewish population than in Milwaukee.100 In Milwaukee, some of Jewish leaders feared that the 
hospital costs threatened the emerging social service network. Morris Miler, the president of 
Federated Jewish Charities in 1903, voiced concerns that the hospital would decrease the resources 
available for new social services. The decision to consolidate all medical services at the new 
hospital assuaged those concerns. The hospital assumed responsibility for all health care services, 
leaving Federated Jewish Charities to develop social service assistance programs.101 There were 
some on the Board of Federated Jewish Charities that disagreed with the decision, citing the 
number of hospitals already serving Milwaukee. The hospital effort got an important boost when 
the Federated Jewish Charities decided that the new hospital actually provided the means to move 
forward with their plans for expanded social services. The five thousand dollars from Slimmer, and 
the matching raised from the Milwaukee community, financed the purchase of a building at 4th and 
Walnut for the new hospital.102 The Jewish community was grateful for his gift. Rabbi Caro 
remarked, “We can return our gratitude for his assistance in placing in this city a monument which 
is and which we hope in the future will be worthy of his and our highest ideas.”103 
Mount Sinai Hospital Milwaukee was dedicated on June 12, 1903. Hospital Board Secretary 
Leopold Hammel declared, “This occasion demonstrates an era in Judaism, not in the country or 
in this commonwealth, but in the city of Milwaukee. On a foundation wide in scope we have 
builded [sic] a house wherein shall be nursed the sick and distressed of all races and of all creeds. 
Today we dedicate this house, where all alike, rich and poor, Jew or Gentile, will be 
welcomed.”104 Board President Max Landauer described Mount Sinai as, “hospital for all creeds, 
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where the rich or poor, the high or low, the Jew or the Gentile can receive free care.”105 
The hospital treated many indigent patients in 1903. They were usually referred to the 
hospital by Federated Jewish Charity workers and had been found eligible for care. However, 
acute illnesses and emergency situations were treated immediately.106 Relief workers categorized 
health care needs, especially contagious illnesses, as urgent services. They usually bypassed any 
investigation until such time as the person had recovered.107 Sixty-two of the one hundred 
seventy-five patients cared for in its first year received free care. In 1905, the hospital served 300 
patients, over one half free of charge. In 1906, 245 patients were served, in 1907, 408, with the 
large majority being free cases. An addition in 1907 allowed Mount Sinai to treat more and more 
patients, many of them for free.108 Its focus on serving the poor required a community 
fundraising effort. At the June 1903 dedication, Leopold Hammel stated the time would come 
when the hospital again asked for their help, “And when that summons comes to you may you be 
ready to answer as Abraham of old, ‘Here Lord, am I.’”109 The Mount Sinai Ladies’ Auxiliary 
coordinated the 1907 drive to build the addition. The tradition of fundraising and organizational 
skills of the female volunteers at Mount Sinai supported the hospital from the beginning.  
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MOUNT SINAI LADIES AUXILIARY  
In Milwaukee, the Ladies’ Auxiliary assumed much of responsibility for funding the hospital. 
The Auxiliary was formed in 1902 as part of the Jewish Hospital Association. Auxiliary members 
worked at Mount Sinai year round at a variety of tasks, preparing bandages and linens and making 
clothes and toys for the children. They also served as volunteers at the hospital assisting the staff 
with patient care.110 One of their major contributions was the annual Donation Drive held on 
President’s Day, starting in 1904. The Mount Sinai women organized and hosted the event, with 
great success. By 1906, the hospital had outgrown the facility and hospital leaders announced the 
need for an expansion. The hospital received a percentage of $10,780 in that year. The exact 
amount is unknown as the yearly report listed on the names of the organizations that received 
money, not an exact amount.111 Slimmer donated an additional $5000 after the community 
contributed $7,000 on Donation Day 1906 to fund a new expansion. The expansion opened in 
1907.112 
Donation Day contributions provided crucial funding for Mount Sinai Hospital. Colder 
winters than usual brought more patients some years. In 1913, a free Dispensary opened. The 
Ladies’ Auxiliary staffed the free maternity program at Mount Sinai. Ten years into their mission, 
the hospital was treating more patients annually: 224 Jewish and 449 non-Jewish, with 374 being 
“charity cases, including 132 free maternity cases.” In 1914, a new hospital building at 945 N. 12th 
Street was officially opened, treating a total of 1,489 patients (1,105 non-Jews, 384 Jews). The 
hospital publicized the urgent financial needs of the hospital, Dispensary, and the maternity 
programs to the community at large. A Milwaukee Sentinel editorial reported on February 19, 1915, 
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just before the annual Donation Day, that those needs are the “urgent reason why the institution 
should be liberally patronized on the annual Donation Day.” Donation Day brought in $1500.113 In 
1917, the Donation Day appeal to the Milwaukee community on Mount Sinai’s behalf was even 
more emphatic. The Milwaukee Sentinel noted that, “Demands upon Mount Sinai for free service, 
resulting from the extremely cold winter, combined with the abnormally high cost of medical 
supplies, food stuffs and other hospital requirements have been so large during the past year that 
officers and members of the board of directors of the hospital association believe the citizens of 
Milwaukee should extend liberal patronage.”114 The hospital raised $2300.115 Federated Jewish 
Charities gave an unknown portion of a total of $31, 320 collected for the year to the hospital. 
Much of that money was dedicated to care for indigent patients.116 
The large number of indigent patients at Mount Sinai Hospital provided a certain amount of 
validation for the Hospital Board of Mount Sinai Hospital; the number of poor patients treated in 
the first ten years verified the contention that Milwaukee urgently needed this hospital. Hospital 
Board Secretary Leopold Hammel stated, “Many claimed that there was no need for a hospital. 
Others even charged us with doing wrong by diverting from other charitable work the money given 
to us by our people. To all of these I desire to say that my humble opinion practicing charity in any 
form is good in the eyes of the Lord and ours is genuine charity.”117  
The hospital treated an increasing number of patients, but not many from the Jewish 
community. The number of Jewish patients treated at Mount Sinai was low from the beginning. 
Just a year after the hospital’s founding, Mount Sinai Hospital’s Board secretary Leopold Hammel 
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stated, “Although we are a Jewish organization, the only Jewish hospital in the state, we have cared 
for more non-Jews in this first year than we have Jews.” In 1907, President Landauer declared at 
the dedication of the new addition, “Since the erection of the hospital 3 years ago, we find by our 
records that less than ¼ of the patients treated were Jews. Another interesting feature is that 94% 
of the people taken care of were charity patients. While our organization is strictly a Jewish one, 
the hospital is not sectarian, and it is our aim to do all the good we can for all these classes of 
people.”118 The support of Jewish community in Milwaukee for Mount Sinai provided indigent 
care for mostly non-Jewish patients. The most likely reason for that circumstance is that the 
hospital was nonsectarian at its foundation. Swichkow and Gartner wrote that the percentage of 
Jews treated at Mount Sinai was lower than any “sizable Jewish hospital in the country and 
stirred considerable discussion. One hint came from a [n unnamed] Yiddish source, that Jewish 
patients felt no different in a Jewish hospital which celebrated Christmas than in any other 
hospital. The unavailability of kosher food was another probable cause.”119  
 
JEWISH CONCERNS AND A NONSECTARIAN HOSPITAL  
Throughout the first decade of operation, Mount Sinai treated more Gentiles than it did Jews. 
Leopold Hammel was not concerned by the lack of Jewish patients. He explained the hospital’s 
general mission, stating “While our organization is strictly a Jewish one, the hospital is not 
sectarian, and it is our aim to do all the good we can for all these classes of people.”120 In 1922, an 
editorial in the Wisconsin Jewish Chronicle chastised Milwaukee’s Jews for failing to patronize the 
hospital: “The disproportionate number of Jewish patients suggests the thought of a lack of interest 
in a Jewish hospital on the part of the Jews of Milwaukee. With hearty cooperation, there can come 
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only substantial settlement and we must strive to the public and especially the Jewish portions 
thereof, appreciate the objects and purposes of our uplifting mission and recognize the beneficent 
service performed by the hospital.”121 On July 8, 1922, another editorial asked 
But are the Jews of this city proud of their hospital, than which there is none better in the 
whole land? It doesn’t seem that they are from this sentence in the report of Secretary 
Hammel, the disproportionate number of Jewish patients suggests the thought of a lack of 
interest in a Jewish hospital on the part of the Jews of Milwaukee. Do some Jews avoid 
Mount Sinai because it is a Jewish hospital? Is it less fashionable to be an inmate in a 
Jewish hospital than in a non-Jewish institution? To those who hold any such prejudices, 
we would suggest a visit and thorough inspection of Mount Sinai Hospital.122  
 
Why were there so few Jewish patients? The surviving archival evidence hints at why 
contemporaries believed Milwaukee’s Jews failed to patronize the hospital, but does not offer 
a definitive explanation. The religious differences within the Jewish community in Milwaukee 
could explain low Jewish patronage at Mount Sinai. The resentment of the West Side Jewish 
toward the East Side Jewish charity workers and their attempts to impose their own Jewish 
beliefs on the newcomers offers another possible explanation. The East Side Jews created a 
hospital intended for a population with whom they had little in common. It is possible that the 
West Side Jewish population considered Mount Sinai Hospital not sufficiently Jewish. The lack 
of Kosher food and differences in Jewish religious observance may have kept members of the 
Jewish community from coming to the hospital.123 On the other side of the Milwaukee River, 
the East Side Jewish population may not have planned on using the hospital, believing it was for 
West Side Jewish patients.  
The hospital continued caring for the sick, and the affluent members of the East Side Jewish 
population continued to support the hospital through donations and volunteer hours. However, the 
Stock Market Crash of 1929 and the Great Depression of the 1930s increased the number of 
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indigent patients who used Mount Sinai’s services. The number of indigent patients at American 
hospitals increased generally, and the donations decreased as the affluent suffered the effects of the 
Depression. Mount Sinai Hospital sought solutions to address its financial difficulties. The 
hospital’s leaders sought new methods in order to fund operations, including a new larger 
Dispensary and a hospital insurance plan. The Dispensary, which opened in 1935 succeeded in 
creating a cooperative health care network in Milwaukee. It provided medical care for those in 
need, training and education for doctors and nurses, and cooperated with other social service 
entities to provide care. The Dispensary remained open until the late 1960s. Also at this time, 
leaders at Mount Sinai tried to establish a hospital membership program to pay for medical care. It 
was designed as a form of insurance sold to prospective patients. This plan ended after strong 
opposition from the medical professionals in Milwaukee. However, it is indicative of the later 
struggles between insurance programs and hospitals and a precursor to the eventual Preferred 
Provider Organization agreements that began in the late 1970s and early 1980s.
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CHAPTER 3 DISPENSARY CARE AND MOUNT SINAI HOSPITAL 
This chapter discusses the creation of the Dispensary at Mount Sinai Hospital, in 
order to analyze the importance of the Jewish community in supporting the hospital. The 
Jewish contributions to the Mount Sinai Dispensary, opened in 1925 and renovated in 
1935, were integral to the treatment of the poor in Milwaukee. Funds from the 
community and volunteer hours from the members of the Ladies Auxiliary sustained 
operations for medical services. Students at the Mount Sinai Nursing School, opened in 
1924, also staffed the Dispensary, as did medical interns and residents. Medical care, 
child care, follow up care, inpatient and outpatient services were all part of the care 
network at Mount Sinai. Thirty-two agencies cooperated with the Dispensary during 1937 
alone, including the Catholic Welfare Bureau, the St. Benedict the Moor Mission as well 
as Jewish Social Services Association, Family Welfare Association, Milwaukee 
Children’s Hospital, and the Milwaukee Health Department.1 This chapter includes a 
brief history of two other Milwaukee hospitals, The Passavant and Deaconess. For this 
research, Passavant Hospital will be called The Passavant, in order to distinguish it from 
William Passavant, its founder. The history of these two hospitals are relevant. The 
merger between them in 1982 provided an example of the impact of changes in funding 
for health care for the poor on private hospitals. That merger created Good Samaritan 
Medical Center, the facility that, after the 1987 merger with Mount Sinai, created Sinai 
Samaritan Medical Center. 
In the 1920s, changes at American hospitals occurred rapidly. The increase in 
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medical training programs and the creation of research programs and a decrease in the 
number of dispensaries at urban hospital changed medical services for the poor. 
Dispensaries, the precursor to outpatient clinics, suffered in the wake of the modernization 
of hospitals. Dispensaries provided medical services for the poor in many American 
hospitals. Many of them began to close in the wake of the creation of medical specialties in 
the 1920s in order to make room for expanded education programs and medical specialty 
departments.2 Mount Sinai Hospital is unique in that it opened and expanded the 
Dispensary during that same time.  
Nursing schools opened at many urban hospitals during this time. The students staffed 
the hospital affiliated with their program as part of their education. Mount Sinai Hospital 
opened a nursing school in 1924. Historian Rosemary Stevens remarked that hospitals 
treated dispensaries as teaching laboratories for doctors and nurses to study the progression 
of disease and gain clinical knowledge, not to aid the poor. When hospitals expanded to 
accommodate their educational programs, dispensaries closed.3 Historian Michael Katz 
also remarked that the growth of modern hospitals ended Dispensary care for residents in 
cities like New York and Boston because doctors preferred clinical experience in 
hospitals.4 The new departments created medical specialties, which increased the 
occupational prestige of the doctors. The general hospital model and the dispensaries gave 
way to a modern approach to medicine based on specialized expertise. Historian Charles 
Rosenberg noted that dispensaries became “decreasingly central as hospitals increased in 
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number and opportunities for clinical training expanded.”5 It was difficult for modern 
hospitals to create specialty departments and continue to treat poor patients in dispensaries. 
Medical students and doctors sought appointments in the new hospitals for their medical 
experience and education and hospital closed their dispensaries to provide space for their 
growing programs.  
However, Rosenberg noted that these changes were not universally embraced. Some 
hospital officials and doctors resisted the drive toward specialization of hospital care. 
Leaders at New York City’s Mount Sinai in particular believed that specialized medical 
services dehumanized patients, transforming them until they were “not a person but a 
configuration of organs and potential syndromes.”6 However, Mount Sinai New York 
decreased Dispensary services and expanded medical education facilities to meet the 
increased demand for doctors.7 
Mount Sinai Hospital Milwaukee did not create a Dispensary for indigent patients as 
part of a teaching laboratory. It established a Dispensary for the explicit purpose of serving 
the poor. Milwaukee’s Mount Sinai combined the missions of teaching and caring for the 
poor at the Dispensary, something many urban hospitals did not consider for their 
institutions.8 The need for staff at the Dispensary meant professional opportunities for the 
younger Jewish doctors in Milwaukee that were not available in larger cities. For example, 
young doctors encountered long waiting lists at New York’s Mount Sinai Hospital for staff 
positions due to the number of doctors in need of internships.9 At Chicago’s Michael Reese 
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Hospital, a Dispensary opened in 1893. The staff of seventeen doctors treated fourteen 
hundred patients a month during the first year.10 The patients paid what they could, and 
those without the means were treated at no cost. In 1899, the Dispensary expanded. 
However, in the early twentieth century, Michael Reese leaders decided to expand medical 
research and specialty departments at the hospital. They established the Medical Research 
Institute in 1929 mainly because leaders believed medical research programs led to 
increased funds.11 Hospital leaders believed that “the new hospital building, which opened 
in 1907, exemplified a number of new trends in architecture as well as in charity and 
medicine.”12   
In Milwaukee, doctors, student nurses and Auxiliary members staffed the Dispensary. 
The nursing school provided student labor for the wards, and the indigent population 
provided the clientele. The financial commitments from the collective Jewish community 
funded the new Dispensary and the main hospital.13  
The 1923 Report on Free Care articulated Mount Sinai’s mission to the people of 
Milwaukee by way of the new Dispensary. The Committee submitted the report to Mount 
Sinai’s Board on October 14, 1923 “for the purpose of considering free work to the hospital 
and recommending ways and means of increasing the amount thereof.”14 The hospital’s 
nonsectarian mission grounded the report. The report stated that “Mount Sinai Hospital, 
pursuant to proper authority has sought to extend its service not only to those whose means 
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14 Mount Sinai Hospital Committee Report on Free Work, Page 1, Box 50, Folder 15, Sinai Samaritan Collection. 
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permit them to pay therefore, but also to the indigent, and those of limited means.”15It 
recommended expanding and solidifying Mount Sinai’s role in charity care especially to 
“those who otherwise might have been deprived of proper medical or hospital attention.”16 
It urged the Board to reaffirm the hospital’s original mission: to treat, nurse, and care for 
Milwaukee’s sick, disabled, and infirm persons, regardless of nationality or creed. “Mount 
Sinai has won the appreciation of the people of this city,” the report stated, “irrespective of 
religious belief or racial distinction. While full pay cases for all, irrespective of their 
religious faith, should be continued, such services should be subordinated to the greater 
service that can be rendered toward the deserving, without expense to them.”17  
By 1938, Mount Sinai developed a comprehensive and community-wide health care 
system at the Dispensary. The nonsectarian nature of the hospital provided the Dispensary 
with funds from places like Catholic charities, the Milwaukee County Fund, and other 
private charity concerns, in recognition of the services Mount Sinai provided to non-Jewish 
indigents. The Dispensary also had a new Occupational Therapy Department. This 
department was funded, organized, and staffed by the Ladies Auxiliary of Mount Sinai. 
The Auxiliary volunteers assisted patients in exercises in order to strengthen injured limbs 
and to increase fine motor skills after injury or stroke.18  
The Dispensary was a success, but the efforts to raise money for operations revealed 
a decrease in support for fund raising efforts within the Jewish community in Milwaukee. 
During the 1935 fund raising drive, Felix Lowy called upon the younger generation of the 
Jewish community to take their place in supporting the Jewish institutions of Milwaukee 
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to meet the fundraising goal. The drive fell short. The failure to reach a funding goal 
surprised and concerned members of the Mount Sinai Hospital Board. They were 
growing older. The younger members of the Jewish community had not joined them in 
supporting the hospital. The ramifications of the decreased support from the community 
are key points in future chapters. 
  
MOUNT SINAI, FREE WORK, AND THE DISPENSARY OF 1924 
Mount Sinai opened the first of two large dispensaries in 1924. A small Dispensary 
existed prior to the creation of Mount Sinai Hospital, but closed after 1903.19 The 1924 
facility came about in part because of the recommendations found in the 1923 Report on 
Free Care. The report noted the need for heath care for the indigent Jewish population. It 
elaborated on the specific needs of the large Jewish population in Milwaukee, stating  
 
The rapid growth of the Jewish population of the city in recent years has, however, 
given rise to the need of extending the free work among our people, as well as those 
of other faiths to the fullest extent of our financial means, and hospital facilities. 
This hospital should serve as a center for the promulgation of health measures. It 
should be a health center, whither may come, not only those requiring strictly 
hospital attention, but also for those whose needs can be served in outpatient or 
similar departments.20  
 
Despite the relatively low number of Jewish patients at Mount Sinai, the report 
specifically identified the commitment to Jewish patients as an important reason to build 
the new Dispensary. The lack of Dispensary services in Milwaukee included in the above 
quote served as another reason to build a Dispensary at Mount Sinai.  
Another crucial recommendation of the committee was that Mount Sinai should 
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develop as a health center for the city of Milwaukee at Mount Sinai Dispensary. It stated the 
Board should “amplify its present policy toward free and partial pay cases, social service 
activities, and the like, by the establishment and maintenance of a free Dispensary, or 
outpatient department, and such clinics as may be recommended by the Medical 
Administration Committee and the Medical staff.”21 The committee wanted to create a 
Dispensary as part of a social service in order to provide comprehensive assistance to 
patients. The reported noted that,  
From time to time, the question has arisen in the minds of individual members of 
the Board whether the hospital has done all that should or can be done in and by an 
institution of this kind, not only in strict hospitalization work for the indigent and 
those of limited means, but also in extending our social service department so as to 
include preventive work, particularly with respect to the Jewish people.22  
 
This was important in light of changes at other Jewish relief organization in 
Milwaukee. In 1921, the Hebrew Relief Association became Jewish Social Services 
Association(JSSA). This change reflected a reorganization of the Association. The new 
organization directed its resources to social work instead of emergency relief services. 
JSSA established programs to assist families with a number of social services, including 
referring patients to Mount Sinai for medical care. The JSSA served the Dispensary 
through the referral of patients and arranging home health services and other assistance 
after the patient was discharged.23  
The committee suggested the transfer of the small clinic operations from the Jewish 
Social Service Association clinic to Mount Sinai and enlarging them meet the needs of the 
poor of Milwaukee. 
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The report stated, 
Your committee believes that the high standard and ideals of the medical 
profession will impel members of that profession to give of their time and 
professional skill toward the successful maintenance of these clinics, and 
the out-patient departments. We believe it to be the rule that the important 
and effective medical clinics which are maintained in hospitals the world 
over are under the guidance and supervision of members of the medical 
profession who have by their industry, skill and devotion to higher 
professional standards, attained fame and renown in the profession, and in 
the communities in which they live; and so it will undoubtedly come to pass 
that these clinics in Mount Sinai will not only reflect credit upon the 
hospital and its sponsors, but upon those physicians, surgeons, and dentists 
who will render service in connection therewith. It must be apparent to all 
that the innovations contained in this report will assure more free work in 
the hospital. The name Mount Sinai will stand for an institution absolutely 
unique among hospitals in this city and state. In short time the poor, the 
needy, and the distressed will look upon this institution as an agency for 
their relief. The hospital then will not only serve as a curative agency, but 
also as a center for the prevention of disease, and thus be a means toward 
upholding sanitation and health in the community.24 
 
The centralization of charity health care at Mount Sinai facilitated the transition of the 
Hebrew Relief Association into a social service institution. The organization changed its 
name to the Jewish Social Service Association, and altered their mission statement to 
include social services for families and children.25 The report suggested that working with 
JSSA, Mount Sinai could “Develop a heath care center. One that should amplify its present 
policy toward free and partial pay cases, social service activities, and the like by the 
establishment and maintenance of a free Dispensary.”26 The JSSA became one of 
Milwaukee’s most comprehensive social service institutions. The Mount Sinai Dispensary 
represented one of the most centrally located medical institutions in Milwaukee. The JSSA 
and Mount Sinai worked together to provide medical and social services in Milwaukee. 
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The transfer of medical services to Mount Sinai from the Jewish Social Service Association 
reflected the change in mission and focus at the JSSA, in that it no longer provided medical 
services. The JSSA referred patients to the Dispensary.27 The Free Dispensary opened in 
1924. Abraham Slimmer donated fifty thousand dollars, but the Milwaukee community 
raised an additional eighty thousand dollars, for a total of one hundred thirty thousand 
dollars.28 
 
SERVICES AT MOUNT SINAI DISPENSARY: 1924 
In the 1920s, medical advances spurred the creation of more hospital in cities around 
the United States as well as expansions at existing facilities. The demand for clinical 
experience for medical students in hospitals increased. In 1924, dispensaries at many urban 
hospitals competed for resources in the wake of the modernization of hospitals. The 
medical professionals, doctors, supported the creation of medical specialties and 
dispensaries closed to accommodate expanded medical programs.29 Rosemary Stevens 
argued that the medical profession created and maintained an identity based on the 
increasing prestige of the doctors in the 1920s.30 Hospitals closed dispensaries and built 
operating rooms, laboratories, and nursing schools. Many, including Mount Sinai New 
York, established themselves in their communities as elite institutions of medical 
learning.31  
Mount Sinai differed from most urban hospitals by building and expanding its 
Dispensary when most hospitals closed them. Dispensary patients provided medical 
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education opportunities for doctors and nurses in Milwaukee. The addition of Dispensary 
services and outpatient programs established Mount Sinai as a community hospital for 
Milwaukee and much “like clinics which are maintained as well as a teaching institution 
for staff.”32 The Dispensary treated patients based on financial need. However, in addition 
to the eligibility investigation, the staff evaluated the medical needs of patients. That is, 
Dispensary staff treated patients after confirming they were worthy of help and the care 
they sought was appropriate. Patients with minor illnesses were more likely to be denied 
free care, in favor of those with more serious illnesses. Dispensary leaders prioritized the 
care of those most seriously ill, and sent less expensive, less serious cases to doctors for 
care. The rationale was that those with minor medical problems were less likely to suffer 
hardship from the cost of their care. The Dispensary was more likely to treat an expensive 
serious medical problem to keep the patient from increased financial hardship. For example, 
the Dispensary often sent paying patients in need of non-emergency care to a doctor in 
favor of an application from a partial pay patient or free care patient. The chronic or more 
serious condition required more care and follow up services. The Dispensary was much 
more likely to care for an unstable diabetic or surgically repair a hernia than they were to 
care for a less expensive condition. This policy provided the staff with learning 
opportunities similar to those found at medical schools in other city hospitals.33 
The committee justified this policy in the report, stating,  
The committee submits these facts so that the Board may have in mind that these 
many men and women are devoting time and effort toward the proper 
maintenance of the hospital and your committee believes that it reflects the 
thought and feeling of each of these men and women in expressing the statement 
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that these men and women are contributing this service in a spirit of philanthropy 
and benevolence, rather than from a desire to provide hospitalization for patients 
who have sufficient means to pay therefor.34  
 
The hospital with a Dispensary model at Mount Sinai served as an example of how 
health care institutions utilized health care resources in the years before government 
and private insurance plans. Patients with serious conditions and in need of more 
expensive medical care received priority for assistance. Those who had minor issues 
went elsewhere with the understanding that treating their condition was not likely to 
cause undue financial hardship. This sometimes meant the Dispensary treated fewer 
patients, but the ones who received care were among the sickest and poorest. After the 
hospital took over medical operations from The Hebrew Relief Association, patients 
went to the Dispensary, the first point of contact for patients. Dispensary staff evaluated 
each case and referred patients appropriately.35  
The Dispensary became part of one of Milwaukee’s more comprehensive social and 
health care service institutions. The Mount Sinai Dispensary treated the patients 
Milwaukee County could not admit to their hospital. It provided services for patients 
designed to manage health conditions to the full extent of medical technology of the day.36 
Unlike patients at other dispensaries, patients at Mount Sinai benefited from the practices 
established by the hospital board in 1923. Hospital staff trained at Mount Sinai’s 
Dispensary from 1924 through the 1960s. The Dispensary, later the outpatient clinic, was 
closed after the Medicaid Program was started. According to Harry Kanin, “The hospital 
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didn’t think it was needed anymore.”37 There were changes coming. A global economic 
depression increased the number of indigent patients in need of assistance. Hospitals like 
Mount Sinai faced rising costs, more patients, and less money by way of both donations 
and payments for care. The Dispensary proved to be very successful at a time when other 
hospitals struggled to remain open. 
 
HOSPITALS AND THE DEPRESSION  
The Depression of 1929 caused a great deal of financial hardship for many city 
hospitals. The efforts to establish hospitals as elite places of healing resulted in a 
quandary for many hospitals. The number of indigent patients increased, and so did the 
cost of health care. Rosemary Stevens noted that “For patients and their doctors the 
lessons of the 1920s had been well learned. Because hospitals were now recognized as 
providers of an essential service, it was difficult to cut this service to the bone.”38 The 
success of the movement to create modern urban hospitals did cause a problem of 
increased demand for services and increased indigent patients. Stevens remarked, 
“Hospitals were prisoners of increased demand– both from doctors seeking to hospitalize 
patients and from a growing group of patients who could not pay.”39  
A number of hospitals, Mount Sinai Milwaukee included, attempted to raise funds by 
offering prospective patients the opportunity to purchase hospital days through 
memberships which offered the benefit of a fixed number of hospital days per year in 
exchange for a fee and a subscription payment. In 1930, according to Mount Sinai 
Superintendent L.C. Austin, hospitals in Milwaukee were losing an estimated three to four 
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dollars a day. Mount Sinai Hospital reported a deficit that year because It treated slightly 
fewer paying patients, while the proportion of patients unable to pay rose considerably. An 
emergency fund raising drive covered the debt, but Austin explored other options for 
raising money.40 Leaders at Mount Sinai reasoned that the Depression led to an increase in 
the need for charity care and also made it difficult, if not impossible, for donors to maintain 
the level of funding for the hospital received in the 1920s.41  
In 1935, Superintendent Austin announced a plan to sell prepaid hospital services. 
Austin attempted to fund the hospital by selling what he called “hospital memberships.” 
The plan seemed simple enough and Mount Sinai’s leaders hoped this would wipe out 
deficit caused by the increased care of indigent patients during the Depression. The idea 
was based on a program already in place at Mount Sinai Milwaukee. Starting in 1928, 
expectant mothers could pay five dollars a month throughout their pregnancies. By the 
time the baby was delivered, the bill was already paid.42 Hospital leaders believed the 
same principle could be applied to all prospective patients. Under the new plan, clients 
purchased health care services at Mount Sinai including a set number of hospital days, 
room and board, operating room services, laboratory and x-ray work, and some 
medications.43 For ten dollars, the member purchased 21 days of hospitalization for the 
year. Austin believed that the plan would ease the burden of charity care debt on the 
hospital.44 The plan could be purchased in advance for use throughout the year.  
 
                                                 
40 Newspaper clipping, “Average Milwaukee Hospital Loses $3-$4 per Day per Patient,” Milwaukee Sentinel, 
September 16, 1930, Box 1, Folder 4, Mount Sinai Collection, JMM Archives. 
41 Newspaper clipping, “Average Milwaukee Hospital Loses $3-$4 per Day per Patient,” Milwaukee Sentinel, 
September 16, 1930, Box 1, Folder 4, Mount Sinai Collection, JMM Archives. 
42 Earl R. Thayer, Seeking to Serve: A History of the Medical Society of Milwaukee County, 1846-1996 (Milwaukee, 
WI: Medical Society of Milwaukee County, 1996), 57-58. 
43 Thayer, Seeking to Serve, 58. 
44 Newspaper clipping, “Average Milwaukee Hospital Loses $3-$4 per Day per Patient,” Milwaukee Sentinel, 
September 16, 1930, Folder 4, Mount Sinai Collection, JMM Archives. 
 139 
 
The costs of indigent care were very high. In 1931, the hospital had lowered prices 
because of the Depression. The hospital lost $21,000 in 1932. Austin explained that 
private hospitals like Mount Sinai were in danger of closing. “Sixty percent of all hospital 
beds in the United States are in independent and public hospitals. The public hospitals are 
today taxed to capacity and would not be able to care for the patients who would be 
dumped on them if the private hospitals were forced to close.”45 In 1933, Mount Sinai 
leaders needed $35,000 for direct patient care. They hoped membership sales would raise 
at least this sum. 
However, The Medical Society of Milwaukee County issued a statement saying that a 
program like this threatened other hospitals and the livelihood and authority of doctors. 
This Society was relatively new. Starting in 1902, members of the Society tried to unify 
Milwaukee County doctors.46 There was serious concern on the part of the doctors about 
the state of available medical education in Milwaukee. At this time, charges that The 
Milwaukee Medical College conferred degrees to improperly trained doctors.47 They 
established a committee in 1913 to study the economic conditions for doctors and found 
that in relation to other professions, doctors earned significantly less money. The Society 
drafted a plan designed to increase income for doctors in order to entice doctors to join 
the Society. The plan included investigations of all patients to ensure all who could pay 
for care did so. In addition, it suggested that younger doctors assume the majority of the 
responsibility for indigent care, leaving older and well established doctors “unburdened” 
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by such work.48 There was another reason for opposition. The Society attempted to 
create an insurance system in the years before WWI. The war delayed that initiative.49 
The Mount Sinai plan threatened plans to renew their own insurance program.  
At the time of the Mount Sinai Membership plan, the Society advocated for the 
“business, socioeconomic, and political work’ on the doctor’s behalf.50 The Mount Sinai 
plan represented a threat to Society members in that the plan required patients to use 
Mount Sinai. The Wisconsin State Medical Society remarked that “The plan would 
develop a system of medical practise [sic] in which the patient would be dealing with the 
hospital, so that the selection of physician might become a matter of choice by the 
hospital rather than the patient. It is our belief that a plan as proposed will result in a 
much greater demands upon the hospital than the income derived through the plan will 
warrant, and the service will be seriously cheapened.”51 Doctors rejected the notion that 
patients could form relationships with hospitals directly when their choice of a doctor was 
out of their hands. Austin responded that fear of change was not a good enough reason for 
Mount Sinai to end its plan. He declared that medical societies and doctors were 
frightened by innovation.52 Doctors considered the choice of hospitals part of the medical 
care under their authority. Membership plans, like the one at Mount Sinai, threatened that 
authority.53 The pressure from the Society ended the membership drive at Mount Sinai. 
The two hundred people who bought memberships received their hospital benefits.54  
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Austin also tried to address what he called “the common charge that hospital 
expenses are too high for the purse of the average citizen” by relating a story about an 
appendicitis case. The patient chose a hospital and had hired a nurse and stayed 18 days 
for a cost of $334. The man complained that the total was too much, and he blamed it 
solely on the hospital’s “terrible prices.”55 Austin explained that the line item bill showed 
the of the $334, $150 was paid to the doctor for his visits to the patient at Mount Sinai, 
$100 for the operation, $50 for visits, $49 for the special nurse who was paid about 60 
cents an hour for her work. The largest hospital cost was $90 for a room for 18 days. The 
nurse bought her meals at the hospital, which translated to $6.25 in revenue to the 
hospital. After expenses, the hospital lost $3 on the operating room; it broke even on the 
anesthetic charge, and lost on the rest of the bill at the rate of $3.60 a day.56  
After ending the membership initiative, the Board of Mount Sinai sought funds from 
a familiar source, the Milwaukee Jewish community. Mount Sinai still faced a serious 
financial situation and the organized opposition had made the membership drive 
unsuccessful. Hospital leaders organized a new charity drive. The drive was decisively 
more successful than the membership plan. It expanded the existing Dispensary at a time 
when many hospitals closed because of the Depression. 
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1938 MOUNT SINAI DISPENSARY EXPANSION 
The Great Depression caused much financial hardship for individuals and 
organizations. The Jewish community contributed money to support existing operations 
and fund the expansion. However, this particular drive required a great deal of support from 
the Gentile population in Milwaukee. The combined efforts of Jewish and Gentile 
community members raised the necessary funds. The Mount Sinai Dispensary and hospital 
survived; despite the country’s economic crisis, the benefactors of Mount Sinai continued 
their support. In fact, in 1938, the Dispensary expanded its services to include new services 
like Occupational Therapy and expanded surgery facilities, transitioning into an outpatient 
department.57 The growth of medical specialization at other hospital led to the creation of 
new departments at the Dispensary. The Jewish Social Service Association and Mount 
Sinai’s Ladies Auxiliary provided crucial resources to the Dispensary and the means to 
expand operations. 
 
SOLICITING COMMUNITY SUPPORT FOR COMMUNITY CARE 
     The fund raising drive of 1935 revealed weakened support from the Milwaukee 
Jewish population. Donations and volunteer numbers decreased. By 1935, the leaders of 
Mount Sinai realized that the Dispensary was in need of expansion and improvement. The 
Depression increased the number of indigent patients who came in search of medical help. 
The Hospital Board, in conjunction with the Ladies Auxiliary, started another fund raising 
drive to expand the facility. The Board decided the appeal for funds would be made to the 
Jewish and non-Jewish communities, in order to raise $75,000. Max Freschl, former 
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president of the Federated Jewish Charities, issued a statement to the Milwaukee Jewish 
community for their non-Jewish associates:  
 
 
A Message to Remember. When a patient enters Mount Sinai hospital for 
healing of any injury or sickness, there is only one concern of the hospital 
and that is to do the best that modern science and skill can do to heal or 
cure. . .In this regard Mount Sinai exemplifies the spirit of mercy, charity 
and humanity common to all religions. . .it is for this reason that Mount 
Sinai appeals to persons of all faiths to help carry it on, for Mount Sinai, 
though founded under Jewish auspices, is nonsectarian in service. This is 
the message you should carry to your friends who are not of the Jewish 
faith.58 
 
They sent a different message to Milwaukee’s Jewish community. Ed Osterman, 
Chairman of the Emergency Campaign of Mount Sinai Hospital wrote: 
A Message to the Jewish people of Milwaukee. Permit me to emphasis the 
fact that the forthcoming campaign is the only source through which may 
continue to function. The hospital is no longer a recipient of funds from 
the Federation, and is not affiliated with any other fund raising group. It is 
merely a matter of facts and figures that if the hospital does not obtain 
sufficient financial aid from the community to carry on its work, it cannot 
survive. I need not amplify that dire possibility. I am confident to the 
utmost degree that the Jewish people of Milwaukee will not permit Mount 
Sinai Hospital to even curtail any of its life saving and health preserving 
functions.59 
 
In total, 700 workers joined the Drive, with women taking the lead. There were 27 
Women’s teams, each with 12-25 workers at the beginning of the Drive. The Men’s 
Division was still in the process of organization at the start of the drive. The Drive 
included personal appeals for funds and an extensive publicity campaign. Volunteers 
mailed an eight-page pamphlet to over five thousand people. They distributed thousands 
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of single page leaflets to employees at the larger industrial and commercial institutions of 
the city and placed several thousand large posters in stores and shops.60  
The pledges came in slowly. The final amount raised, $54,000, was not enough; in 
order to raise the final $21,000, the Jewish leadership recruited past members of the 
Mount Sinai Board and spoke directly to the younger members of Milwaukee’s Jewish 
community. Judge John C. Karel offered his support to the workers who had already 
brought in over fifty thousand dollars by telling them they were over half way there and 
urging them not to quit. He referenced Rabbi Caro and reminded the volunteers that he 
had helped the Rabbi secure the original Mount Sinai Hospital building.61  
Felix Lowy, a member of the Fund Raising Committee stated he was happy to do his 
part, but made a strong plea for support from the younger members of Milwaukee’s 
Jewish Community:  
I want to take this opportunity to call on the younger men and women to 
assume their rightful share of communal responsibility. It is high time that 
the many thousands of Jewish people in this city develop newer leaders to 
take the place of the very few veterans who are called upon year after year 
to assume the heavy burdens of conducting our institutions and also of 
raising the funds for their support. Mount Sinai should not be the concern 
of only a few men and women who are willing enough to devote their time 
and energy to it. The hospital is a Jewish responsibility for the entire 
community of Jews not just a few individuals. The hospital never was 
designed as paying business. Its function is to cure the sick, heal the 
injured, save human life and preserve the health of the community without 
regard to profits or even balancing its budget by selling its service. No 
Jewish hospital in the world worthy of the name is operated on a strictly 
paying basis.62 
 
The appeals raised more money but at the end of the drive the Hospital had collected only 
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sixty thousand dollars for the hospital and Dispensary.63 The Board drew up plans to 
expand the facility despite the fact that the goal of $75,000 was not reached and opened 
the expanded Dispensary in 1938. 
DISPENSARY SERVICES, STAFF AND PATIENTS 
     The dedication of the new facility received a great deal of media attention in 
Milwaukee. Hospital leaders supplied a great deal of information about the facility and 
held a large ceremony to mark the occasion. On May 6, 1938, the Wisconsin Jewish 
Chronicle published several articles about the dedication of the Dispensary at Mount 
Sinai. These articles reported the services now available at the facility, and the fund 
raising efforts. Articles about the kind of care the Dispensary provided its patients 
appeared as examples of the success of the new facility. These articles reveal the 
cooperation between the Dispensary, Mount Sinai Hospital, and the social service 
agencies in Milwaukee in providing comprehensive care for patients.64 The articles 
included stories about the patients and their treatment, Jewish and Gentile. However, 
those stories do not include direct quotes from the patients themselves and appear to be 
written by Dispensary staff, in order to advertise their services. 
One story was about “Mrs. Rose Blank” who now needed an operation after years of 
chronic illness and putting off care for other bills and necessities. Her husband was laid 
off and her acute gall stone “troubles” were at a peak. The article also noted she was “A 
lady ‘of the old school,’” and “adhered to the ancient ritual practices” and “observed the 
dietary laws.” The idea of going to a public hospital was “revolting, clean enough in 
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hygiene” but what of “intangibles like spiritual cleanliness and the proper way of life” for 
a Jewish woman, in keeping with God’s laws? The inclusion of God’s laws in the article 
is difficult to explain. The nonsectarian tradition of Mount Sinai remained paramount, but 
many of the accounts of patient experiences read as testimonials rather than assessments 
from the actual patients. They are written in the third person, and do not include many 
quotes directly attributed to the patients. The article reported that at Mount Sinai’s 
Dispensary, she finds the care she needs; it is the only place to go. There she is among 
“friends.” If in her pain she “should suddenly cry out in mamanloschen” [the mother 
tongue] she would not be looked at askance, “like a stranger in a strange place.”65 The 
article described Mount Sinai thus, “This is her hospital. At Mount Sinai, the people here 
know what she meant by ‘spiritual cleanliness.’ Rose felt ownership of the hospital for 
hadn’t she, during the ‘good years’ contributed according to her modest means to its 
regular campaigns?”66 The staff at Mount Sinai could also understand that “rooted in her 
east European ancestry was a fear of officialdom, and despite her confidence in the 
hospital and its personnel, she feared the ordeal of questioning.”67 This was why her first 
contact with the hospital is through a social worker from the JSSA at the Dispensary. She 
told the social worker of her trouble and gave a financial history about ability to pay 
along with her medical information; the question was not whether she should receive care 
but whether she is in a position to get the same care privately at her own expense. 
Because of her more serious illness, Rose was accepted as a patient.68 She was treated 
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with “human kindness” and her tests revealed that no surgery needed; instead, primary 
care with follow up was prescribed, along with a diet which relieved her symptoms. After 
a time, Rose returned for follow up care and was found to be “in comparative good health 
and free from pain.”69 
Gentile patients were also included in the patient articles. Mrs. Santo 
Controfelli–whose name signaled she was Italian–was “troubled with bad eyesight” and 
applied for glasses at the Dispensary. After testing she was given a diabetes diagnosis, 
which required an eight day stay to start insulin and dietary therapy.70 However, she had 
eight children; her husband works and she lacked other childcare. The Dispensary’s 
Social Service Director called the family welfare association, which sent a housekeeper to 
assist her husband while she stayed in the hospital and received insulin therapy, and she 
“takes[it] faithfully and returns to the clinic for assessment.” Her “dark Latin eyes flash 
with gratitude whenever the words Mount Sinai are mentioned.”71 The descriptions of 
patient treatment at Mount Sinai’s Dispensary reveal a community cooperative health 
care system that assisted patients in a variety of ways. However, it is likely that the stories 
included in the article represented the assessment of Dispensary staff about the patient 
care experiences, not actual testimonials from them themselves. 
The Mount Sinai Dispensary opened in Milwaukee despite a national trend that saw 
many hospitals closing their dispensaries. The Report on Free Care of 1923 suggested 
that the hospital build it and partner with the newly formed JSSA to meet the medical 
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needs of the indigent in Milwaukee. The Dispensary expanded in 1938. By all accounts it 
was a successful and beneficial facility for the indigent patients and medical staff at 
Mount Sinai Hospital.  
However, the efforts to raise money for operations revealed a concerning new reality 
to Jewish leaders and the Jewish community at large. For the first time in the history of 
the hospital, a fundraising drive failed to meet its goal. During the 1935 fund raising drive, 
Felix Lowy called upon the younger generation of the community to take their place in 
supporting the Jewish institutions of Milwaukee to meet the fund raising goal. The drive 
fell short. The Depression may have reduced the amount of money raised, but older 
Jewish leaders were concerned that younger members of the Jewish population were not 
as active as they had been. The failure to reach a funding goal surprised and concerned 
members of the Mount Sinai Hospital Board. They were growing older. The missed goal 
cast the future of hospital leadership and future funding in doubt. Members Milwaukee’s 
Jewish population eventually moved to the suburbs. They established new institutions, or 
took existing ones with them to their new neighborhoods. Time and money for Jewish 
institutions in Milwaukee competed with new neighborhood programs. By the 1960s, 
Mount Sinai was one of a few Jewish institutions located in Milwaukee’s downtown area. 
In 1967, Mount Sinai Hospital’s leaders faced a critical question: relocate the hospital to 
the new suburban Jewish communities or remain downtown. Changes in government 
programs affected urban hospital like Mount Sinai, the cost of indigent care and the 
changes in funding became unstable. Hospital leaders decided to keep the hospital 
downtown, but twenty years later, the hospital merged in order to remain open. Changes 
in health care policy and the creation of government programs created new challenges for 
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urban hospital like Mount Sinai.   
Two other Milwaukee hospitals, The Passavant and Deaconess, faced these issues as 
well. They too had long histories of community service in Milwaukee. They also relied 
on the support of their religious communities for funds throughout their histories.  
 
THE PASSAVANT  
The original name of the first Lutheran hospital established in Milwaukee was the 
Milwaukee Hospital. It opened on August 3, 1863.72 In 1966, the hospital was renamed 
Lutheran Hospital. It is referred to by three monikers in the literature; Milwaukee 
Hospital, Lutheran Hospital, and The Passavant.73 I will consistently use the term The 
Passavant. It is a colloquial term used by the people who founded it. 
The Passavant was one of the first hospitals established in Milwaukee. Reverend 
Johannes Muehlhauser, pastor of Grace German Church, was the first to recognize the 
need for a Protestant hospital. He was influential in establishing the Wisconsin Synod of 
the Lutheran Church and brought Lutheran ministers to Milwaukee to assist in the effort 
to create a Lutheran hospital.74 One of the men he brought in was William Passavant, a 
minister and hospital administrator from Pennsylvania; as Victor Caro was to the creation 
of Mount Sinai Hospital, so William Passavant was to the creation of The Passavant. 
Passavant was raised in an affluent and religious German home. During his childhood he 
accompanied his mother on errands delivering relief supplies to the poor. As a young 
adult, he learned the German language and became interested in the German American 
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community. Passavant published The Lutheran Almanac for the German American 
population as “a means of diffusing any information among our people” in order to 
stimulate interest in educational opportunities and benevolent organizations in the 
Lutheran religion.75 He entered the ministry and sought to establish church-based 
institutions that aided the poor.76 He had an established a national reputation of success 
in Pennsylvania when Reverend Muehlhauser brought him to Milwaukee.  
After a few false starts, Passavant found a suitable location for the new hospital in 
1863, at 21st Street between Kilbourn Avenue and State Street. During the negotiations, 
the seller of the property asked Passavant if he had the necessary one thousand dollars to 
seal the bargain. In response, Mr. Passavant stated his belief that the Lord would provide 
the money.77 According to legend, an old acquaintance of Mr. Passavant dropped by 
during these negotiations and left an envelope containing the exact amount needed for the 
new hospital. It was later revealed that Mr. Passavant had signed the contract to purchase 
the hospital site without the thousand dollar deposit. Witnesses to the signing were 
shocked to realize that he had agreed to the terms of the loan with less than one dollar on 
his person.78 
Pastor Muehlhauser relied on Passavant to engage support for the hospital from 
Milwaukee’s Lutherans. Passavant believed that building the hospital required 
community cooperation for relief efforts for those in need. Much like Abraham Slimmer, 
he disapproved of sectarian ideology and encouraged community cooperation.79 The 
Passavant opened on August 3, 1863. The Board of Visitors (later the Milwaukee Hospital 
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Auxiliary) for the new hospital included some of Milwaukee’s most prosperous men: 
John Plankinton, the owner of a large packing house, as well as German businessman 
August Uihlein, owner of the Joseph Schlitz Brewery, and Gustav Reuss, a banker at 
Marshall & Ilsely.80 Although the hospital’s religious foundation was Lutheran, 
community support was ecumenical. Historian Ellen Langill noted that “Within the first 
five years, the Protestant community of Milwaukee, including Lutherans, Presbyterians, 
Methodists, and Congregationalists, rallied around the Milwaukee [Passavant] Hospital, 
the only Protestant hospital west of Pittsburgh, and made its welfare its cause.”81 
Fund raising was crucial for hospitals. They maintained operations with the money 
from donations and volunteers staffing many urban hospitals. The Passavant was no 
different. The affluent board members of The Passavant gave generously, but the hospital 
was still faced with debt issues from the purchase of the property. The thousand dollar 
deposit from the unknown donor was not nearly enough to entirely fund the hospital. The 
hospital spent its money on patients and the initial cost of care for the community resulted 
in a deficit. Hospital’s leaders did not have enough money to pay on the balance of the 
original lease. By November 1863, donors pledged six thousand dollars toward the debt 
of twelve thousand dollars owed for the new hospital. The Milwaukee Sentinel published 
an editorial in May of 1866 which argued that The Passavant was a worthy cause for 
charitable donations.82 On October 31 of that same year, a successful benefit dinner was 
held, but the hospital was still struggling.83  
The hospital eventually secured additional funds from the Wisconsin legislature for 
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its charitable work. In the summer of 1867, The Passavant received an important patient 
base: The United States Secretary of the Interior designated The Passavant as the official 
marine hospital for Milwaukee’s port. This crucial designation provided a steady stream 
of money for patient care. The continued fund raising efforts by the community enabled 
the hospital continue to treat Milwaukee residents and federal funds provided for the 
costs of care for sailors in port.84 A renovation project was completed in 1894 on 
Kilbourn Avenue, the location where The Passavant Hospital remained for the rest of its 
years.85  
 
EVANGELICAL DEACONESS 
Deaconess was also a Lutheran hospital. However, it was staffed by subset of the 
work of the Lutheran Church. The term Deaconesses refers to young women who devoted 
themselves to charity work and dissemination of the religious missions of the Lutheran 
church. However, Deaconess Motherhouses also included members from other Protestant 
religions including Episcopalian, Methodists, and Evangelicals. It was “a special type of 
organized Christian service in the Lutheran Church.”86 The goal of the Deaconess 
mission was “educating and training Christian women for professional charity work.”87 
The community that created it retained a great deal of its German identity long after other 
Lutheran churches embraced English language services and prayer books. The continued 
use of the German language set them apart from The Passavant community. For the 
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purpose of this research, the use of the German language is most significant difference 
between the two hospitals. There were also differences in religious doctrine.88 The 
Deaconess women adopted a way of life that represented “a paring of sorts between 
Lutheran and Catholic traditions.” Deaconesses were akin to nuns, at a time where many 
members of the Protestant community “shunned all things Romish.”89 The Deaconesses 
embraced the “Inner Mission” brought over from Europe. The mission called for the 
increased attempts to spread the Christian gospel and expand charity work.90 Deaconess 
Milwaukee was a smaller hospital that established a tradition of Diakonia (service) in 
Milwaukee distinctive from the larger Passavant Hospital.91 
William Passavant brought the first Deaconesses to Milwaukee. He attended a 
conference in London on May 11, 1843. He was impressed by the presentation of 
representatives of the Deaconess Motherhouse in Kaiserswerth on the Rhine. Passavant 
visited the Motherhouse and before he left, recruited four Deaconesses for a Motherhouse 
in Pennsylvania.92 Passavant visited Milwaukee in order to open another Motherhouse in 
Milwaukee. He brought Deaconesses and with Passavant’s assistance and fundraising 
efforts, Deaconess Hospital opened in 1909. The new hospital was designed “to serve all 
as nonsectarian and as a refuge for the worthy sick.”93  
The Deaconesses included efforts to fulfill their inner mission at the hospital.94 They 
continued many of the religious practices brought to America from Europe at a time 
where other Milwaukee Lutheran groups were ending such traditions. The Evangelical 
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Lutherans insisted on conducting services in German even as other Lutheran churches in 
Milwaukee adopted English. The Deaconess staff was comprised of missionary 
volunteers rather than paid workers, with stipends for room and board given in exchange 
for their work.95 Evangelical Lutherans formed a Deaconess Service Society with the 
purpose of establishing a hospital built on the principles of Diakonia ,benevolence, 
education, and poor relief.96 On August 2, 1909, the Deaconess Service Society 
formalized a mission statement which included three goals: to establish a hospital for 
charitable care, establish a Deaconess Home to provide living quarters for the volunteers 
and nursing school students, and to create new charitable programs to meet the needs of 
the city.97 The Evangelical Deaconess Hospital, consisting of a small pharmacy and only 
fifteen beds, opened on December 10, 1910 at 1807 Grand Avenue. By 1917, a new 
50-bed structure was built next door at 1815 West Grand Avenue. The Society hoped to 
raise enough funds to build a Deaconess House and the nursing school.98 
 The Passavant and Deaconess received charitable support in Milwaukee, but there 
were differences between the two religious communities in both religious and cultural 
practices. Evangelical Lutherans at Deaconess retained much of their cultural norms from 
Germany, including the German language. World events highlighted the impact of that 
difference; when the United States entered World War I, the anti-German rhetoric 
decreased donations at Deaconess. All things German were suspicious after the United 
States entered the war; German newspapers closed and German language classes 
decreased dramatically.99 The Passavant and Deaconess received charitable support in 
                                                 
95 Langill, Tradition of Caring, 44. 
96 Langill, Tradition of Caring, 44. 
97 Langill, Tradition of Caring, 56. 
98 Langill, Tradition of Caring, 45. 
99 Langill, Tradition of Caring, 46. 
 155 
 
Milwaukee, but there were differences between the two religious communities in both 
religious and cultural practices. Evangelical Lutherans at Deaconess retained much of 
their cultural norms from Germany, including the German language. World events 
highlighted the impact of that difference; when the United States entered World War I, the 
anti-German rhetoric decreased donations at Deaconess. The Wisconsin Loyalty Legion 
held its first meeting in March 1918 with the self-appointed task of uncovering any 
opposition or disloyalty to the American war effort.100All things German were suspicious 
after the United States entered the war; German newspapers closed and German language 
classes decreased dramatically. Historian Bayrd Still estimated that during this time, at 
least 250 persons changed their German names in response to the backlash against 
German identity.101 German organizations and businesses also altered their names at this 
time. The Deutscher Club became the Wisconsin and the German-English Academy 
became the Milwaukee Academy. The Germania Bank renamed itself the Commercial 
National Bank. In contrast, The Passavant was fifty-four years old by 1917 and had 
established strong ties with other religious groups because of William Passavant’s 
commitment to a nonsectarian mission. The hospital administrators did not insist on the 
strict use of the German language in its literature and adopted many American cultural 
practices. Deaconess continued to insist on the use of German in much of their literature 
and supported German language education in public schools.102 After the war ended, 
anti-German hostility faded and donations at Deaconess increased.103 
In the decades following World War I, The Passavant and Deaconess expanded their 
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facilities to meet the needs of the Milwaukee community. Additions were built at both 
hospitals to house nursing students. The Great Depression in the 1930s led to decreased 
hospital revenues in many hospitals in the United States, and The Passavant and 
Deaconess were no exception. A variety of cost cutting measures were implemented in 
order to continue treating the large number of non-paying cases; interns and nursing 
students volunteered their services and wages for staff were reduced by as much as ten 
percent at both hospitals. They remained open through the Depression because of these 
actions.104 After World War II, The Passavant and Deaconess grew in order to meet the 
needs of the community and to take advantage of the advances in the field of medicine. 
The Hill-Burton Act, passed in 1946, allowed both hospitals to receive federal funding to 
modernize. Despite this aid, Milwaukee hospitals experienced massive bed shortages. 
The Passavant and Deaconess created additional beds to address the problem.105 By the 
1950s, many urban hospitals in America had begun to close, or relocate to the growing 
suburban areas because of overbuilding. Milwaukee hospitals, including The Passavant 
and Deaconess, grew during the 1960s.106 It was not until the late 1970s that The 
Passavant and Deaconess began to feel the effects of expansion on their bottom line. 
By that time, both The Passavant and Deaconess were on the verge of closing. A 
merger between the two hospitals offered a means to preserve the community service 
mission of each hospital. However, the merger was complicated by plans to build the 
Regional Medical Center in Milwaukee County. Initially, leaders at the Center proposed a 
merger with The Passavant. When that failed Deaconess leaders joined negotiations to 
create a final plan that included a merger between the new hospital at the medical 
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complex and the Passavant so they could remain open. Deaconess’ representatives balked 
at any proposal that closed their campus. The strong support for the regional complex 
from both civic and business leaders in Milwaukee County and the precarious financial 
situation at both The Passavant and Deaconess resulted in a merger. It took six years to 
develop a merger plan acceptable to both parties. The two hospitals merged to create 
Good Samaritan Medical Center in 1982. By 1987, the hospital merged with Mount Sinai 
to avoid closing
 158 
 
CHAPTER 4 POLITICAL CHANGES IN HEALTH CARE: MERGERS AND 
EXPANSIONS  
This chapter does not speak specifically about Mount Sinai Hospital. Instead, it 
examines three specific events in Milwaukee in the 1970s that impacted the merger 
decision in 1987: the 1982 merger between The Passavant and Evangelical Deaconess 
hospitals, the creation of a medical school at a new Regional Medical Center, and the 
construction of Froedtert Lutheran Memorial Hospital as a new teaching hospital. Chapter 
5 details how the creation of Froedtert Hospital and the Medical College of Wisconsin at 
the Milwaukee County Regional Medical Center in 1980 ended plans at Mount Sinai 
Medical Center to establish its own teaching hospital and medical school program. 
Froedtert Hospital and its Medical College of Wisconsin also increased competition for 
patients.1 Leaders at both Mount Sinai Medical Center and the Regional Medical Center 
wanted to establish medical schools to address the physician shortage for the Milwaukee 
area. The Regional Medical Center garnered support from civic and political sources 
through its board, the Hospital Area Planning Committee (HAPC). The members acted to 
capitalize on changes in policy and funding to create their desired medical center. These 
resources, in addition to the actions of the local government and private entities expedited 
the medical center project.2  
These three events also reveal the ramification of specific changes in the delivery of 
health care services in America. Mergers increased between 1970 and the mid-1980s.3 
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Also during the 1970s and 1980s, local government entities gained significance power in 
health care decisions, specifically over hospital construction, and used that influence to 
make the changes they wanted, sometimes over the protests of hospital leaders. The 
histories of the Medical College of Wisconsin and Froedtert Lutheran Memorial Hospital 
illustrates the amount of agency a well informed and influential local government 
regulatory board had over the local health care market. I argue that the ability of the local 
government regulatory boards to approve construction for a regional medical center 
contributed to the decline in available patients for other Milwaukee hospitals. The merger 
between Deaconess and the Passavant occurred because influential members of the 
Milwaukee population wanted to see the regional center built. To that end, they used their 
political power and polity knowledge to secure funding and facilitate the necessary 
merger of Deaconess and The Passavant.  
Increased costs of health care compelled hospital leaders and administrators to 
examine their business practices and make changes in order to offset the rising price of 
health care. Scholars identified many possible reasons for the rise in health care. This 
chapter focuses on three viable reasons for the rising cost to hospitals for care: the growth 
of medical technology and specialized care, overbuilding and a surplus of hospital beds, 
and changes in funding for Medicare and Medicaid patients. Of the three, I argue that the 
changes in funding for the two federal programs offers the best explanation for rising 
hospital costs. This chapter explains the impact of local government action on both the 
number of hospital beds in the market and construction decisions. Chapter 5 takes up the 
discussion of changes in funding for Medicaid and Medicare.  
The creation of Good Samaritan Medical Center is discussed first. The merger 
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between The Passavant and Deaconess is significant because it created Good Samaritan 
Medical Center, the institution with which Mount Sinai ultimately merged. This merger 
also illustrated the difficult experience of combining hospitals. Health care providers 
realized the need for major changes in their management style during the 1970s. Hospital 
leaders understood that some of these changes represented a paradigm shift in the 
American health care system, primarily in funding.4 Mergers represented one of the most 
profound changes in the business of health care. The construction of the regional medical 
center is also discussed. The establishment of the center illustrates the increased power 
held by local political and private groups. Political and private groups worked together to 
build an ambitious institution. I argue that their power facilitated not only the center, but 
the merger of Deaconess and The Passavant. The merger may have eventually occurred, 
but the regional medical center would not have happened if not for the actions of local 
groups in Milwaukee. 
 
VOLUNTARY HOSPITALS AND FINANCES 
Rosemary Stevens noted that the traditional community assistance to hospitals all but 
ended by the mid-1970s. Hospital leaders searched for additional ways to fund health care 
services. Hospitals no longer received gifts from donation drives, the responsibility for 
capital fell on the hospital leaders themselves. Management focused on growing capital 
through market forces and collecting fees for patient care. Stevens noted that “No longer 
heavily dependent on community gifts and fund drives, voluntary hospitals were no 
longer gaining capital from public sources on a voluntary basis, that is from their local 
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communities. Instead, in their capital formation, voluntary hospitals were now similar to 
major business corporations.”5  
Hospital leaders began to adopt a decidedly corporate approach to health care. 
Economists Avi Dor and Bernard Friedman explained that hospital mergers were 
considered part of a rising trend of corporate mergers and plant closings in the 1980s. 
This meant that some opponents of mergers sought to block mergers under antitrust laws 
that protected business interests from unfair limitations on competition and trade. 
Hospital leaders designed merger agreements meant to maintain services and preserve 
positive community reputations in the cities they served. Hospital board members tended 
to accept a merger over outright closure.67 Economists Erwin A. Blackstone and Joseph P. 
Fuhr, Jr. stated that since many hospital board members were business leaders in their 
communities, they supported the notion that the hospitals should hold down costs and 
limit competition as much as possible. Mergers offered a means to that end.8  
Merger attempts revealed sources of conflict in the process of combining different 
organizations. Conflict between merging organizations can occur even between 
businesses that appear to be closely similar. One possible source of conflict stemmed 
from conflict between corporate cultures. Economists Roberto A. Weber and Colin F. 
Camerer observed that a sense of culture is developed in an organization through 
common experiences over time. The longer the company history, the more likely conflict 
will arise during the merger process.9 
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Kevin J. Dooley and Brenda J. Zimmerman described the merger process using a 
marriage metaphor. Merging health care organizations seek collaboration through mergers, 
acquisitions, alliances, and resources in order to gain profit or reduce costs. Much like a 
marriage, each organization hopes to gain value from the new relationship.10 Similarities 
and differences between the merging interests present unique challenges to the 
relationship.  
The opposites, while appreciating at one level the differences, are often 
challenged by the stress of having to work at understanding the other’s 
assumptions and make one’s own position heard. The relationships between more 
similar partners may find subtle but significant differences in their ways of doing 
things that challenge their relationship. For a merger where the focus is on 
creating new opportunities, having too much similarity may limit the potential to 
see new options.11 
 
There was a great deal of similarity between Deaconess and Passavant. They were in 
the same health care service market. Both hospitals enjoyed decades of community 
support, and formed their own traditions and culture. But leaders at each hospital felt 
forced into a “marriage of convenience” which led to distrust and a protracted merger 
process. 
Mergers were relatively rare before the 1980s. Hospital administrators considered 
mergers a means for their struggling hospitals to remain open. Merger supporters 
considered them a favorable alternative to relocation or closing a hospital. Hospital 
mergers increased in American cities part because of the provisions of the federal 
Medicaid and Medicare legislation of 1965, which created fiscal advantages for hospital 
consolidation. Sociologists Jack Reardon and Laurie Reardon described the situation 
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facing hospitals in terms of profit and debt. Mergers provided an easy way for hospitals to 
increase revenue without building additional facilities. The easiest way to grow was to 
take over an existing institution.12 Lower patient cost of care was the manifest function 
of the legislation.13 Dor and Friedman found that many merger agreements tended to 
include hospitals that were in relatively good financial shape, these mergers succeeded 
more than those which included failing hospitals.14 Economist Tony Ugur Sinay argued 
that merger activity in the late 1980s was meant to reduce production costs by the 
elimination of waste and duplicate units at hospitals in close proximity. Mergers occurred 
to ensure long-run survival for the merging hospitals.15 The American Hospital 
Association (AHA) data indicated that most hospitals involved in a merger or 
consolidation between 1987 and 1990 were located in or around the same metropolitan 
areas. 
There was a latent function associated with the financial incentives in Medicare and 
Medicaid legislation. Investor owned hospital systems grew out of the unintended fiscal 
advantages associated with buying a single hospital. Hospital systems were created from 
these provisions.16 Hospital mergers permitted the reduction of operating costs for 
hospital systems. For example, after a hospital merged, the newly formed hospital 
received discounts from suppliers based on volume. Investor-operated hospital systems in 
Milwaukee include Humana, Hospital Corporation of America (HCA), and American 
Medical International. These systems of investor-owned hospitals over time became 
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powerful interest groups at both the federal and state level.17 As the hospital systems 
grew, doctors saw changes in their private practices; they became part of the hospital 
systems. Hospital systems began to acquire physician networks that brought the entire 
medical practices of doctors into the corporation; health care networks were able to 
establish complete health care systems with these purchases. The purchase of both 
hospitals and physician networks provided the facilities and medical staff for the growing 
hospital systems.18  
Mergers, along with the purchase of physician’s practices and other services as part 
of the deal, led to the advent of antitrust lawsuits against hospitals under the Sherman Act 
and the Clayton Act. Prior to the 1970s, antitrust legislation was considered inapplicable 
to the business of health care work, based on a traditional sense that heath care work was 
noncompetitive and performed by specialized professionals.19 The first two sections of 
The Sherman Act prohibit restraints on trade through contracts and forbids the creation of 
a monopoly in the market.20 The first section of Clayton Act outlaws any merger that 
would substantially decrease competition in any geographical market.21 Two antitrust 
cases set precedence for possible antitrust allegations against hospital merger plans: the 
1975 Goldfarb v Virginia State Bar decision22 and the 1976 Hospital Building Company 
v Trustees of Rex Hospital decision23 in 1976. Goldfarb struck down the idea that 
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hospitals were automatically absolved from antitrust regulation, and Rex ruled that 
hospital mergers could be blocked under the Sherman Act on the basis of concerns over 
limiting competition in the overall hospital market.24 Blackstone and Fuhr observed that 
the vast majority of nonprofit mergers were not challenged.25 In the years between 1981 
and 1993, less than 4% of the 394 merger applications were challenged under antitrust 
legislation.26  
There are two distinct types of mergers: horizontal and vertical. Horizontal mergers 
seek to increase the market share for the merging facility. Vertical mergers seek to gain 
control over resources like medical supplies and physicians, and secure their place in that 
diversified market. The Deaconess/Passavant merger was horizontal. Opponents to the 
Deaconess/Passavant merger did not cite antitrust issues as a deciding factor in trying to 
stop it. That did not mean that the merger was without controversy. By 1978, three 
hospitals remained in downtown Milwaukee: Mount Sinai, The Passavant, and Deaconess. 
They continued to treat patients, but administrators and Board members at each hospital 
faced the same challenge: how could the hospital stay in Milwaukee and remain fiscally 
viable? The practical answer to that question was complicated. All three hospitals 
eventually decided to merge with another hospital in order to continue treating patients. 
They maintained their traditions of community service but lost their individual identities 
in the process.27 The collective fiscal problems of these three hospitals led to a series of 
mergers in the early 1980s. First, The Passavant and Evangelical Deaconess merged to 
create Good Samaritan Medical Center in 1982. Then, in 1987, Mount Sinai Medical 
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Center merged with Good Samaritan to create Sinai Samaritan Medical Center. 
 
THE COST OF HEALTH CARE AND BUILDINGS  
Rosemary Stevens noted that one of the most salient explanations for the increase 
was the rise of medical specialties and new technology. Health care cost more because it 
included unprecedented technological advances.28 In the case of Milwaukee hospitals, 
the creation of cardiac centers, emergency departments, neonatal wards, and other 
medical specialties competed for patients at an increased cost. Mergers made sense 
because consolidating services at a single hospital saved money for both the patient and 
the provider. Philosopher Daniel Callahan believed that medical technology was a 
blessing and a burden for patients and the hospitals that treat them. The costs of providing 
care increase with advances in care. Uninsured and underinsured patients are essentially 
priced out of assistance for their health care needs, leaving the hospitals to collect the cost 
of care from those who cannot afford it. Hospitals compete with each other to draw 
patients, but charge more for the treatment offered. He cites the nature of the “private 
sector” as a salient reason cost controls on health care fail. The private sector has 
autonomy in its business decisions and exercises that ability to set costs.29  
These high cost led to more financial problems. Advancements in the national health 
care industry contributed to the financial problems at urban hospitals in that they led to 
shortened hospital stays for patients.30 In addition, some health services kept patients at 
home instead of in a hospital bed. This cut hospital revenue even further at renovated 
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medical facilities.31 Many Milwaukee hospitals and experienced low patient census 
numbers and financial shortfalls in the 1970s.  
Overbuilding and duplication of services made possible by government programs are 
another possible explanation for higher costs. Dor commented on the situation saying that 
by the 1980s, hospitals that had expanded their facilities faced the task of “restructuring” 
and mergers offered a means to that end.32 Stevens observed that many American 
hospitals expanded their facilities in order to draw in patients.33 Simultaneous 
renovations at many Milwaukee hospitals time created an excess of hospital beds. 
Historian Ellen Langill noted that hospitals that were overcrowded in the 1960s built 
expansions in the 1970s and were virtually empty at times by the 1980s.34 Hospitals 
raised room rates in order to address the loss of patients to their competitors.35  
Three Milwaukee hospitals with over a century of history among them–The 
Passavant, Evangelical Deaconess, and Mount Sinai Medical Center–eventually 
disappeared into a single hospital through a series of mergers caused in part by these 
changes.36 Administrators at the three hospitals, as in other American urban areas at the 
time, approved expansion plans during a building boom in the early 1970s. Hospital 
administrators and board members believed that the larger facilities and specialized 
medical services would bring in more money. However, the overall number of beds in 
Milwaukee decreased the number of patients at each of the three hospitals. Expanded 
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choices and the decreased length of hospital stays decreased hospital revenue.37 The new 
departments needed more patients to offset operation costs associated with creating new 
treatments and to fund new technological procedures and tools.38  
The 1982 merger was deemed necessary in order to reduce the number of beds in 
Milwaukee. It was offered as an alternative to closing either hospitals. In addition, local 
government officials wanted to build a regional medical center. The number of hospital 
beds in Milwaukee had to be reduced. Mergers between hospitals were difficult because 
none wanted to close. The merger between The Passavant and Evangelical Deaconess 
illustrates the challenges of the merger process. The historic commitment to community 
service at both hospitals complicated the merger negotiations.39 The Passavant and 
Evangelical Deaconess hospitals were established by members of Milwaukee’s German 
Lutheran community and had served the people of Milwaukee for decades. The merger 
created Good Samaritan Medical Center after years of negotiation and conflict caused by 
the desire on the part of the representatives from both The Passavant and Deaconess to 
stay open. 
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MERGING INTERESTS: THE PASSAVANT AND EVANGELICAL DEACONESS 
The Passavant and Deaconess were two of Milwaukee’s oldest hospitals, established 
and sustained by two religious communities in Milwaukee. Both were committed to 
serving the city of Milwaukee. The merger between these two hospitals was contentious 
and conflicted, and it took six years to complete. Tensions remained after the creation of 
Good Samaritan Medical Center; the merger did not alleviate the discord between the 
administration and staff from both hospitals. It exacerbated it.40 
Mergers between hospitals often turned into conflicted and time consuming 
endeavors. The boards of each hospital had to agree on matters of both administrative and 
day-to-day operations. New leadership boards had to make decisions on personnel and 
location. The employees who worked in the new hospital had the responsibility of making 
those changes work. At first glance, it may not seem that the merging of two Christian 
hospitals would be overly difficult; but representatives of both hospitals wanted to 
preserve the individual history of their respective institutions described in the previous 
chapter.41  
At the time of the merger, the main point of contention between The Passavant and 
Deaconess was preservation of each hospital’s mission. Their traditions, their daily 
operations, and the location of the new hospital mattered most.42 As noted above, each 
hospital wanted a relationship, a “marriage” that yielded valuable benefits.43 The merger 
between these two hospitals took years to complete due in part to the stipulations offered 
by Deaconess’ administrators, the smaller and younger hospital. They insisted the final 
                                                 
40 Vital Signs, Newsletter Deaconess Hospital, July 1977, Box 4, Folder 11, Sinai Samaritan Collection.  
41 Merger Memo, May 27, 1977, Box 4, Folder 11, Sinai Samaritan Collection. 
42 Langill, A Tradition of Caring, 56. 
43 Dooley and Zimmerman, “Merger as Marriage: Communication Issues in Postmerger Integration,” 55. 
 170 
 
merger agreement had to include their campus. This conflicted with The Passavant 
leadership’s efforts to do the same for their own facility.44 
 
MERGERS AND COMPLICATIONS: THE MAKING OF GOOD SAMARITAN 
This section details the merger between Deaconess and The Passavant. The merger 
between two of Milwaukee’s oldest hospitals was complicated and conflicted. Both 
hospitals had decades of history and a strong sense of community pride. The actions of 
the HAPC, the committee planning Froedtert Hospital, during the 1970s alienated leaders 
at both the Passavant and Deaconess Hospitals and delayed any merger. Leaders at 
Deaconess and The Passavant resented the idea of merger and remained suspicious of the 
motives and machinations of the Greater Milwaukee Committee and HAPC involved in 
creating the new regional complex. Initially plans for Froedtert Lutheran Memorial 
Hospital included a merger with The Passavant to create a single Lutheran hospital in 
Wauwatosa. However, The Passavant was not willing to relocate to the complex. 
Throughout the merger discussions with The Passavant, HAPC leaders tried to convince 
Passavant leaders to join the new complex, especially when merger negotiations between 
Deaconess and The Passavant lagged. These actions irritated Deaconess leaders, due to 
ongoing the merger discussions between Deaconess and The Passavant. The distrust grew 
to the point that Deaconess’ leaders halted merger negotiations a few times before 1980 
merger.45 The HAPC was determined to build Froedtert Hospital and sought to secure 
any merger agreement as quickly as possible. In the negotiations with The Passavant and 
Deaconess, the reference to Froedtert Memorial Hospital as a possible merger partner was 
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remarkable in that the hospital did not yet exist. It may have been that leaders at both 
hospitals accepted the inevitable creation of Froedtert Hospital and fought to preserve as 
much of their missions as possible. 
The publicized financial troubles at both the Passavant and Deaconess drew the 
attention of the members of HAPC. They entered into negotiations with The Passavant 
and Deaconess to negotiate a merger agreement and build the regional hospital.46 
Deaconess’ leadership suspected that their hospital, as the smallest, was targeted for 
outright closure.47 The GMC had hoped to partner with The Passavant to create a single 
Lutheran hospital at the new Center. Deaconess leaders believed their exclusion from the 
merger negotiations meant both the Passavant and the HAPC sought to close their 
hospitals.48 
Deaconess’ leaders remained skeptical and eventually refused any affiliation with 
Froedtert Hospital.49 The leaders of The Passavant and Deaconess fought against any 
plan that closed either hospital. But the construction of the regional medical Center 
hinged on closing beds in Milwaukee. The Passavant and Deaconess were losing money, 
and when The Passavant leaders left merger negotiations with Deaconess over a dispute 
about the final location of the new hospital, the regional medical Center representatives 
tried to convince The Passavant to merge with their facility instead. This caused anger 
and distrust between Deaconess and the leadership at new medical Center. The local 
newspapers contextualized negotiations between these three hospitals as a “rocky 
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marriage” that resulted in the merger of The Passavant and Deaconess and the creation of 
the Regional Medical Center.50 Good Samaritan Medical Center and Froedtert Memorial 
Hospital were the end result of years of conflict, discord, and hostile negotiations. 
On November 2, 1976, representatives of The Passavant and the HAPC, representing 
the not-yet-extant Froedtert Hospital, released a statement saying they had agreed to 
merge. The announcement was apparently made without prior notice to Deaconess 
Hospital representatives, who still believed they were exploring a merger with The 
Passavant.51 If the November 2, 1976 announcement was intended to intimidate 
Deaconess leaders into a quick and final merger, it did not succeed. If anything, the 
announcement prolonged negotiations. Eight months later, in 1977, Deaconess leaders 
offered a merger plan that would allow the planners of Froedtert Hospital to join the 
merger between The Passavant and Deaconess Hospital, but on Deaconess’ terms.52 
Deaconess leaders hoped to exploit the efforts of the HAPC, and use it to their advantage 
in the final merger plan. The beds at Deaconess acted as a barrier to those who wanted the 
new center. Deaconess sought to protect what they could by opening themselves up to 
any inducements HAPC might offer, in order to stay open.53 It stated that the proposed 
merger plan excluded Deaconess. Deaconess’s leaders believed that the information cited 
by the Southeastern Wisconsin Health System Agency, (SEWHSA), responsible for 
collecting the data supporting hospital bed reductions for the new center, forced HAPC to 
act. Representatives for Deaconess believed the announcement was a ploy to get any 
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merger agreement: “this agreement, which was negotiated without the involvement of 
Deaconess obviously cast Deaconess’ role in a joint venture with Lutheran [The 
Passavant] in some doubt.”54 This was, to say the very least, an understatement. 
Deaconess’ leaders refused to discuss any merger plans unless their own stipulations were 
included for serious consideration and were now convinced that the only reason they 
were invited into the merger discussion was to close Deaconess:  
It is now obvious that Deaconess was sought as a party to the 
Froedtert/Lutheran situation in order to: satisfy health planning officials 
that a significant number of beds could be eliminated and provide a way to 
keep the lagging Lutheran [Passavant] facilities operating while Froedtert 
was under construction, by closing Deaconess and taking over its many 
programs. These objectives could only be accomplished by elimination of 
Deaconess Hospital’s facility. The entire planning process to date has been 
slanted in this direction.55  
 
Deaconess leaders became wary of any future merger plans with The Passavant. One of 
the most obvious signs of animosity between Deaconess and Froedtert occurred after the 
November 1976 announcement: Deaconess refused to merge with The Passavant if 
Froedtert was involved in any way. 
Without the Passavant, Deaconess would have had to find a new merger partner, 
relocate, or close.56 It is entirely possible that the merger announcement was a 
negotiation tactic designed to force an agreement. The announcement may have been 
designed as a means to intimidate the Deaconess leadership and force them to reengage 
with The Passavant on the stalled merger negotiations. The leaders of The Passavant were 
highly committed to the legacy of their hospital; it is unlikely that they would have 
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agreed to a final merger with the regional medical complex that closed their own 
downtown campus.57  
By November 2, 1976 Deaconess resumed discussions with The Passavant. However, 
if the announcement of a merger between Froedtert and The Passavant was designed to 
intimidate Deaconess into accepting a predetermined plan, it was not successful. 
Deaconess leaders continued to issue statements designed to ensure their official 
positions on all matters relating to the merger were known. Deaconess wanted more than 
equal representation on the new administrative Board. Deaconess insisted that a full fifty 
percent of the Board be Deaconess representatives and the other fifty percent to be split 
between The Passavant and Froedtert leaders.58 In addition, Deaconess stipulated that the 
final terms of consolidation were to be defined as a multi-facility system rather than a 
single site.59  
By July 18, 1977, Deaconess announced that “with information to date, 
Deaconess, Froedtert and Lutheran [Passavant] Hospitals are not ready to commit to the 
principle of merger.”60 The final agreement to resume merger discussions did not include 
Deaconess’ stipulation about Board composition; each hospital had a one-third interest in 
leadership decisions, but Deaconess was willing to talk. Each hospital formed legal teams 
to protect their interests. The official position of the merger team was, “The proposed 
structure protects the interests of each hospital in such key areas as medical staff by-laws, 
employee assets, corporate policy and budgetary and operational control. It guards the 
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religious affiliations of each hospital since the original corporate parent bodies and their 
religiosities are maintained.”61 The hospitals appeared ready to discuss creating a 
cooperative health care agreement between both locations. The merger team planned to 
conduct feasibility studies.62  
It was not to be that simple. A surprise announcement in February 20, 1978 halted 
the merger process yet again. Deaconess called off the merger, citing a loss of twenty 
million dollars a year if a new facility was created without closing The Passavant. 
Passavant leaders now balked at implication that their facility was the most logical choice 
to close because of its age.63 The Passavant representatives were opposed to their own 
closure and refused any merger that included HAPC, the Froedtert representatives. It is 
quite likely that the HAPC leadership capitalized on Deaconess’ hostility in order to force 
their hand on a merger, whether with The Passavant or with them. On August 26, 1977, 
Deaconess announced that The Passavant leadership rejected the July 18th merger 
proposal over the inclusion of Froedtert. This decision ended any chance of the three 
hospitals merging and Froedtert hospital was no longer a part of the merger discussion.64  
This turn of events meant that a merger between The Passavant and Deaconess was 
an alternative to closing both hospitals. The Passavant leadership refused to close and 
Deaconess representatives had a very strong commitment to the preservation of their 
hospital as well.65 Merger negotiations had reached an impasse. The distrust between 
Deaconess and The Passavant over the role of Froedtert hindered the renewed merger 
process and the final agreement for the new facility even after Froedtert left the 
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negotiations. The official statement from Deaconess in 1977 about any future proposed 
merger was unambiguous:  
Representatives of Froedtert and Lutheran knew or should have known the 
qualifications with which Deaconess had agreed to enter into further 
discussions. Instead of acknowledging these qualifications, approval for 
Froedtert Hospital was sought from the state health planning agency based 
upon, among other things, the impression that Deaconess had agreed to a 
merger between the three hospitals. This was never true. It is obvious now 
that Deaconess was sought as a party to the Froedtert Lutheran situation in 
order to satisfy health planning officials that a significant number of beds 
could be eliminated, provide a convenient way to keep the lagging 
Lutheran facilities operating while Froedtert was under construction by 
closing Deaconess and taking over its many programs.66  
 
Even without Froedtert, Deaconess leaders were suspicious of their counterparts at 
The Passavant. Another two years passed before the hospitals reached an agreement. The 
fact that neither hospital closed during the prolonged negotiations leads to the question: 
were either one of the hospitals facing imminent closure? The merger discussions and 
statements indicate concern over keeping the hospitals open. Deaconess representatives 
reiterated stipulations to The Passavant officials that neither hospital close. They 
supported the creation of a cooperative system between their hospital and The Passavant. 
Deaconess wanted to form operating relationships with other hospitals in Milwaukee, 
keeping them all open but treating distinct groups of patients. Cooperation between the 
hospitals left each hospital’s identity intact, which was the main goal for Deaconess 
Board members from the beginning.67 Deaconess leaders wanted to keep both hospitals 
open and invite other hospitals to join them.68  
Deaconess’ leaders began approaching other hospitals to explore possible 
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partnerships. They wanted to create a system of shared services and active ties with 
Children’s Hospital until the construction of the new facility at the regional complex.69 
Deaconess also sought a relationship with St. Luke’s Hospital in order to “Begin a 
feasibility study for the purpose of exploring areas where shared services and programs 
between the hospitals might lead to improving the quality, economy, and efficiency of 
health care.”70 The partnership with St. Luke included referrals from Deaconess to St. 
Luke’s Cardiac Care center, and orthopedics services. St. Luke’s in turn, referred patients 
to Deaconess for ambulatory care and emergency services.71 Deaconess leaders knew 
their hospital was in dire straits and tried to establish a relationship with St. Luke’s on its 
own, to perhaps claim a sense of autonomy in the decisions for its future or to secure an 
alternative agreement with St. Luke’s in case the relationship with The Passavant ended.  
After more negotiations, a new merger plan between Deaconess and The Passavant 
was finally announced in June, 1980. The official statement from SEWHSA applauded 
the agreement, saying, “The long term saving and efficiencies will be tremendous. This 
consolidation is just what the doctor ordered in light of today’s rising cost of health 
care.”72 An editorial in the Milwaukee Sentinel on June 27, 1980 also approved of the 
plan, “Two major causes of today’s obscenely high health–care costs–which everyone 
more or less shares at least indirectly-are excess hospital bed capacity and duplicated 
medical services. Merger is the key to curing both problems.”73 An article published the 
same day reported the merger plan in terms of marriage, stating that after a “rocky four 
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year courtship,” the two hospitals had finally “consummated their marriage” and agreed 
to “tie the knot,” ostensibly leaving Froedtert at the altar.74 The final plans to create Good 
Samaritan Medical Center were in place. The merger was approved on September 11, 
1980 and on September 29, 1980, an announcement made it official; Good Samaritan 
Medical Center had arrived.75 Froedtert Lutheran Memorial Hospital opened in the same 
year. It partnered with the Medical College of Wisconsin as a teaching hospital. 
 
GOOD SAMARITAN MEDICAL CENTER 
Initially, Good Samaritan Medical Center implemented the vision of Deaconess’ 
leadership. The two hospitals remained open even as they shared leadership. Deaconess 
remained on Wisconsin Avenue and The Passavant on Twenty-First Street and Kilbourn 
Avenue. Services were redistributed between the two sites. By 1984, St. Luke’s Hospital 
joined Good Samaritan as a “health care associate.” The hospitals shared some services 
but did not merge with the new facility. St. Luke’s continued as a stand-alone hospital and 
maintained its previous relationship with Deaconess.76 The combined hospital sites of 
Good Samaritan and St. Luke’s shared patients based on services offered at each site. St. 
Luke’s received cardiac patients from Good Samaritan. The Deaconess site received 
pediatric and maternity patients and The Passavant site treated emergency cases from the 
other two hospitals. They shared services such as CAT scan technology and surgery cases. 
Shuttles transported patients between sites.77 The merger appeared to have met its goal of 
cost savings by July 7, 1986 when John Schwartz, President of Good Samaritan 
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announced that “the ink at Good Samaritan was finally black again.”78 
Exactly how that ink changed back to red was a matter of controversy. Staff 
reductions were one of the ways that the new hospital cut costs. Workers at both hospitals 
were concerned about their employment status months before the merger. In the July 3, 
1980 edition of Vital Signs, the newsletter of Deaconess Hospital, Kenneth S. Jamron, 
president of Deaconess Hospital addressed this concern: 
One thing that you should keep in mind as you hear rumors about cutting 
the workforce: we have all been the target of a bureaucratic attack on that 
they call ‘excess beds.’ The pressures applied to downtown hospitals to 
merge or close have been based on that questionable statistic. Even giving 
them the benefit of a doubt however, look again at what they’re talking 
about–EXCESS beds. They don’t claim we’re caring for too many patients, 
just beds. Let them preach all they want–how much of your work is 
involved with tending to the needs of a nonexistent patient? 79  
 
Projections for the future for Good Samaritan Hospital and the fiscal bottom line were 
hopeful due to lessons learned in the merger process; Jim Schwartz, President of Good  
Samaritan Medical Center, explained, “We were losing a bundle of money. We were 
worried about how deep we could cut, and if we cut too deep, would the whole thing 
collapse?”80 The article warned readers that “instead, he found that, much to his surprise 
[,] that you could not cut too deep. There may be a few more layoffs at the hospital.”81 
Layoffs were a source of tension at the new facility, but the most controversial 
change after the merger was final was the closing of the Deaconess Campus of Good 
Samaritan. On March 30, 1985, Good Samaritan leaders announced closing of the 
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Deaconess campus. Staffing cuts had not provided enough cost savings. It was just too 
expensive to keep both hospitals open. After all the struggle and the insistence on the part 
of the merger team that the histories of each hospital would be preserved, the original 
Deaconess building was sold to Marquette University and razed, leaving only a plaque, 
including its motto Diakonia, at the site of its campus on Wisconsin Avenue, the sole 
reminder that the hospital had ever existed.82 The news on the decision to close included 
the sentiments of the Deaconess representatives, albeit only after justifying the decision: 
The rich history of Deaconess Hospital accounts for the very mixed 
feelings about its closure. On the one hand this represents a sound and 
logical business decision, but on the other, we cannot help but see it as an 
event fraught with emotion. However, the final chapter of Deaconess 
Hospital’s history is read. It is a prime example of the tremendous change 
occurring in health care today and the absolute necessity for flexible 
management.83 
 
The closure of the Deaconess site did alleviate some of financial burden at Good 
Samaritan Medical Center, but it did not result in increased revenue for the hospital; the 
overall savings in overhead costs were still not enough to finance both operations. Good 
Samaritan leaders continued to pursue cost cutting measures to strengthen the fiscal 
situation and continue operations in Milwaukee. A stipulation in the merger agreement 
was that Good Samaritan Medical Center would continue to provide medical services in 
the city; the mission included a formal commitment to the Milwaukee neighborhood 
around Twenty-First Street and Kilbourn Avenue. The administrators of Good Samaritan 
assisted in the establishment of the Avenues West Association, which brought Near West 
Side businesses and charitable concerns together to address social and economic 
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challenges in the neighborhood, but did not result in increased patient revenue or census 
numbers.84  
The protracted merger process between Deaconess and The Passavant Hospitals 
illustrated the lack of agency private hospitals had in the context of new government 
regulations. The leadership at Deaconess aggressively fought off attempts by the 
proponents of the Regional Medical Center to force a merger, but their efforts could not 
overcome the advantages held by those supporting the new Center. The political support 
for the new Center, combined with the threat of closure, brought about the merger and 
cleared the way for construction.  
The actions of Deaconess leaders illustrated an awareness of the power shift between 
private hospitals and government regulatory institutions. The suspicious and antagonist 
press releases, culminating in the Merger Memo, indicated an understanding that their 
hospital was at risk of closing. Their agreement to the merger came in response to the 
perceived risk of closure. The closing of the Deaconess campus soon after the merger is 
ironic in that the merger was supposed to keep the hospital open. Rather than close 
Deaconess under their own terms, the decision came after the creation of Good Samaritan, 
when Deaconess leaders no longer had the final say in such matters.  
During the six years spent finalizing the merger creating Good Samaritan Medical 
Center, and the establishment of Froedtert Memorial Hospital, Mount Sinai Hospital 
continued to struggle financially. In 1987, Mount Sinai and Good Samaritan announced 
their own merger. The merger process was just as complicated as its predecessors and the 
final plan also had to satisfy two distinctly different religious traditions. In addition, the 
health care networks in Milwaukee were growing and absorbing other hospitals in 
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Milwaukee. In light of consolidated health care services and dwindling resources for 
health care services for the poor, Mount Sinai Hospital administrators felt that merger was 
the only option available to them that allowed some sense of the historic commitment to 
Milwaukee by the Jewish community to continue.  
 
THE REGIONAL CENTER AND MEDICAL SCHOOL: POLICY AND POLITICS 
The context of the state, for the purpose of this research, is one that sees the political 
aspect of social discourse and policy as a theoretical meeting place, or arena, in which the 
public and the government of elected officials accept and reject social policy. Elected 
members of the formal political structure and the members of the public at large can use 
this concept of the state in order to air their differences and their views about the direction 
of policy and possible changes in social programs.85According to sociologist Ellen 
Immergut, public policy is not assumed to be a linear orderly process incorporating the 
needs and wants of individuals or the economic sphere, nor is it the end result of any one 
actor or interest. Political decisions “emerge from highly complex combinations of 
factors that include . . . systematic features of political regimes. . .Institutions do not 
determine behavior, they simply provide a context for action that helps us to understand 
why actors make the choices they do.”86Sociologist Robert H. Cox elaborates on the role 
of the state in creating social policy outlined by Immergut and posits that, in the realm of 
public policy, the state acts as a framer when successful in its quest for new social 
spending programs to the voting public. In matters of social policy, the state is both an 
identifier (or an enumerator) of problems faced by the citizens and the market, and also 
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defines the proposed legislation as addressing a “social problem” or as a “needed 
reform.” The state defines the need for help on the part of its people and works within the 
market system to bring about a solution. In the case of welfare programs like health care, 
policy institutions, like the government, show whether the state has a part to play in the 
formation of new or innovative programs.87  
The local government boards in Milwaukee sought to shape policy in the matter of 
hospital construction as they saw fit. The merger process created an adversarial 
relationship between The Passavant, Deaconess, and the Hospital Area Planning 
Committee (HAPC). The HAPC represented the future Froedtert Lutheran Memorial 
Hospital. Deaconess representatives ended negotiations at times because of their distrust 
of Froedtert leaders.88 The foundation for that distrust came from the actions of two 
Milwaukee County committees: The Greater Milwaukee Committee (GMC), which in 
turn created the HAPC. These two committees strongly supported the new regional 
Center hospital, and Deaconess’ leaders distrusted their motives. The GMC and HAPC 
concurrently raised funds for the new facility while negotiating with Deaconess and The 
Passavant. They planned to build a medical school and bring other health care institutions 
together on a large campus.89 
The Greater Milwaukee Committee (GMC) was a major influence in Milwaukee 
business and civic affairs. Avella argued that from the 1930s, the group was instrumental 
in monitoring and capitalizing on federal funding opportunities for Milwaukee’s 
development.90 The GMC established itself in the local political arena in order to get 
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approval for the center.91 The surplus of hospital beds in Milwaukee was an issue, but it 
is not the only reason for the drive to create the Center. The GMC wanted to create a 
centralized medical center and wanted a medical school in order to receive research 
grants. Public support for a regional medical center grew, and the findings of two 
commissioned studies, the McLean Report of 1953 and the Willard Report of 1959 
supported the construction of a regional medical center in Milwaukee.92 After County 
Executive John L. Doyne took office in 1959, the GMC worked to establish a large scale 
regional medical facility.93 Avella analyzed the change saying, “The Doyne-GMC 
combination was to mastermind the delicate and difficult process that culminated in the 
establishment of the Regional Medical Center in 1969.”94 This Center ultimately ended 
the separate entities of The Passavant and Deaconess. 
Federal government funding through Titles 18 (Medicare) and 19 (Medicaid), and the 
federal Regional Health Care Act of 1965 financed the plans to establish a regional 
medical center. This act set aside federal funding for areas that had no such facility. A 
subcommittee of the GMC, dubbed the Heil Committee after committee member Joseph 
Heil, Sr., issued a report in 1967 that became a road map for the creation of the center. 
The report supported the creation of the center and drew its attention on the benefits to 
those institutions that planned to join the project, not the hospitals in merger discussion.95 
The report stated that Milwaukee was one of three major metropolitan regions of the 
country without such a facility. The committee recommended a location for the Center in 
Wauwatosa. The final draft of the Articles of Incorporation and by-laws established by 
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members of the business and health care communities completed the proposal. On 
November 20, 1969 the committee announced the regional medical Center “officially 
called into existence,” as a goal for the future. Essentially speaking, this announcement 
represented the position of the GMC that the center was a foregone conclusion. The GMC 
established the Hospital Planning Board (HPB) with the ultimate goal of using federal 
funds from the Regional Health Care Act of 1965 to establish a regional medical Center 
outside the city of Milwaukee.96  
Beginning in the 1960s, hospitals were required to submit plans for expansion to a 
new organization: The Southeastern Wisconsin Regional Planning Committee (SEWRPC) 
established in 1960.97 Its twenty-one members were appointed by the governor, the 
Secretary of the Department of Development, and the seven southeastern Wisconsin 
county boards. Three members from each of the counties participating (Milwaukee, 
Ozaukee, Washington, Racine, Kenosha, Waukesha, and Walworth) served six-year terms. 
SEWRPC had no acting authority; its role was to conduct research to plan for 
development in the region to avoid overbuilding in the represented counties. Any 
recommendations made by SEWRPC were carefully considered before approval for 
county projects.98  
Their recommendation was that the Regional Center could not add to the number of 
beds in the Milwaukee Count area. It was not binding. However, given the new authority, 
neither The Passavant nor Deaconess could act independently and risk losing revenue 
under the Development Act of 1974. This act included penalties for violations of any of 
the recommendations of the local board. In order to build the regional medical center, a 
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decrease in the current number of hospital beds in Milwaukee had to occur. Construction 
could not begin until some sort of agreement to reduce the number of beds overall was 
finalized. SWRPC’s report provided the organizations with a vested interest in creating 
the Regional Medical Center, the GMC and the HAPC, an important recommendation 
supporting their plan. Avella stated that “With the cooperation of Doyne [,] a vision 
developed of a coordinated health care Center located on the County Institution grounds, 
with the medical school and a host of other independent health care facilities in close 
proximity or attached by bonds of affiliation.”99 
As much support as the regional medical center plan had from local political leaders, 
the plan for a medical school at the center led to a fortunate situation on the issue of 
funding. The Medical College of Wisconsin brought prestige to the project. As a teaching 
hospital, the new hospital gained support from the public. 
 
MEDICAL COLLEGE OF WISCONSIN 
The planning board of the new regional Medical Center wanted a medical school to 
create a teaching hospital at the new center. HAPC members approached representatives 
at the private, Jesuit School of Marquette University. Marquette University School of 
Medicine was formally chartered in 1918. By the 1950s the school faced a severe 
financial crisis. An accreditation team of the Association of the American Medical 
Colleges flagged the college with a status of “confidential probation” in 1952 because of 
financial problems.100 Marquette officials approached trustees of the Kurtis R. Froedtert 
estate for financial help. Froedtert was a prosperous brewer who had died in 1951. He had 
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been a devout Lutheran and left a trust for the construction of a teaching hospital to be 
named after him.101 The Marquette Medical School failed to secure any of the funds; the 
trust money was held up in local business projects, and a lawsuit filed on behalf of the 
Lutheran Men of America denied the Marquette University School of Medicine’s funding 
requests in part because it was a private Catholic university. They felt the money should 
go to a Lutheran institution. 
Years of declining enrollment and the flagging of its credentials led to a financial 
crisis that could not be solved by many public funding options because of its private 
school status. Hill-Burton Act of 1946 provided funds for private hospitals treating 
patients on Medicare and Medicaid. Hospitals used Hill-Burton funding to build additions 
and establish specialty departments. State agencies applied for funds to build facilities. 
Private medical schools could not apply. However, a medical school, as part of a public 
hospital, did qualify.102 Marquette was ineligible for government grants through the 
National Institute of Health and the Hill-Burton Act of 1946 because of its private school 
status. Each of these federal sources provided millions of dollars to various public 
institutions for construction and research.103 Proponents of the Medical Center secured 
funds for its medical school program because it was eligible for various public financial 
sources through the Hill-Burton legislation.104  
The Center leadership’s commitment to establish a medical school stemmed from the 
projected physician shortages in Milwaukee identified in the Heil Report of 1967. GMC 
leader Edmund Fitzgerald believed the medical school was an integral aspect of the 
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whole Center. The existing program at Marquette University School of Medicine 
provided an opportunity to include a medical school at the Center. Fitzgerald facilitated 
the transition of Marquette’s medical program from a private religious school to a 
nonsectarian entity. The Heil Report recommended that the new facility needed a medical 
school to provide crucial training for future doctors who, in turn, would staff the proposed 
hospital. After the transition, the medical school became eligible for expanded public 
funding opportunities.105 The combined efforts of the GMC and The HAPC succeeded in 
quickly establishing the medical school at the regional center campus. On September 30, 
1967, the medical school program left Marquette University, and in February of 1969 
received over one million dollars in state funding for relocation to the Center. Avella 
noted that because of the actions of the members of the planning board, the school was 
approved: “After having fended off a court challenge to the aid, the school moved to a 
new status, changing its name in 1970 to the Medical College of Wisconsin.106 
This plan for a medical school and an affiliated teaching hospital and the strong 
support for the Center outpaced Mount Sinai Medical Center’s efforts to establish its own 
medical school.107 For the leadership of Mount Sinai Hospital, the establishment of a 
teaching hospital affiliated with a medical school so close to their facility was profoundly 
disappointing, in part because Mount Sinai Hospital had attempted to establish a 
relationship with the Medical College. Mount Sinai Board members wanted to establish 
the hospital as a teaching hospital, something they felt would add to the prestige of an 
already “great” hospital.108 Mount Sinai needed more patients and hoped to attract them 
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with a medical education program. The renovations in 1972 and 1976 coincided with 
simultaneous expansions at The Passavant and Deaconess, two hospitals in close 
proximity. Mount Sinai established a partnership with University of Wisconsin-Madison 
to create a residency program for new doctors, but only after ending its plans for a 
medical college of its own. Mount Sinai Board member Ben Marcus remarked that 
despite several overtures during the 1970s on the part of Mount Sinai, the Medical 
College “never” responded.109 The new construction at the hospital included expanded 
obstetrics and emergency departments, but the leaders at Mount Sinai abandoned plans 
for a medical school and teaching hospital. This decision increased the financial 
difficulties at the hospital. The renovations had not brought in more patients and the loss 
of the teaching hospital and medical school option influenced the merger decision.110 
Mount Sinai leaders searched for another way to establish a teaching program and bring 
in new patients. This led to two new initiatives at the hospital: a relationship with the 
University of Wisconsin-Madison and the attempt to establish a Jewish brand for the 
hospital. The relationship with UW-Madison was a modest success and the attempt at 
establishing a Jewish brand was for all intents and purposes, unsuccessful.
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CHAPTER 5 IDENTITY, CHANGE, AND INNOVATION AT MOUNT SINAI 
 Many of the descendants of original East Side Jewish population no longer lived 
within Milwaukee city limits by the mid 1960s. Jewish doctors had established practices 
in Milwaukee because of Mount Sinai Hospital. The acceptance of Jewish doctors at 
other Milwaukee hospitals allowed the doctors to expand their medical practices, 
facilitated upward economic mobility, and allowed many to follow their patients to the 
suburbs.1 As the Jewish community dispersed beyond the city of Milwaukee, in the 
mid-1960s, Mount Sinai’s leaders debated whether the Jewish hospital should go with 
them. After a great deal of time and effort on the part of the Jewish leadership and the 
Milwaukee Jewish community at large, they decided not to move. The Milwaukee Jewish 
Chronicle reported that the decision to stay downtown was because, “They [the hospital 
leaders] believed there was a continued need for a hospital that would serve both the 
city’s Jewish population which had long since moved out of the area, and the residents 
near the hospital which had become dependent on its services.”2 
 The line in this editorial about the hospital “serving the Jewish population that 
had long since moved of the area” was quite puzzling; the Jewish population needed the 
hospital along with the patients downtown, but why? The small number of board 
members made the decision to remain downtown. There is no indication that any vote 
was taken about the future of Mount Sinai. It is possible that the success of the 
fundraising drive that financed expansion implied support for the downtown location.3 
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The iconic Star of David edifice added with the 1972-74 expansion and the hiring of a 
full time Rabbi who was also a mohel signified a Jewish presence, but the changes were 
more cosmetic than substantive as religious expressions.4 These additions sought to set 
Mount Sinai apart as a Jewish brand, rather than change the nonsectarian mission and 
adopt a religious identity. Pat Kerns stated that “we wanted to give something back.” The 
decision was announced by board president Ben D. Marcus who “lauded the hospital for 
making the decision to remain downtown.”5  
That decision, combined with the approved construction of the Regional Medical 
Center, rendered their plans to brand Mount Sinai as a teaching hospital moot. There was 
considerable conflict between hospital administrators and board members over the issue 
of increasing revenue at Mount Sinai. Mount Sinai leaders realized a collaboration with 
the Marquette Medical School to become a teaching hospital was no longer possible. The 
Regional Medical Center had a medical school already, there was no need for another full 
medical school in Milwaukee. Two different approaches to address the growing financial 
shortfall; surfaced, one championed by Ray Alexander, Vice President of Mount Sinai, 
the other from board members and doctors at the hospital. Alexander believed that 
establishing a religious identity at Mount Sinai would increase hospital census numbers. 
The board members wanted to look at other Jewish hospitals and identify any changes or 
new ideas that could be brought to Mount Sinai. The literature presented thus far sheds 
light on the reason for the conflict: the different approaches to measure and establish 
Jewish identity. Ray Alexander’s action suggest that he believed that instituting religious 
practices at the hospital created a Jewish identity for the hospital. The members of the 
                                                 
4 Rabbi Tsvi Schur, Phone Interview by author, March 23, 2011. 
5 Newspaper clipping, “Addition Gives New Life to Mount Sinai,” Wisconsin Jewish Chronicle, February 19, 1976, 
Box 51, Folder 8, Sinai Samaritan Collection. 
 192 
 
board and the doctors acted to emphasize their presence at the hospital as a way of 
bringing attention to the Jewish leadership and medical practitioners present since the 
hospital opened.  
Ultimately, the answer to the question about what actually constituted Jewish identity 
became less important in light of the effects of government programs created in 1965. 
The Medicaid (Title XIX) program initially covered the full cost of care for patient 
treatment. As medical costs increased, reimbursements for costs of care for those using 
Medicaid and Medicare fell behind the costs to the hospital. These programs ended the 
community funding for private hospitals. In a sense, these government programs severed 
the relationship between communities and hospitals.  
For a time, Board members and physicians believed that by branding Mount Sinai as 
a Jewish hospital, it was possible that new patients, assuming they believed in the 
conventional wisdom about how Jewish hospitals were among the best, would use the 
facility in greater numbers. They hoped to capitalize on that stereotype in an effort to 
bring more private paying patients to Mount Sinai.6 Their attempts to do so foundered 
due to the conflicts between Alexander and the board and doctors about what exactly 
constituted a Jewish identity. Ray Alexander, Vice President of Mount Sinai from 
1969-1976, committed a great deal of time and support toward the goal of establishing a 
Jewish identity centered on establishing religious practices and iconography at Mount 
Sinai.7 Dr. Paul Jacobs, on the other hand, reported that hospital board leaders and many 
of the doctors wanted to emphasize the fact that the hospital was Jewish without radical 
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changes to its administration, design, or practices.8 The two positions are best described 
as a choice between establishing a Jewish identity and establishing a Jewish brand. A 
Jewish identity required a departure from the nonsectarian history of the hospital. 
Establishing a Jewish brand meant capitalizing on the history of Mount Sinai and the 
contribution of the Jewish population in Milwaukee.  
Establishing a Jewish identity through the recognition of specific Jewish religious 
practices as proposed by Alexander at Mount Sinai Milwaukee represented an attempt at 
major change while continuing the mission of the hospital. He advocated the idea that 
making Mount Sinai more “Jewish” would complement the historic nonsectarian mission 
of the hospital. Alexander hoped that by doing so, Mount Sinai- Milwaukee could attain 
the success of other Jewish hospitals. Mount Sinai New York opened in an area with a 
higher number of Jewish residents. It began as a Jewish hospital and eventually adopted a 
nonsectarian mission.9 Beth Israel in Newark also treated a large Jewish population and 
began as a Jewish hospital, with a nonsectarian mission adopted later.10 Beth Israel in 
Boston did the same.11 These hospitals were considered Jewish from the very start. 
Michael Reese in Chicago adopted a nonsectarian mission, but treated a large Jewish 
population. It was also recognized as a Jewish hospital.12  
By comparison, Mount Sinai Milwaukee began as a nonsectarian hospital and 
historically had more Gentile patients. Observing the Sabbath, an increased emphasis on 
celebrating Jewish holidays, and offering Kosher meals were not part of the hospital’s 
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practices.13 At the time hospital leaders considered these changes, the hospital treated 
more Gentile patients than Jewish. The former Jewish neighborhoods near Milwaukee 
were now almost completely Gentile and black. Historian Joe Trotter found that African 
Americans settled in West Side neighborhoods near Jewish residents. In the 1920, African 
Americans and Jews lived in close proximity, in the sixth and tenth wards. After 1930, the 
African American population concentrated in areas vacated by the Jewish population.14 
By the 1970s, the neighborhoods adjacent to Mount Sinai Hospital were predominantly 
black.15 The decision to remain downtown and treat Gentile patients signified the fact 
that Mount Sinai’s leaders acknowledged the success of the nonsectarian mission. The 
number of Jewish patients at Mount Sinai was lower from the beginning. In addition, in 
the postwar years, Jewish patients in the suburbs of Milwaukee started using hospitals 
closer to their homes, instead of patronizing Mount Sinai exclusively. In addition, more 
Jewish doctors established themselves at other hospitals and more Gentile doctors began 
to practice at Mount Sinai.16 Concurrently, the creation of a medical education program 
sought to elevate the status of Mount Sinai as teaching hospital, like many of the Jewish 
hospitals cited above. Like other Jewish hospitals in large cities, Mount Sinai Milwaukee 
hoped to create a reputation as an institution of innovation and learning.17  
In light of changes in public policy, health care costs, and health care services 
emerging in the late 1960s and early 1970s, the Milwaukee Jewish community’s support 
for Mount Sinai proved crucial. Their fundraising efforts paid for a massive expansion of 
Mount Sinai Hospital in the 1970s. Mount Sinai’s leaders implemented two significant 
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initiatives during the 1970s to meet the needs of patients and stay financially viable: the 
attempt to establish a more distinct Jewish identity at the newly renovated Mount Sinai 
Medical Center and a partnership with the University of Wisconsin-Madison for medical 
interns and residents. The first floundered; the second was a mixed blessing. 
 
STAYING IN MILWAUKEE: DECISIONS  
The Jewish population in Milwaukee in the early twentieth century lived in 
neighborhoods on the east and west sides of the Milwaukee River. Between 1925 and 
1950 the Jewish community established a concentrated presence in neighborhoods north 
and east of the downtown area. By 1963, the West Side Jewish population was 
concentrated in Milwaukee, in Sherman Park, while the East Side population had moved 
to the North Shore suburbs.18 All the while, Mount Sinai Hospital remained in its 
location at Kilbourn Avenue and Twelfth Street.19 Until the 1960s, Jewish doctors who 
established practices in Milwaukee could practice only at Mount Sinai Hospital. Other 
Milwaukee hospitals’ withholding of privileges for Jewish doctors revealed one of Mount 
Sinai’s crucial functions: it enabled the growth of a successful Jewish medical 
professional class that paralleled the established Jewish business class in Milwaukee.20 
Many Jewish businessmen and doctors were able to achieve the upward social mobility 
necessary to move their families out of the urban core.21 Historian John Gurda referred to 
the years between 1945 and 1967 as “the golden age” for the Jewish community. Jewish 
institutions in Milwaukee were thriving in the post war years. Many Jewish families 
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relocated as a result of economic success, moving to more affluent areas outside of the 
city. They left behind the old neighborhoods that began to decline.22 By 1967, Jewish 
doctors had gained privileges at other Milwaukee hospitals and were not practicing 
exclusively at Mount Sinai. Harry Kanin and Jay Larkey reported that by this time 
discriminatory practices at other Milwaukee hospitals ended and Jewish doctors were no 
longer barred from them.23 
Their Jewish patients began to patronize other hospitals as well; many were now 
living outside the city limits in suburban Fox Point, Glendale, and Mequon and used the 
hospitals closer to their homes.24 In this respect, the Jewish community of Milwaukee 
was not unlike the Jewish populations of other urban areas; after World War II, Jewish 
families were able to move to the suburbs in part because of their economic achievements. 
Historian Hasia Diner notes,  
If any era in the history of American Jewry could be considered a “golden age” it 
would be the twenty years following World War II. They crafted a series of new 
communal practices that reflected the dominant themes of the postwar age: 
prosperity and affluence, suburbanization and acceptance. Jews in their 
associations and organizations emphasized that they supported America’s 
increasing commitment to end privilege based on race, religion, and national 
origin. In this era dominated by a new kind of Jewish mobility—the move from 
the cities to the suburbs—American Jews found ways to combine middle class 
comforts, social activism, and Jewish commitments.25  
 
The descendants of the original Milwaukee East Side and West Side Jewish 
immigrants were part of that “golden age” of upward mobility and suburbanization. Even 
after relocating, their ongoing commitment to Mount Sinai Medical Center was the means 
by which Milwaukee’s Jewish community gave back to their original neighborhoods. 
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Many Jewish civic organizations, including synagogues and community programs, 
followed Milwaukee’s Jews out of the city; Mount Sinai Medical Center was the 
exception. This migration was not unusual; in many urban areas, the Jewish community 
and the organizations they established moved together.26  
Jewish leaders were aware that keeping Mount Sinai in downtown Milwaukee would 
mean fewer Jewish patients, but that knowledge did not prompt them to relocate the 
hospital. A study commissioned by three major Milwaukee Jewish institutions, Mount 
Sinai Hospital, the Jewish Home for the Aged, and the Jewish Convalescent Center, 
influenced the decision to stay downtown. The Jewish Welfare Fund funded the study. It 
was the central charitable organization in Milwaukee.27 The Rosenfeld study, which was 
referred to by the name of its main author, Eugene Rosenfeld, supplied data about the 
city’s population distribution and suggestions and plan for the Boards of the four 
institutions to consider in order to improve their operations. The study also provided data 
to assist the institutions in determining what changes should be made to best serve the 
Milwaukee community through their cooperative efforts.28 The study provided 
information about social and economic environment in Milwaukee in the geographic 
areas serviced by the Jewish organizations. It outlined and provided the information 
foundation for establishing a medical training and research program at Mount Sinai, 
including policy objectives, staffing, finances, and administrative structures required to 
coordinate their efforts.29 In short, the Rosenfeld Study provided Jewish leaders at these 
four Jewish institutions with a great deal of data to assist them in decisions for the future 
                                                 
26 Donald Weber, Haunted in the New World: Jewish American Culture from Cahan to the Goldbergs (Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press, 2005).  
27 The Rosenfeld Study, Page 3, Box 1, Folder 5, Mount Sinai Hospital Collection, JMM Archives. 
28 The Rosenfeld Study, Page 1, Box 1, Folder 5, Mount Sinai Hospital Collection, JMM Archives. 
29 The Rosenfeld Study, Page 7, Box 1, Folder 5, Mount Sinai Hospital Collection, JMM Archives. 
 198 
 
of Jewish Community efforts in Milwaukee. The decision solidified the commitment of 
the Jewish community to the city, even as the Jewish population moved outward. Mount 
Sinai continued as a nonsectarian hospital under Jewish sponsorship until the 1987 
merger, in part due to this decision. 
 
THE ROSENFELD STUDY 
The Boards of the four facilities, Mount Sinai, the Jewish Convalescent Home, the 
Jewish Home for the Aged, and the Jewish Welfare Fund, commissioned the Rosenfeld 
Study to assist in the creation of a cooperative future between these institutions, which all 
served the health care needs of Jewish Milwaukee. The employees of Eugene D. 
Rosenfeld MD, of E. D. Rosenfeld Associates Incorporated, Hospital and Health Services, 
conducted the study and submitted the findings to leaders at each institution and the 
Milwaukee Jewish Federation.30 These consultants from New York City conducted the 
study in order to “suggest short and long term guidelines for the development of health 
services for the Jewish community.”31 The study “suggested appropriate methods for the 
Jewish community to meet its obligations in health care to itself and the general 
community.”32 It measured the current and projected health and medical needs of the 
Jewish and non-Jewish communities in Milwaukee and made recommendations to the 
Jewish-sponsored agencies in respect to their specific and joint responsibilities to meet 
those needs. The study included suggestions and methods for meeting the costs involved. 
It also recommended that the Milwaukee Jewish Federation serve as a central 
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communication link between the health services of the three facilities.33 Finally, it 
highlighted the need for the three health care facilities to develop new programs and 
define their functions and offerings to the Jewish community of Milwaukee and guided 
the leadership at the Jewish Welfare Fund in decisions about funding those efforts.34  
     The Rosenfeld researchers concluded that the residents of downtown Milwaukee, 
the majority of them non-Jewish, relied on Mount Sinai for their health care. The report 
then made suggestions for how Mount Sinai, the Home for the Aged, and the 
Convalescent Home could strengthen their cooperation and communication to serve 
Milwaukee residents. The study suggested partnerships between the facilities.35 They 
discovered a relative lack of efficiency in each of the health care settings. All three 
facilities, Mount Sinai, Jewish Home for the Aged, and the Jewish Convalescent Center 
provided almost identical services. In addition, the study determined that some parts of 
the facilities at Mount Sinai were “obsolete, inefficient or inadequate” and suggested 
upgrades of some sort, either through relocation or remodeling.36  
Pat Kerns recalls the Board meeting in 1967 that resulted in the decision to keep 
Mount Sinai Hospital downtown. In that meeting he stated only a few voted differently; 
the majority of the Board committed to keeping the hospital in Milwaukee to continue to  
mission of caring for the needy in Milwaukee. Leaders had already committed to staying 
downtown. The study included suggestions for the renovation.37 
The demographic information in the Rosenfeld Study confirmed that the number of 
Jewish patients at Mount Sinai was very low, as was the number of Jewish families living 
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near the hospital. The majority of Milwaukee’s non-white population was found to be 
most highly concentrated within the near north side area of the city, just north of Mount 
Sinai.38 The patients living in Mount Sinai’s neighborhood were less affluent than 
elsewhere in the city, and the report revealed that a full three-quarters of charity care 
patients at Mount Sinai lived in areas “immediately adjacent to the hospital.”39 Historian 
Joe Trotter noted that African Americans settled in Jewish immigrant neighborhoods in 
the central business district (CBD) as early as 1910. Mount Sinai was built on the western 
boarder of the CBD. The decrease in Jewish immigration in the 1920s and residential 
mobility decreased the number of Jewish families. The African American population 
grew as the Jewish population decreased.40 Gurda notes that, “The Near North Side 
became the heart of Milwaukee’s African American community. Between 1940 and 1960, 
black residents grew from 46 of the old Jewish quarter’s population to 85 percent. Nearly 
all the old synagogues that survived the wrecking ball were purchased by African 
American congregations.”41  
The creation of the federal Medicaid program meant that poor patients did not have 
to travel farther away from their homes to the County Hospital. This hospital, which had 
served the downtown patient base, had relocated in 1968 from the city to the new 
Regional Medical Center outside of Milwaukee city limits, in Wauwatosa. City residents 
sought services closer to home. Mount Sinai Hospital was their hospital, even if they 
were not Jewish, because it was in their neighborhood.42  
The Rosenfeld Study also suggested that the leadership of Jewish efforts in health 
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care needed a strong board to take responsibility for policy decisions by “interpreting 
the hospital’s needs through its relationship with staff and administration.” The 
decisions about the future operations of the three institutions had to be collaborative. 
The reason for the inefficiency stemmed from the lack of communication and 
collaboration between leaders in health care service institutions in Milwaukee.43 The 
study recommended cooperation between the three facilities in order to serve 
Milwaukee and highlighted the need for open and cooperative Jewish leadership, 
stating, 
Historically, the Mount Sinai Hospital Board of Trustees has been a closed 
self-perpetuating body, not well representative of the Jewish community 
and concentrating too often on operational problems, without clear-cut 
long-range development goals on education, research, and facilities. In the 
past, it has not worked closely with the Welfare Fund and the Jewish 
community to obtain sufficient understanding and support of its program. 
The present policy and administration bodies should be strengthened and 
reorganized and eliminate confusion by creating a framework for each area 
to work from and with.44  
 
The decision to remain downtown preserved the original mission to care for the poor in 
Milwaukee. That decision could signify a tacit acceptance of the Rosenfeld Study’s 
findings. Archival documents do not contain any Board meeting minutes that illuminate 
any debate. They committed themselves to strengthening the hospital’s medical 
reputation in order to draw more patients to the hospital by way of a large-scale 
renovation of the existing facility. They explored options that would strengthen their 
relationships with Milwaukee’s other Jewish institutions and work together.  
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FUNDING THE JEWISH BRAND  
The issue of money remained problematic. Leaders at Mount Sinai believed the key 
to alleviating deficits from decreased reimbursements for care was to increase revenue. 
They resolved to enlarge the hospital and solicit support from more members of the 
Jewish community. If Jews would no longer be patients at Mount Sinai, they could 
remain volunteers and donors. Mount Sinai had a strong Ladies Auxiliary with experience 
raising funds and volunteering.45 However, the Milwaukee Jewish community’s historic 
financial support of the hospital was decreasing over the course of the 1970s.46 Auxiliary 
members contributed many volunteer hours and sponsored an annual fund raising ball, 
but the formal charitable structure funding Jewish efforts fragmented upon their departure 
from Milwaukee. As the number of Jewish organizations to serve the suburban Jewish 
population outside of Milwaukee increased, the amount of money available to Mount 
Sinai decreased.47 Also, the public perception that indigent care at Mount Sinai Hospital 
was covered through Medicare and Medicaid decreased the perceived urgency of raising 
funds for the hospital from the community. Mount Sinai’s donors believed that the 
Medicaid and Medicare programs were paying for indigent care. In fact, in many cases, 
these programs covered only a portion of the total cost of patient care. In addition, 
patients with no insurance added to the hospital’s overall deficit.48 The relocation of the 
more affluent Jewish community meant that while Mount Sinai remained in Milwaukee, 
the Jewish community leaders were not as accessible as they had been before the move. 
The change in geography distanced them from the hospital. They established community 
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centers and shuls near their new homes and devoted their time and resources to nurturing 
the new institutions. The Rosenfeld Study noted that over time and distance a problem 
arose; disagreement between members of the Jewish population existed over the degree 
of its responsibility for the maintenance of service for a large number of persons from 
Milwaukee as well as for the Jewish community now living outside the city.49 
This situation was of particular significance for Mount Sinai Hospital. Some of the 
confusion stemmed from urban problems common to all cities and involved all types of 
voluntary entities. The Milwaukee Jewish population, like other immigrant groups, left 
the buildings of their community behind and built new structures in new areas. Many of 
the synagogues left behind were razed or purchased by others.50 The hospital was 
different. It was not razed. It was not reestablished in a new Jewish suburban location, 
and it was not purchased by another entity. It was still the Jewish-sponsored nonsectarian 
hospital in Milwaukee.51  
The Rosenfeld Study found that the Milwaukee institutions helped define and 
identify the Jewish population and served as an opportunity for Jewish civic involvement 
in Milwaukee, even after many Jewish families moved north of the city.52 Its operations 
were a credit to the community. Gurda remarks that, “Landmarks like Mount Sinai and 
the JCC had raised the community’s local profile.”53 The study highlighted the fact that 
the majority of the Jewish population had not been sufficiently involved in decisions of 
the role and direction for its remaining health care agencies. The study suggested 
engaging more members of the population. The study suggested Mount Sinai and the 
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other institutions needed that strong support.54 The study recommended increasing the 
involvement of the Jewish population beyond fund raising drives. Ray Alexander hoped 
the decision to consider a more religious Jewish identity at the newly renovated Mount 
Sinai Medical Center would increase the involvement of the Jewish people. The 
Rosenfeld Study suggested that the leadership recruit new representatives beyond the 
“closed self-perpetuating body” of leaders identified in the study.55 The Board sought 
ways to elevate the prestige of the hospital by appealing to the affluent members living 
outside Milwaukee. There is no mention in the Rosenfeld Study of creating religious 
programs or practices at these institutions.  
The Rosenfeld Study also noted that medical training opportunities in Milwaukee 
lagged behind other large cities. Other Milwaukee hospitals were offering training in the 
emerging specialties for residents and interns, but the study noted that at Mount Sinai, 
The hospital itself is not providing the opportunities and the climate in 
which the capacities of the staff can flourish. This along with the 
negativism on the part of many staff members about teaching and lack of 
interest by others has been one of the great problems of Mount Sinai 
Hospital. . .On the whole; the older men are less committed and less 
willing to devote time and leadership to education and research. The 
younger men would like more facilities and services allocated to these 
activities and are discouraged about the hospital’s failure to move in these 
directions. . .The absence of a comprehensive health center is perhaps the 
most obvious reflection of this weakness. Milwaukee is one of only three 
cities among the 25 SMAs in the United States that does not provide at 
least one major medical center for its citizens. One of three without one 
single outstanding general hospital of national note.56 
 
The Rosenfeld Study, like the Heil Report commissioned by a subcommittee of the 
Regional Medical Complex planning board in 1967, noted Milwaukee’s lack of a 
large-scale medical facility. This was one the reasons that leaders at Mount Sinai wanted 
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to establish a medical school program; doing so would address the need for learning 
opportunities for doctors and create a regional medical Center. In Milwaukee, however, 
approval for the Medical College of Wisconsin at the County Regional Medical Complex 
in Wauwatosa usurped those plans. In 1974, Mount Sinai established a teaching program 
affiliated with a major Wisconsin university as an alternative way to accomplish both 
goals.57 It was not quite what the Board members envisioned, but at the very least the 
partnership addressed the need for medical education at Mount Sinai. The Rosenfeld 
Study led to two significant initiatives at Mount Sinai during the 1970s: exploring a more 
Jewish identity and establishing a teaching partnership with the University of 
Wisconsin-Madison. Each initiative presented hospital leaders with additional challenges.   
The Jewish community in Milwaukee had never been religiously homogeneous, not even 
close, but a strong commitment to the city that had provided generations of Jewish 
residents with opportunities and acceptance transcended differences between the East 
Side and West Side Jews. Mount Sinai Medical Center remained a source of pride and 
civic service for the entire Jewish population, whether they lived in Milwaukee or not.  
 There was a great deal of disappointment on the part of Mount Sinai leaders over the 
unsuccessful attempt to partner with the new medical center in Wauwatosa. Many had 
personally approached leaders at the center in an attempt to strike a deal. Several attempts 
to establish any affiliation between the facilities failed.58 Leaders at the medical college 
at the Regional Medical Center expressed no interest in partnering with Mount Sinai, 
citing a 1954 accreditation survey which recommended that the College “should not let 
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service to the community impinge on the academic mission.”59 By 1959, college leaders 
were urged to consolidate the facilities in Wauwatosa rather than disperse services to 
other hospitals in Milwaukee.60   
 They funded the ambitious renovation through a fund raising campaign named “Once 
in a Generation.”61 Board president Ben Marcus remarked that, “The Jewish community 
in Milwaukee is not only involved in Jewish causes, but it deeply involved in welfare, the 
arts, industry, and civic enterprises throughout the state of Wisconsin. We are willing to 
assume positions of leadership and we are proud that we care.”62 This drive raised 
enough money to create a facility fit for a medical college and the title teaching hospital. 
The new Star of David erected over the main entrance of Mount Sinai signified a Jewish 
hospital. But what kind of Jewish hospital? Differences in religious observance among 
members of the Jewish community complicated the exploration toward being a Jewish 
hospital. As a nonsectarian hospital, adopting a Jewish brand through the support of the 
Jewish population, the religious differences did not matter; but as a religious hospital, 
those differences became important and more contentious.  
 Alexander strongly supported the plan to establish religious observant practices at 
Mount Sinai; the board wanted to brand Mount Sinai Hospital Jewish. Alexander wanted 
to change the nonsectarian mission of Mount Sinai, and the Board wanted to capitalize on 
stereotype that Jewish doctors and Jewish hospitals were the among the best and establish 
a Jewish brand that celebrated the Jewish support for the hospital. But when he left his 
position, the Board pursued other options for the future of the hospital. 
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A PRACTICING JEWISH HOSPITAL   
Raymond Alexander was the Executive Vice President of Mount Sinai at the time of 
Rosenfeld Study. He came to Mount Sinai from Mount Zion Hospital in New York City. 
He dedicated a great deal of time and effort to the task of creating a Jewish religious 
identity at Mount Sinai and used his experience and contacts from New York and Mount 
Zion to further the cause of creating a Jewish religious presence at Mount Sinai 
Milwaukee.63 In May of 1971, Alexander issued a report claiming that 1971 was “the 
most decisive year in Mount Sinai’s history.” He stated that the “boldness and foresight 
with which the Board and Medical Staff of Mount Sinai have moved” by creating new 
medical programs was commendable. He wanted to pursue a religious Jewish identity 
with the same level of determination.64 He also stated that there was to be a new 
philosophy that Mount Sinai and other Jewish hospitals could embrace, one that 
advocated that “Health care should be a right and not a privilege, and that the heritage of 
Judaism with its emphasis on social justice. . .all concede to emphasize the health care 
role.”65  
Mount Sinai had already committed their hospital to serving health care services to 
those in need, as a nonsectarian hospital, in 1903. The decision to brand the hospital as 
Jewish really had less to do with a “new” commitment to social justice and more to do 
with making Mount Sinai a Jewish hospital as a marketing strategy.66 Alexander pursued 
the establishment of a religious Jewish identity with what could only be described as 
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“boldness.” The Board sought to emphasize the fact that the Jewish doctors at their 
nonsectarian hospital treated all.  
 On January 24, 1971, Alexander invited Dr. Lowell Eliezer Bellin, the First Deputy 
Health Commissioner of the New York City Health Department, to speak at a celebration 
for newly appointed Chiefs of Staff at Mount Sinai. In his comments, Bellin addressed 
the importance of the relationship between Jewish hospitals and Jewish identity. He 
believed that Jewish hospitals were vital not just for the cities they operated in but for the 
Jewish community.  
But if Jewish hospitals were to vanish tomorrow from the United States, it would 
spell tragedy both for the general community and for the Jewish community. It is 
not chauvinistic to mention here that Jewish voluntary hospitals are among the 
best in the United States. They have set local and national standards for therapy, 
teaching, education, and general innovation. Substitutes for them in sufficient 
numbers are not imminent, and the mediocre institutions actually available to take 
their place would add morbidity and mortality of all ethnic groups. Moreover, the 
continued existence of the hospital under Jewish auspices accords with a 
sophisticated Jewish Realpolitik.67 In some communities the mere threat of 
founding a Jewish hospital has been enough to encourage other local hospitals to 
liberalize their staff privileges to Jewish physicians. I anticipate no immediate 
reversion to the pervasive anti-semitism [sic] of the medical schools and the 
hospitals, which besmirched our nation until recently. Nevertheless, I agree with 
those who suggest caution before giving ourselves over totally to generalized 
de-ethnicized auspices. “The poor of your own city take precedence over the poor 
of another city,” counseled the Talmud, opposing thereby an escapism into holism 
in which the poor of neither city receive succor.68  
 
Bellin believed that Jewish religious hospitals had an important role in health care 
and in the Jewish community as a whole for the survival of a Jewish identity. He argued 
that Jewish communities had to reinvest in their religious institutions as part of a plan to 
“re-Judaize” their identities. He noted the potential for some Jewish communities to, 
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Be indifferent and possibly hostile. To these. . . I would respectfully submit that 
during the next ten years any agency that is viewed as of dubious Jewish 
authenticity, of spurious Jewish particularism, and of ambiguous Jewish 
accomplishment will find it increasingly difficult to obtain support from the 
Jewish community that becomes increasingly assertive about its identity, and has 
many calls upon it from competing Jewish causes.69  
 
The support for a distinct Jewish religious character for hospitals like Mount Sinai 
linked to the Jewish community as a whole. Bellin elaborated on his statements about 
Jewish identity and emphasized the merits of a strong Jewish identity for the community 
and highlighted the absence of such at Mount Sinai. He was particularly concerned about 
the lack of Jewish presence in the hospital and in the community, stating, 
The following areas are worthy of discussion: (1) It is grotesque that some Jewish 
hospitals in this country as a matter of policy do not hire pious Sabbath observers. 
There is no incompatibility between running a hospital 24 hours a day, 7 days a 
week, and having observant Jews on the staff. Similarly, there is no 
incompatibility between fiscal solvency and the maintenance of a kosher kitchen. 
(2) The Jewish hospital as a “Jewish” institution should be able, without 
defensiveness, to assert its religious identity. The Christmas tree on the lawn of 
the Jewish hospital has been cited so often that it has become a cliché. It is 
intolerable that there are Jewish physicians within Jewish hospitals who routinely 
urge their new Jewish mothers, for the sake of convenience, to circumcise their 
sons before the 8th day and thereby eschew the religious ceremony of the Briss 
[sic] altogether.70 
 
After decades of service to Milwaukee as a nonsectarian hospital, Alexander urged the 
Board at Mount Sinai to seriously consider strengthening the Jewish presence at Mount 
Sinai by incorporating religious observance at the hospital. Mount Sinai did not provide 
Kosher food, had a nondenominational chapel for patients and families, and apart from 
the name, did not display a Jewish religious identity in the hospital. Sabbath observance 
was not part of hospital policy, but patients could elect to observe the Sabbath if they 
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wished. Norma Achter, a nurse at Mount Sinai for over forty years, reported that there 
were volunteers who lit Sabbath candles for patients, and staff avoided any unnecessary 
procedures if they violated the prohibition against working on the Sabbath.71 The 
hospital was decidedly nonsectarian; Abraham Slimmer, the original benefactor of Mount 
Sinai predicated his continued support on the nonsectarian mission for Mount Sinai. Even 
the orthodox West Side immigrants used the hospital when it opened in 1903 had been 
expected to embrace the less ritualized Judaism of the East Side Jewish community that 
operated Mount Sinai while they were patients. By 1971, Slimmer had long since passed 
away, and the Board was now seriously considering embracing a Jewish identity for 
marketing the hospital.72 The Board wanted to brand the hospital as Jewish, but did not 
support incorporating specific religious practices, their use of the term identity was, 
unsurprisingly, secular; they wanted to highlight the presence of Jewish doctors at Mount 
Sinai and the support that came from Milwaukee’s Jews. Their understanding of Mount 
Sinai’s Jewish “identity” resulted from the belief that the hospital was Jewish because 
they made it so, through their support.  
By 1974, the Mount Sinai Jewish Hospital Study Mission was formed to investigate 
other Jewish urban hospitals in order to learn more about successful urban Jewish 
hospital. The Study Mission included Board members, doctors, Ladies’ Auxiliary 
representatives, and Jewish community members at large.73 Volunteers traveled to Jewish 
hospitals in Chicago, Detroit, Toronto, and St. Louis to meet with staff and reported their 
findings to the board at large. In a letter to Mrs. Ruth M. Rothstein of Mount Sinai 
Hospital Chicago, Alexander explained that the “Mount Sinai Study Mission” wanted to 
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study medical departments, the Ladies’ Auxiliary, and fundraising efforts. Alexander 
believed in the Study Mission and wrote in his letter, “If all works well, which I’m sure it 
will, we would be glad to reciprocate. Maybe we can start a national movement.”74 These 
study missions did not focus much, if any attention on the religious aspects of the 
institutions. The main focus was on matters of service and policies, medical departments, 
and census numbers.75  
Mount Sinai board members visited Chicago on December 19, 1974. They met with 
administrators to learn about the emergency department, outpatient programs, hospital 
goals and objectives and relationships between Sinai Chicago and other hospitals. 
Milwaukee Sinai leadership learned that Chicago Sinai had a program to ensure patients 
were satisfied with their care and other customer service issues. The Milwaukee Sinai 
leaders took that policy under consideration.76 There is no indication that the committee 
specifically targeted any Jewish religious practices at Sinai Chicago for consideration. 
The focus of the mission was on hospital operations and specific medical departments, 
not on Jewish religious identity. Alexander tried to use religious practices to impart 
Jewish identity on the hospitals. The Board wanted to implement proven operational 
strategies found at other Jewish hospitals.  
Milwaukee Sinai representatives then traveled to Detroit Sinai and the Jewish 
Hospital of St. Louis in 1975. At the annual meeting of the Board of Milwaukee Sinai in 
May 1975, the mission report was presented to the full Board. The study mission 
members concluded that Mount Sinai Milwaukee was operating much like the hospitals 
                                                 
74 Letter from Raymond Alexander to Ruth Rothstein, December 1, 1974, Box 50, Folder 14, Sinai Samaritan 
Collection. 
75 Report to the Board and Corporate Body of Mount Sinai Medical Center, Box 50, Folder 14, Sinai Samaritan 
Collection. 
76 Report to the Board and Corporate Body of Mount Sinai Medical Center, Box 50, Folder 14, Sinai Samaritan 
Collection. 
 212 
 
visited. The challenge for leaders was to determine why the other hospitals were more 
financially successful.77 The mission study did not yield much new information for the 
leaders of Mount Sinai Milwaukee. The focus of the research was on matters of clinical 
policy and medical departments. The attempts to create a religious identity at Mount Sinai 
Milwaukee ended abruptly a year later. In May 1976, the hospital announced that Ray 
Alexander had left his position. The Wisconsin Jewish Chronicle reported that he left 
Mount Sinai for a job at Albert Einstein Medical Center in Philadelphia.78 The board did 
not continue what Alexander had started. 
There was no specific reason given why Alexander left Mount Sinai at such a crucial 
time, but his departure essentially ended efforts to create a Jewish religious identity at 
Mount Sinai. His efforts did not receive a great deal of support. Alexander wanted to 
institute practices at Mount Sinai to emphasize the Jewish religion and the mission 
wanted to establish a successful hospital using the business practices at other Jewish 
hospitals. The board wanted to create a successful hospital with the support of the Jewish 
community. It seems likely that Alexander left because he realized few, if any, of the 
changes he worked toward would ever become reality at Mount Sinai. As recently as 
April of 1976, he touted the changes made in Milwaukee to attendees at a conference of 
Jewish Hospital Directors, saying, “There has been an ongoing debate over many years as 
to whether or not a Jewish hospital will lose that identity if it serves a cross section of the 
community. Mount Sinai maintains its Jewish identity by giving free services to Russian 
immigrants, serving Kosher meals and cooperating with leaders in the Jewish 
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community.”79 Mount Sinai had historically served more non-Jewish than Jewish patients; 
commitment to “the cross section” was the reason the hospital remained downtown. The 
Jewish community in Milwaukee had always supported Mount Sinai as a matter of 
tzedakah and as an expression of their Milwaukee Jewish identity.  
In truth, the hospital did not need a Jewish religious identity to survive; it needed 
continued support from the Jewish community. Hospital leaders wanted a Jewish brand. 
There was a profound difference between Alexander and the members of the hospital 
research mission. Again a crucial difference between Alexander and the Board stemmed 
from different interpretations of what made the hospital Jewish. Ray Alexander wanted to 
add religious practices as an expression of Jewish identity, complete with traditional 
observance rituals at Mount Sinai. The Board wanted to accentuate a Jewish brand for the 
hospital using the historic contributions of the Jewish people of Milwaukee. Paul Jacobs 
noted that there was interest in creating a Jewish essence for the hospital, but in the 
context of staffing Jewish doctors and a medical education program. Alexander wanted to 
add significant religious elements to the hospital. Milwaukee had a deliberately 
nonsectarian Jewish hospital. A religiously observant Jewish hospital in Milwaukee had 
not ever existed. The effort toward making the hospital more religiously observant Jewish 
floundered after Alexander left, but the plans for a Jewish brand materialized. There were 
some changes to the hospital.  
The Board focused on possible changes the hospital could make to improve their 
health services; after Alexander left the issue of instituting religious practices at the 
hospital was tabled and the leaders at Mount Sinai concentrated their efforts on creating a 
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teaching program at Mount Sinai. In fact, had Mount Sinai pursued plans to become a 
more religious hospital, the teaching program might not have been established. 
 
UNIVERSITY MEDICINE: MEDICAL EDUCATION AT MOUNT SINAI      
While the Mount Sinai Study Mission was visiting other hospitals, other Board 
members worked to create a teaching program for doctors. The decision to form a 
teaching relationship with a university was not without precedent for a Jewish hospital. 
Jewish hospitals in large urban areas like New York,80 Boston,81 and Newark82 had 
strong relationships with university medical programs. The Rosenfeld Study 
recommended similar efforts to do so at Mount Sinai.83 Creating a formal relationship 
with the University of Wisconsin-Madison represented the chance for a symbiotic 
relationship between the organizations. The city of Milwaukee offered the medical 
students the opportunity to observe and learn about a variety of medical procedures in an 
urban environment distinctly different from Madison.84 
Mount Sinai wanted to partner with the struggling Marquette University program as 
part of their vision for a regional medical Center in the city. The Medical College of 
Wisconsin, formerly the Marquette School of Medicine, was a logical choice because of 
its location near Mount Sinai Hospital. However, Ben D. Marcus, President of the Board 
of Trustees at Mount Sinai, told the Wisconsin Jewish Chronicle that “We just could not 
get a hearing from them. They just didn’t seem interested in using Mount Sinai.”85 The 
                                                 
80 Aufses and Niss, This House of Noble Deeds. 
81 Linenthal, First a Dream. 
82 Krause and Krause, Covenant of Care. 
83 The Rosenfeld Study, Box 1, Folder 5, Mount Sinai Hospital Collection, JMM Archives. 
84 Newspaper clipping, “Medical School Affiliation Aids Hospital,” Wisconsin Jewish Chronicle, April 22, 1976, Box 
51, Folder 8, Sinai Samaritan Collection. 
85 Newspaper clipping, “Medical School Affiliation Aids Hospital,” Wisconsin Jewish Chronicle, April 22, 1976, Box 
 215 
 
pending merger between the Medical College of Wisconsin and Froedtert Lutheran, 
which moved their operations to Wauwatosa, may explain why the Medical College did 
not respond to Mount Sinai’s overtures.86 Marquette Medical College had severe 
financial problems in the early 1970s and could not secure funding because it was 
affiliated with a private religious college. The available funds came from government 
programs that did not fund private institutions. The decision to end the medical school 
program at Marquette University and move it to the Medical College of Wisconsin at the 
new regional medical center allowed the college to receive funds denied to a private 
university program.87  
Marquette Medical College’s lack of interest might also have stemmed from concerns 
that any affiliation with a religious hospital, however nonsectarian, would disqualify the 
program from government funding under the Hill-Burton Act. The religious differences 
between the medical school and the hospital presented another challenge. If funds had 
been secured, the institutions had to address these differences before establishing any 
program. The merger between Deaconess and The Passavant illustrated the possible 
difficulties facing both institutions in creating a partnership. Economist Teresa D. 
Harrison found that most hospital mergers occur between two nonprofit hospitals within 
the same health care service market.88 The merger between these two hospitals represents 
one of the most common merger scenarios. Whereas Harrison concluded that more 
attention needed to be focused on the actual effects of mergers on competition after the 
merger, this research documents the battle between representatives of the merging 
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hospitals and government entities.    
The teaching program established at Mount Sinai was designed to create a “clinical 
arm” for University of Wisconsin-Madison’s third year interns and medical residents in 
order to provide them with more experience in the “urban clinical environment.”89 
Mount Sinai representatives approached faculty members at the Medical College of 
Wisconsin in order to recruit them for the purpose of creating a teaching program. Their 
attempts to establish any affiliations between the Medical College and Mount Sinai 
failed.90 However, there was another available option in Madison. “In contrast with the 
situation at the Medical College of Wisconsin, UW-Madison lacked an adequate supply 
of patients and looked longingly toward Milwaukee. Mount Sinai, rebuffed by the 
Medical College, looked to Madison for an affiliation and was warmly received.”  
 Hospital officials hoped the relationship would be the first step toward the goal of 
creating a full-scale teaching institution at Mount Sinai.91 Student doctors, especially 
those interested in emergency medicine, needed a comprehensive education in the field. 
Milwaukee’s cultural make-up was much more diverse ethnically, and the larger 
population offered more clinical experiences in urban-based hospital medicine. David 
Amrani described the clinical opportunities in Madison as limited. Milwaukee had a 
variety of cultures and provided a diverse patient pool. UW-Madison students at Mount 
Sinai gained experience in a variety of emergency cases. Madison offered a more 
homogeneous clinical experience.92  
 The Rosenfeld Study had concluded that it was “axiomatic that major Jewish 
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training and teaching hospitals that were affiliated with universities were a drawing card, 
a magnetic attraction for interns and residents.”93 Madison students treated a variety of 
patients with diverse ethnic backgrounds, while Mount Sinai enjoyed the status of 
teaching hospital. It appeared to be a mutually beneficial relationship. However, conflict 
between university administration and faculty and hospital doctors arose; namely, the 
Milwaukee doctors gave and the University took. 
 
MEDICAL EDUCATION AT MOUNT SINAI MEDICAL CENTER  
The description of the relationship between the staff of UW-Madison and Mount 
Sinai’s doctors comes from a member of the University staff, Dr. David Amrani, and Dr. 
Paul Jacobs, a Jewish Milwaukee doctor. Amrani was recruited from New York in 1980 
as part of the UW- Madison clinical program research staff.94 He had been to Milwaukee 
ten years earlier for personal reasons and had visited Mount Sinai. When the opportunity 
to work at the only Jewish hospital in Wisconsin arose, he accepted the position and 
moved with his wife to Milwaukee. Despite plans to stay in Milwaukee only for a short 
time, Dr. Amrani remained in Milwaukee for over thirty years.95 He explained the 
relationship from his perspective; the program at Mount Sinai was a “clinical arm” of the 
University of Wisconsin-Madison Medical School. The hospitals in Madison were 
considered “narrow” in terms of patient demographics and clinical experience. The 
school sought opportunities to provide students with medical training in an urban hospital 
with a more diverse patient demographic. Mount Sinai Medical Center of Milwaukee 
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provided that diversity.96  
The agreement had advantages for the medical students from Madison and the 
doctors at Mount Sinai. It provided student doctors with medical experience. Those 
students, in turn, were valuable in providing much needed staffing help at the hospital. 
However, the new program resulted in conflict over hospital policy and procedures 
between the new UW-Madison leadership and the Milwaukee doctors. Amrani named Dr. 
Richard Rieselbach, from the University of Wisconsin-Madison as the “driving force” for 
the new program and stated the university essentially “overtook” the hospital under 
Rieselbach.97 
At a 1976 symposium held at the Mount Sinai Medical Center, the program received 
praise for its initial success. In two years the program had already “improved patient care 
with better medical education.”98 Dr. John A.D. Cooper, president of the Association of 
Medical Colleges in Washington D.C., stated that medical schools gained from 
partnerships with urban hospitals because students get better clinical experiences working 
in a metropolitan hospital.99  
Amrani believed that it was Rieselbach’s support for the partnership that kept Mount 
Sinai in downtown Milwaukee. In 1979, an opportunity to buy land in Mequon arose; 
Mount Sinai again had the opportunity to relocate. Reiselbach used his influence to keep 
Mount Sinai in Milwaukee and touted its status as an urban medical campus to persuade 
Board members at Mount Sinai to stay in Milwaukee. He highlighted the fact that Mount 
Sinai provided downtown neighborhoods with access to university medicine. Hospital 
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leaders decided to pass on the possibility of relocating.100  
The Medical program at Mount Sinai was a mixed blessing for the hospital; it was a 
source of pride for the hospital but it also ultimately altered the partnership between 
Mount Sinai and Jewish doctors in Milwaukee. The University academic staff from 
Madison “overtook” the main hospital and displaced the Milwaukee doctors in hospital 
administrative operations.101 The Milwaukee doctors started practices at other 
Milwaukee hospitals. The historic relationship between the Jewish doctors and Mount 
Sinai diminished. One of the fundamental aspects of the hospital’s Jewish identity 
weakened as the doctors practiced elsewhere.102 Ironically, the establishment of a 
teaching program in the tradition of other Jewish hospitals in America affected the 
traditionally close relationship between Jewish doctors and hospital in Milwaukee. 
Amrani explained that Milwaukee’s Jewish doctors were not included in the 
decisions about the teaching program. Instead, they were literally displaced by the 
UW-Madison doctors; the non-university doctors had their offices relocated to the 
remodeled “professional building” away from the main hospital.103 The displaced doctors 
resented being pushed aside and expressed the feeling that as non-UW doctors they were 
“second class” staff, subordinate to the new doctors from Madison.104 The experts from 
the university, not the neighborhood experts, settled into positions of power at the main 
campus. 
Paul Jacobs was a Jewish doctor practicing at Mount Sinai at the time of the 
university partnership. He reported that general practitioners at the hospital felt 
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resentment toward the university staff and left due to their dissatisfaction with the 
changes at the hospital after the teaching program began.105 He stated that Milwaukee’s 
Jewish doctors did not have to stay at Mount Sinai; they had chosen to remain there. 
Jacobs remarked that, “After the university program was established, the close feeling 
that this was our hospital and our attachment lessened a great deal. After moving to the 
professional building, some began to establish their practices at other hospitals.”106    
This rift led to a decrease in the amount of influence Milwaukee doctors had over 
policy and procedure decisions at a time when Mount Sinai needed the support of 
Milwaukee’s Jewish community, including its doctors. The Board retained control of 
funding decisions and still held a great deal of power, but the doctors did not have the 
influence they once had in the hospital hierarchy. Amrani believes that in the late 1970s, 
Mount Sinai died as a Jewish community hospital and transitioned into an urban medical 
education institution. He explained, “Mount Sinai became the University of 
Wisconsin-Madison hospital for a period of time. By 1981, the doctors from the 
university were entrenched at the main hospital, with the Jewish Milwaukee doctors 
practicing off site.”107 The influence of the hospital Board in leadership and decision 
making matters weakened. The members of the hospital Board made major decisions 
among themselves for decades. Now, there was another entity in the hospital that wanted 
to have a say in matters.108 This was not what the Rosenfeld Study suggested. It urged 
Milwaukee Jewish institutions to cooperate with one another. The conflict between the 
Milwaukee Jewish doctors and board members and the university administration resulted 
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in a strained relationship between Mount Sinai Medical Center and important members of 
the Jewish community, the doctors, at a time when a strong relationship was crucial. By 
1984-85, the financial difficulties at Mount Sinai stalled any growth of the medical school 
program. Medical students continued to staff Mount Sinai, but there were no increased 
financial benefits to the hospital. Mount Sinai was broke and unable to dedicate resources 
to any expansion of the UW-Madison program.109  
In 1967, the Rosenfeld Study provided suggestions for strengthening Jewish health 
care institutions in Milwaukee. The end result of the changes made by Mount Sinai’s 
leaders was a weakening of the relationship between Jewish doctors and the hospital. It 
recommended creating a medical teaching program at the hospital. Despite the teaching 
program and remodeling project, the finances at the hospital did not improve. In addition, 
the program created a distance between the hospital and Milwaukee Jewish doctors. The 
Rosenfeld Study did not account for the importance of Jewish doctors to the Jewish 
identity at Mount Sinai. This was a crucial error. Hospital leaders erred as well; they did 
not solidify Jewish community support for Mount Sinai as the study recommended. The 
hospital needed the doctors even if they no longer needed the hospital. It also needed the 
continued community support, donations and volunteer hours, at this time.  
The study also noted that there was no need for an exclusively Jewish hospital in 
Milwaukee, in part because Jewish doctors and patients were no longer barred from other 
Milwaukee hospitals. Ray Alexander was not able to create a more religious Jewish 
identity at the hospital, but leaders wanted a Jewish brand. The hospital had started as a 
nonsectarian hospital supported by the Jewish population. The Jewish support made the 
hospital Jewish. The other hospitals in Milwaukee accepted Jewish doctors. Leaders 
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implemented cosmetic elements to the new addition to brand the hospital as Jewish but 
did not realize the importance of the Jewish doctors. The doctors expanded their practices 
to other hospitals after feeling usurped by the new university program. The effects of 
these actions were that by 1980, Mount Sinai Medical Center had a small university 
education program for doctors, an expanded facility, and a strained relationship with 
Milwaukee’s Jewish doctors and the Jewish community at large.  
The financial difficulties brought on by changes in government programs led to a 
merger with Good Samaritan Medical Center in 1987. The hospital lost the foundation of 
its Jewish brand, community support, and Jewish doctors, when the doctors began to 
practice elsewhere. The volunteer hours from the doctors’ wives decreased as well.  
Jewish patients went to other hospitals. The hospital could have moved with other Jewish 
institutions north of downtown. Mount Sinai could have joined the other relocated Jewish 
institutions in the suburbs. The decision against relocation sealed the fate of Mount Sinai. 
When the time came to consider a merger, the Jewish population did not see the need for 
a Jewish hospital for themselves any longer. Government programs replaced fundraising 
for indigent care. The community support of the original nonsectarian mission of the 
hospital to serve those in need and the desire to give back to the city led to the decision to 
surrender the hospital. The hospital remained downtown and after the merger became the 
main campus for Sinai Samaritan Medical Center. 
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CHAPTER 6: MERGER WITH GOOD SAMARITAN MEDICAL CENTER 
The 1982 merger of Deaconess and Passavant Hospitals did not prevent the 1987 
Mount Sinai merger with Good Samaritan. Why did Mount Sinai have to merge when the 
number of beds was reduced downtown? The merger of Deaconess and The Passavant 
significantly reduced the number of beds. Hospital leaders and local government officials 
believed that the reduction of total hospital beds in Milwaukee would help other hospitals 
in Milwaukee so what led to the 1987 merger? The answer to the question stems from a 
variety of changes in government programs, hospital administration practices, and changes 
in the fund raising practices within the population. Many urban hospitals struggled to meet 
the costs of patient care in light of decreased reimbursement rates in the Medicaid 
program. However, the location of Mount Sinai, in a downtown and poor neighborhood 
and the high number of poor patients led to a decrease in private insurance patients. This 
led to higher rates of shortfall between actual cost of care and the amount hospitals 
received. The hospitals then tried to address the shortfall by adopting a different 
organizational model, more “business like” in practice. The decrease in fund raising from 
the Jewish population and volunteer hours, combined with the declining funding for a 
growing number of Medicaid and uninsured patients led to the need to merge.   
Changes in Medicaid funding did not fully illustrate the situation at many urban 
hospitals treating large numbers of indigent patients. In addition to the shortfall between 
full cost of care and government benefit payments, there were other latent functions to 
consider. The assessment that Medicaid was working as it was intended had been presented 
by David Rodgers et al. in 1982. The data they collected indicated that health care access 
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for poor people had indeed risen, with good outcomes.1 More people were being helped, 
more care was being delivered, and the program was indeed working and expensive 
because hospitals recovered the total cost of care. The authors of that article assumed that 
cuts would be made to the program. The effects of those cuts remained to be seen.2 The 
American taxpayers were now invested in the public health care system and subsidized 
health care expenditures for the poor.3 Charles Rosenberg noted that from the foundation 
of the first hospital, the cultural belief was that patients in public hospitals should be 
expected to pay for their care, but not be denied if they could not afford it, while Starr 
remarked that toward the end of the 20th century, the poor should be cared for, with a caveat 
about wasteful spending on that care. Public medicine should be freely given but not at the 
expense of the fiscal health of the institution.4 
     The use of tax dollars affected the private hospitals that accepted patients on Medicaid, 
like Mount Sinai. Public perception pitted their own life situations against the needs of the 
poor and not wanting them to receive handouts they themselves could not get in hard times. 
The notion that no one be denied care because of poverty carried the stipulation that as long 
as the cost did not conflict with the needs of those not on aid, care could be given.5 Soon, 
Medicaid patients found themselves increasingly vulnerable to the health of the economy. 
The commitment to helping the poor combined with unreliable funding sources resulted in 
many fiscal challenges for hospitals like Mount Sinai. For decades, private hospitals like 
Mount Sinai had distinguished themselves from the public hospitals by way of funding and 
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community support. They also benefited from their private hospital status. In the early 
history of American hospitals, public hospitals, like many other public institutions and 
poverty programs, were hampered by erratic funding sources and public perception about 
the way they treated patients.6 Whereas at the start of the 20th century public hospitals were 
seen as a place for those with the lowest socioeconomic status, private hospitals treated 
those determined to be worthy of help through the efforts of various affluent community 
members.7 
      Historian Sandra Opdycke explained that the fundamental difference between a 
public and a private institution is that a public institution is bound by many social and 
cultural understandings about their mission.8 Private hospitals rejected patients based on 
their inability to pay for care and could also discharge those who could no longer afford to 
pay for their care. They were much more likely to uphold the standard of guarding against 
the perils of charity, even in the event of severe illness. They were free to consider their 
economic health over the needs of the indigent.9 The public hospital did not have that 
option, but there were rules for them as well. Public hospitals provided assistance for the 
poor freely when a life was at stake. They aimed to avoid creating dependency, and at the 
same time gave to those in need proper and respectful treatment.10  
The creation of government health insurance programs relieved hospitals of the task of 
measuring worthiness. The programs also subjected private hospitals to the problems faced 
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by public hospitals, namely the insecurity of funds for patient care. Private urban hospitals 
began to treat more Medicaid patients and the decreased reimbursement rates began to 
affect the budget. However, one of the latent effects of treating a large number of poor 
patients was the decrease in patients who had the ability to pay in full. Economist Andrew 
Sfekas examined the possibility that private pay patients avoided hospitals with high 
numbers of Medicaid patients. He found that privately insured patients did exactly that.11 
These patients may have feared their own costs increased at these hospitals, to make up for 
the poorer patients. Economists David Dranove and William D. White studied private 
hospitals in California to measure the effects of increased numbers of Medicaid patients 
had on the hospitals. They looked for any instances of “cost shifting,” charging private pay 
patients more to make up for the poorer patients, any incidents of cutting services to 
Medicaid patients, and whether or not hospitals treating high numbers of Medicaid patients 
were more likely to close. They found that there was no cost shifting, in fact many private 
patients paid less for services. But, some services for Medicaid patients were cut, 
especially at hospitals with the highest number of Medicaid patients. Finally, they found 
that hospitals treating a majority of Medicaid patients were more likely to close.12  
That these hospitals were often in poor neighborhoods also kept wealthier patients 
away. David Amrani, a physician at Mount Sinai, suggested that the hospital’s downtown 
location kept Jewish patients away. He believed that the Jewish population living 
northeast of downtown Milwaukee no longer felt comfortable at the hospital’s location. 
The Board decided to make Mount Sinai Medical Center a “community hospital” by 
                                                 
11 Andrew Sfekas, “Is There a Medicaid Penalty? The Effect of Hospitals’ Medicaid Population on Their Private Payer 
Market Share,” Health Economics 22, no.11 (December 2013): 1360-1376. 
12 David Dranove and William D. White, “Medicaid-Dependent Hospitals and their Patients: How Have They Fared?,” 
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staying downtown and that is exactly what it became: a hospital for residents who were 
predominantly black and poor.13 Amrani reported that when his wife was pregnant in 
1981, their decision to have the baby at Mount Sinai elicited surprised reactions from 
some of their Jewish acquaintances. He stated that the same people who had supported 
the idea of keeping the hospital in the downtown area would not use it themselves 
because of the “element” or the “urban population.”14 He noted that not all of their 
Jewish cohort said such things, but a noticeable number did.15 He also thought that it 
seemed that it was the native Milwaukee Jewish community members who avoided the 
Mount Sinai neighborhood. Amrani and his fellow ex-New York residents grew up in a 
large diverse city and patronized Mount Sinai after moving to Milwaukee.16 
While it may be that members of the Jewish community did not use Mount Sinai 
Medical Center in great numbers because it was downtown, it is clear that the people 
responsible for making the decision to stay downtown knew exactly what patients would 
use the hospital. Board member Pat Kerns, who attended the very meeting that chose to 
keep Mount Sinai at the downtown location stated that, “We wanted to give something 
back to, mainly the Black people really, at least half of the patients are Black, I would say 
in that area.”17 It is unlikely that the Milwaukee Jewish community did not realize that 
Mount Sinai would serve a majority of poor black patients. Dr. Harry Kanin noted that 
when the decision was made to stay downtown, Mount Sinai “got mostly Title 19 
(Medicaid) and indigent patients.”18 Dr. Jay Larkey noted that the location of Mount 
Sinai was home to a large black population was common knowledge in the Milwaukee 
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14 Dr. David Amrani, Interview by author, Milwaukee, Wisconsin, July 14, 2011.  
15 Dr. David Amrani, Interview by author, Milwaukee, Wisconsin, July 14, 2011. 
16 Dr. David Amrani, Interview by author, Milwaukee, Wisconsin, July 14, 2011. 
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Jewish population.19  
However, three major changes in indigent health care programs led to severe 
financial shortfalls at urban hospitals. One of the most profound changes came in the 
aftermath of the PL 93-641, federal legislation passed in 1974 as part of the Hill-Burton 
Act discussed in the previous chapter. It gave the government the power to set 
reimbursements on the medical care of Medicaid patients below the total cost of care. The 
Reagan administration began changing health care funding in 1982. New federal 
regulations on Medicare patients’ care automatically disallowed two percent of the total 
cost of care, leaving the care provider to cover the balance. The creation of Diagnostic 
Related Groups (DRGs) lowered the amount of reimbursement for Medicare patients 
further through standardized medical coding. The changes represented an attempt to 
regulate federal funding for state programs. They required a great deal of work in order to 
remain in compliance with funding requirements. These changes led to the need for 
Mount Sinai to merge.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
19 Dr. Jay Larkey, Interview by author, Milwaukee, Wisconsin, August 17, 2011.  
 229 
 
POLITICAL CHANGE, POLICY CHANGE 
The election of Ronald Reagan as U.S. president in 1980 was a pivotal event in 
history of American health care programs for the poor. The Republican governor from 
California and former actor used his inaugural address to lay out his plans for “public 
spending” and his intent to reevaluate current social programs:  
Idle industries have cast workers into unemployment, human misery, and 
personal indignity. Those who do work are denied a fair return for their 
labor by a tax system which penalizes successful achievement and keeps 
us from maintaining full productivity. But great as our tax burden is, it has 
not kept pace with public spending. For decades we have piled on deficit 
upon deficit, mortgaging our future and our children’s future for the 
temporary convenience of the present. To continue this long trend is to 
guarantee tremendous social, cultural, political and economic upheavals. 
You and I, as individuals, can, by borrowing, live beyond our means, but 
only for a limited period of time. Why then should we think that 
collectively, as a nation, we’re not bound by that same limitation? We must 
act today in order to preserve tomorrow. And let there be no 
misunderstanding--we are going to begin to act, beginning today.20 
  
One of the first changes made by the Reagan administration was to the Medicare 
program. By 1982, government policy denied two percent of the total costs treating 
Medicare patients. This policy placed the responsibility for the balance on the institution 
providing care. Mount Sinai continued to treat Medicare patients and absorbed the 
disallowed costs; the program that had once paid in full for caring for uninsured patients 
was now adding to the hospital’s deficit.21 The same was true at other Milwaukee 
hospitals; Medicare patients were adding to the deficit and the hospitals were left to cover 
the shortfall.22 
                                                 
20 Ronald Reagan, “Inaugural Address,” in Representative American Speeches: 1980-81, ed. Owen Peterson (New York: 
H.W Wilson, 1981), 12.  
21 Newspaper clipping, “Federal Cost Cutting Pushes Up Deficits of Non Profit Hospitals,” Wall Street Journal, 
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Hospitals felt the effects of the decreased federal commitment to Medicare and the 
state regulations on Medicaid reimbursement almost immediately. J. Alexander 
McMahon, President of the Chicago-based American Hospital Association remarked that 
“When the government reduces payments or tightens eligibility rules for poor people, 
non- profit institutions as well as public hospitals continue to treat them. An 
underpayment simply becomes a non-payment.”23 The two major programs used by poor 
people for health care services at Mount Sinai Medical Center were paying less, while 
hospital leaders were limited in their ability to offset the loss through expansions or rate 
increases. The hospitals were caught in a Catch-22 situation. If they treated more patients 
on government programs, the hospitals lost more money, and they could not increase 
rates for their services to raise money.  
Local businesses, labor groups, and health insurance firms explored the possibility of 
forming a collective group between themselves and Milwaukee’s hospitals. The goal was 
to create coalitions between local businesses and Milwaukee health care institutions 
treating poor patients in order to minimize the projected shortfalls due to disallowed care 
costs at any one hospital. They tried to bargain for discounted rates for their services, with 
the goal of “reining in escalating hospitals costs over the next decade.”24 In essence they 
tried to create a network to share the burden of caring for underinsured patients on 
Medicaid and Medicare.25  
A subcommittee of leaders from Milwaukee institutions formed to discuss the plan 
                                                                                                                                                 
Folder 9, Sinai Samaritan Collection. 
23 Newspaper clipping, “Federal Cost Cutting Pushes Up Deficits of Non Profit Hospitals,” Wall Street Journal, 
February 9, 1982, Box 50, Folder 37, Sinai Samaritan Collection. 
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and noted that,  
While such a recommendation acknowledges that consumers would have 
less choice as to where they get their medical care. . .under the increased 
competitiveness under such a plan ought to improve system- wide cost 
effectiveness as hospitals provide services for the amount the purchasers 
are willing to pay.26 
 
The proposed coalition was an attempt to meet the care needs of patients on Medicare and 
Medicaid while addressing the fiscal deficits created by underpayment for services at the 
hospitals treating them. The rationale was that cooperation between hospitals would 
lower hospital costs for all Milwaukee’s hospitals. The problem with the plan was that an 
equitable way to direct poor patients to hospitals based on their particular health care 
issue, not the closest hospital, was not found.27 The financial problems at many of 
Milwaukee’s hospitals hindered any agreement between them. They all needed a great 
deal of help, and the proposed agreement did not offer enough. The subcommittee report 
stated,  
Also recommended that if the state decided to eliminate freedom of choice 
for Medicaid recipients in picking doctors and hospitals, the state should 
direct those patients to hospitals with lower costs for specific services. For 
example, the state could direct recipients to certain hospitals for high risk 
pregnancy but to a different institution for tonsillectomies.28  
 
This recommendation represented an attempt to address a major issue in the 
treatment of the Medicare and Medicaid patients. It sought to compel Milwaukee’s 
for-profit hospitals to care for them and absorb some of the shortfall from the government 
insurance program. The financial difficulties at hospitals like Mount Sinai Medical Center 
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highlighted the success of the private hospitals established under the provisions of the 
Medicaid/Medicare legislation, and the creation of early hospital networks.  
The financial incentives for private businesses to take over struggling hospitals were not 
offset by any requirement that they accept Medicare/Medicaid patients. The acquisition of 
hospitals by business groups led to the growth of early health care networks and created 
hospitals that were free to deny medical services to those who could not pay in full. 
Rosemary Stevens writes, “The notion that hospitals are simply businesses was fueled by 
their financial success for most of the 1980s, by the financial environment in which they 
operate[d].”29 David Amrani remarked that “businesses and business systems were able 
to manage their hospitals and clinics in order to make them more profitable. They 
changed medical practice in this town and all over.”30 One of the ways hospitals achieved 
the goal of making a profit was to be selective about the patients treated. Richard 
McDonald, President of McDonald, Davis & Associates, a Milwaukee advertising and 
marketing group, remarked in 1985 that “There is an all out war in the making between 
the providers of health care.” He feared that proprietary hospitals could and would make 
it a priority to “turn down Medicaid recipients” in order to avoid any loss of revenue.31  
That is exactly what happened. Mount Sinai Medical Center and other Milwaukee 
hospitals treated more and more underinsured and uninsured patients, while other 
hospitals in the area refused to care for patients using government insurance programs.32 
The for-profit hospitals utilized the practices of the earliest private American hospitals in 
order to maximize profits and reduce costs by running them as businesses and by refusing 
                                                 
29 Stevens, In Sickness and in Wealth, 332. 
30 Dr. David Amrani, Interview by author, Milwaukee, Wisconsin, July 14, 2011. 
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Samaritan Collection. 
32 Dr. Harry Kanin, Interview by author, Milwaukee, Wisconsin, July 14, 2011. 
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to care for Medicare and Medicaid patients to avoid underpayment.  
In response to the report of the coalition of local business, labor and hospital leaders, 
the Southeast Health Systems Agency (SEHSA) released its own “Hospital Blue Print for 
the 1980s” in April of 1982 to address hospital costs and government insurance shortfalls. 
The Blue Print’s suggestions attempted to consolidate health services in Milwaukee 
without input or final say from any of the hospitals. While the hospitals could offer their 
own ideas, the final decision came from the SEHSA.33 The hospitals were bound to any 
decision made because of PL 93-641; as with the Deaconess/Passavant merger, other 
Milwaukee hospitals accepted the recommendations of the SEHSA Blue Print or faced 
the loss of any reimbursement for care.34  
The Blue Print incident highlighted urban hospitals’ weakened efficacy in creating 
revenue. The leaders and administrators at Milwaukee’s hospitals were now effectively 
bound to the suggestions of the SEHSA. They could no longer act on plans of their own 
and in some cases had to act against their own wishes. Some Milwaukee hospital leaders 
were critical of the Blue Print; John Comesky, President of St. Michael Hospital, was 
vocal in his opposition to the SEHSA plan; he questioned the premise of the Blue Print 
that unused hospital beds or duplication of services increased cost by citing a study that 
apparently showed, “Unstaffed hospital beds accounted for a very insignificant portion of 
total hospital costs. Duplication was essential to provide reasonable access to hospitals. I 
beg all who believe mergers, linkages, consolidations etc. in the health care field reduce 
costs to read the literature and cite support for these ideas.”35 
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The combined effects of government funding changes and the regulations on it were 
both a blessing and a curse to hospitals like Mount Sinai; a blessing when the full cost of 
care was covered, a curse when funds were cut to less than the costs to the hospital. Mount 
Sinai was struggling in 1982, with both Medicare and Medicaid underpaying for care when 
a new standard was introduced by the federal government.  
 
STANDARD OF CARE  
In 1983, federal legislation created a system meant to standardize care for Medicare 
patients, the Diagnostic Related Groups (DRGs). These groups evaluated clinical 
conditions and set reimbursement rates designed to keep costs of care within a specific 
range for hospital care.36 The DRGs prevented hospitals from charging more money for 
procedures in order to increase revenue.37 David Amrani described the establishment of 
the DRGs as “the roof falling in” when it came to what doctors and hospitals received in 
reimbursement for their services.38 Before DRGs, doctors and hospitals set the rates for 
care, billed the insurance companies for that amount, and received the total amount. The 
DRGs created a system, using 467 diagnosis-related groups, to code the medical 
condition and treatment and base reimbursement on what the DRG found reasonable 
rather than actual cost.39 Stevens explains the DRGs as an attempt by the Reagan 
administration to continue to cut the costs of Medicare by creating flat fees for services at 
all hospitals: “In the 1980s, as in the 1920s, standardization was defined by the practical 
politics of what can be regulated. Interweaving through the new standardization of 
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hospitals by government has been an increased ability to measure health-service 
utilization and financing.”40 Ostensibly, DRGs were intended to “level the playing field” 
between hospitals by preventing any one hospital from claiming that any higher costs of 
care at their facility were justified.41 The DRGs established nationwide standards on the 
costs of care; all hospitals treating Medicare patients were responsible for any 
discrepancy between the DRG-computed cost and the total cost to the hospital. The plan 
grouped hospitals into regions and all hospitals in each region charged the same amount 
of money for procedures.42 The DRG system gave the federal government the power to 
establish prices for the health care of over twenty million Medicare recipients on the 
assumption that their care could be sold as a standardized product, rather than as the 
unpredictable and varied process of treating human beings.43 
However, a senior systems analyst and a Vice President of Finance at 
Rush-Presbyterian-St. Luke’s Medical Center in Chicago, Illinois predicted a very serious 
problem. Cynthia Barnard, the analyst, and Truman Esmond, the Vice President, studied 
the plan to implement DRGs on hospitals. They identified a problem with the creation of 
the DRGs, namely one of timing. They determined that in their study it was unclear if 
hospitals in their data set had collected information about the cost of hospital stays 
concurrently or retrospectively, and that was vital in the case of setting reimbursement 
rates. They believed that hospitals may have entered concurrent data, which only included 
charges as of a few days before the patient was discharged.44 They believed that in order 
for the DRGs to set appropriate rates, all hospitals had to submit retrospective data about 
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total hospital costs for all diagnostic categories. Only then could the DRGs accurately 
standardize hospital prices. This information was integral, without it, hospitals stood to 
lose money.45 They concluded that “Until the data can be adequately received and 
explained or replaced with appropriately retrospective data and the differences between 
billing and clinical data eliminated, the current case mix based on DRGs cannot be used 
to measure resource use and therefore will not accurately predict reimbursement needs.”46 
Health Economist Sylvester E. Berki, in 1984, noted the fact that the issues raised by 
Barnard and Esmond had not been addressed, and he commented that,  
The basic effect of paying for care on the basis of a prospectively established 
price per treated case (PPS) is that it changes, as if by magic, revenue centers into 
cost centers. Additional days of stay and more intensive services before PPS were 
sources of additional revenue. Under PPS, each additional day of stay and every 
additional service is an addition to cost, a reduction in net revenue. What hospitals 
before were motivated to maximize, now they will have to minimize. If under 
retrospective cost- based reimbursement the hospital's role was to provide 
facilities and personnel required to produce the maximum combination of services 
physicians wished to order, now hospitals will wish to reduce the cost of treatment 
both by reducing the amount of services and by producing them more efficiently.47 
 
The use of DRGs to set prices led to Medicare patients themselves literally suffering 
under the new guidelines. Sociologists Juanita B. Wood and Carroll L. Estes found that 
hospitals discharged patients when they reached the end of their standardized care, not 
when they were necessarily healthy. Their research indicated that patients were 
readmitted after discharge and used additional medical resources, increasing the cost of 
care at the hospital.48 
The system challenged the right of the doctor to determine the course of care and 
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length of hospital stay. Jay Larkey remarked that the new system of standardizing care 
was less than optimal from his perspective as a doctor: “I’m a Socialist, he said. When I 
was in the service, I never sent a bill to a patient, and I never had some high school 
dropout telling me that I had to discharge a patient out of the hospital.”49 David Amrani 
noted that hospital leaders at Mount Sinai Medical Center struggled with the regulations. 
One problem was that those responsible for comprehending and explaining the 
documentation involved with the new coding system were unable to do so.50 Brenda 
Wagner, a staff member at Mount Sinai, remarked that the paperwork involved in getting 
funds was very time-consuming, and the forms had to be filled out correctly in order to 
avoid having the request denied. This was well before the Internet age; these forms were 
typed and mailed through the United States Postal Service.51 Reimbursement was slow in 
coming, and took a great deal of labor in order to secure.   
Hospitals sought solutions to the shortfalls caused by the new “standards of care” 
created by government regulations and the DRGs. Many hospitals, Mount Sinai Medical 
Center included, had to adopt a “business model” approach in order to survive. In 
October 1981, a Mount Sinai Status report stated that, “In response to continuous 
concerns regarding reimbursement from the federal (Medicare) and state (Medicaid) 
government, we have initiated additional steps to reduce payroll of the Medical Center 
below the reduced budget which was submitted.”52 The steps included layoffs due to low 
patient numbers and wage reductions for staff. The official statement about the steps 
noted that, “Although we are concerned with the emotional and financial welfare of our 
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employees, the realities of today’s economy have necessitated these extraordinary 
steps.”53 Despite those “steps,” the deficit continued to grow. 
 The continued strain between the commitment to delivering health care to all in need 
and the rising costs of providing that care without any increase in resources compelled 
hospitals like Mount Sinai Medical Center to explore mergers or face closing. Lawrence 
Tarnoff, Mount Sinai’s Vice President of Marketing Development, told a reporter, “In the 
first six months [of 1984], total patient days dropped 9.5%. More and more hospitals are 
becoming sensitive to the fact that you cannot do business the same way you did four or 
five years ago. We realize we have to do business differently in order to maintain market 
share.”54 The decrease in days spent in the hospital by paying patients added to the 
hospital’s difficulties.  
Mount Sinai was not the only Milwaukee hospital struggling at this time. In 1986, 
many hospitals in Milwaukee were working together to stay open. An article published in 
the Milwaukee Sentinel noted that “Facing increased competition, declining patients counts, 
and unprecedented pressures to hold the line on costs, area hospitals are forming 
affiliations with other medical institutions at an accelerated pace.”55 Mount Sinai formed 
an alliance with Good Samaritan a year later. Bill Loebig, of Franciscan Hospital, remarked 
that, “I think in the next five years, it is imperative that the Catholic hospitals in the 
Milwaukee area be in some kind of alliance with one another. Virtually all hospitals will 
have connections with some major national or regional system over the next ten to 15 years. 
We are positioning our organization currently to look for meaningful partnerships and 
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relationships that will vary across the spectrum from loose alliances to acquisitions.”56 
There were too many struggling hospitals and not enough alliances. A 1985 Milwaukee 
Sentinel article made a dire prediction about the future of the city’s hospitals. “By the year 
1990,” it noted, “at least seven hospitals now in the Milwaukee area will have gone out of 
business. Proprietary for-profit hospitals are on the increase; by 1995, 50% of the hospitals 
in the country will be proprietary.”57 The changes in government policy for programs 
covering indigent care resulted in a mounting deficit for Mount Sinai that could not be 
covered as it once was: by increased revenue, expansion, or donation drives or other fund 
raising. The new medical center, Good Samaritan Medical Center, despite early success, 
was also struggling in 1985. 
In the wake of increased costs of care, hospitals tried to increase the efficiency of their 
operations. Jonathan Engel notes that hospitals tried different hospital operation models to 
run their institutions. Hospitals adopted a more business oriented model in order to meet 
the demands of accountability and care for all in need. As hospitals took a more 
businesslike approach to health care, and federal and state funded poverty programs fell in 
and out of favor with Americans, they felt squeezed between the need to remain both 
financially solvent and accessible to those in need.58 The fiscal reality of caring for patients 
as health care costs rose was often subordinate to caring for those in need.59 The adoption 
of a more business centered model changed the way hospitals administered care; indeed, 
hospitals became businesses, and acted accordingly. David Cutler and Jill Horwitz note that 
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with this new business approach, hospitals had to adjust to these new fiscal realities, which 
threatened the core missions of many public institutions, treating all in need, regardless of 
ability to pay.60  
The ramifications of the changes in both hospital ownership and operation models 
were most readily seen in the process of merging long standing private hospitals into a 
single institution within a hospital network. Many of the private hospitals in Milwaukee 
had always operated under the auspices of religious orders or private ownership. The 
creation of hospital systems made these hospitals part of an organization that had no 
personal affiliation with the traditions of the hospitals or the communities that had 
established them. As hospital systems streamlined operations in response to market forces 
and heeded the call to maximize utilization, hospitals with decades of community service 
faced difficult circumstances. Health care systems began buying struggling hospitals. The 
Hill-Burton Act included incentives for systems to buy failing hospitals, including money 
for renovations and tax breaks.61 Another goal of the new regulation was to avoid 
duplication of services in cities.  Jonathan Engel noted that it was intended to regulate 
hospitals in urban areas in order to enable “new investment in health care infrastructure and 
equipment through a newly created certificate-of-need [CON] process. A CON granted by 
a local Health Systems Agency was now required for most new construction, purchasing of 
major medical equipment, or institutional realignment.”62 A certificate of need was a 
governmental designation that imposed limitations and offered benefits to certain 
hospitals.63 Mount Sinai was designated as a vital part of Milwaukee’s hospital system, 
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and was therefore unable to relocate without government approval. 64The bill transferred 
the power to regulate the operations of urban hospitals and make decisions about hospital 
expansion and operations policy from the individual hospital boards and administration to 
local government agencies. David Amrani pointed out that a CON was both good and bad 
for Mount Sinai; good in that any plans for expansion had a better chance of being 
approved, but any attempt to relocate after getting would not be approved.65 
 
THE MERGER DISCUSSIONS 
The decision to keep Mount Sinai in downtown Milwaukee was a conscious effort by 
the Hospital Board to continue the original mission of the hospital, tzedakah for the 
indigent patients. Many of those Interviewed believed that to be true. Pat Kerns remembers 
attending the 1967 Board meeting that decided to keep Mount Sinai in downtown 
Milwaukee: “The men that made that decision cared for the community, really cared about 
the community. I’ll never forget that meeting, maybe two said no. We were accepted into 
Milwaukee and we had a wonderful Jewish community, we still do, and this is part of the 
whole thing.”66 He and the other board members believed that the decision to remain 
downtown was a mitzvah to the non-Jewish community in Milwaukee.67  
The mounting debt caused by years of decreased reimbursements resulted to two 
alternatives for Mount Sinai’s leadership: merge with Good Samaritan Medical Center or 
explore the possibility of relocating the hospital in Mequon. Both Kearns and Amrani 
mentioned the land in Mequon. It was purchased by Aurora Health Care in 1979. While this 
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land could have been used for a hospital, Amrani reiterated that there was no way to move 
Mount Sinai to Mequon in light of the CON. Mount Sinai Medical Center was vital to 
downtown Milwaukee’s health care system.68 Kerns recalls that it was the Board who 
rejected any offer to relocate to Mequon.69 The hospital board rejected any plan to relocate 
the hospital, so a merger appeared to be the only alternative for keeping the hospital open.70 
Amrani remarked that by the time the decision about a merger was made, Mount Sinai 
Hospital was needed in its downtown location. The hospital had received a Certificate of 
Need in 1979, designating it as a vital hospital resource. “They couldn’t leave, there wasn’t 
[sic] very many hospitals left!”71 Jay Larkey noted that of the six hospitals in the 
downtown area in the 1960s and 1970s, only two remained: “St. Anthony’s at 10th and 
Wells, Deaconess at 18th and Wisconsin Avenue, Lutheran on Wisconsin Avenue, West 
Side Hospital on 24th and Wells, and Doctor’s Hospital on 27th and Wells, all closed.”72 By 
1986, Mount Sinai Medical Center and Good Samaritan Medical Center were the only two 
left. When they merged, only a single hospital remained to serve downtown Milwaukee. 
 
MAKING MERGER EASIER 
The merger between Mount Sinai Medical Center and Good Samaritan Medical Center 
was not as protracted or contentious as the Deaconess and The Passavant. Mount Sinai 
accepted the merger as a foregone conclusion, and this eased the process somewhat. The 
effects of the Reagan administration policies on both hospitals made a merger seem 
necessary. The ramifications for the Milwaukee Jewish community are relevant. The 
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migration of Milwaukee’s Jewish community to other neighborhood and other hospitals 
had significantly weakened the relationship between the community and Mount Sinai. The 
Board remained Jewish, but the hospital was no longer the only hospital for Jewish doctors 
and patients. David Amrani believes that “Society had changed, and there was no need for a 
Jewish hospital in the way that the hospital was originally needed. The 1903 reasons for a 
Jewish hospital did not exist in 1983. The reason there is not a great deal of involvement by 
the Jewish doctors and their wives, from a Jewish perspective is that there isn’t, it’s a very 
different animal now than it was even when I moved here thirty years ago.”73 And that is 
what happened; the hospital stayed downtown and announced a merger with Good 
Samaritan Medical Center in 1987.  
Initial discussion between the two hospitals began in 1984. Leaders at both hospitals 
met to study a possible merger. There were a few leadership clashes between the two 
hospitals, but nothing like the conflict over the Deaconess/Passavant merger. On June 8, 
1984, the two hospitals announced they were considering a merger to reduce health care 
costs at each hospital. On July 18, 1984, Mount Sinai President Daniel Kane outlined six 
major issues that needed to be studied before any merger. In a July 18, 1984 Milwaukee 
Journal opinion column published by the Milwaukee Journal he claimed that “Self-interest 
and practice, commitment of leadership, medical education and care, quality of care, 
consumer education, and a cost benefit analysis of creating a single medical Center through 
merger.”74 Eight days later the Journal reported that there were “anger signs” at Good 
Samaritan Medical Center over the opinion piece and merger discussion. Good Samaritan 
Medical Center leaders viewed Kane’s opinions as presumptuous. They halted merger 
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discussions in order to allow both sides time to form committees to discuss the specifics of 
a merger. On December 13, 1984, Mount Sinai announced that Daniel Kane had abruptly 
resigned as President of Mount Sinai and the merger discussions stalled.75 Sarah Dean was 
appointed acting president in January 1985, and merger talks began anew.76 Patient census 
numbers at Mount Sinai Medical Center continued to decrease after 1984, putting 
additional pressure on the hospital leadership to negotiate a satisfactory merger agreement.  
Good Samaritan Medical Center was also struggling. In March 1985, the Deaconess 
campus of Good Samaritan Medical Center closed.77 Both Mount Sinai and Good 
Samaritan continued to treat a large number of poor patients, resulting in even more overall 
debt. The deficits caused by decreased reimbursements created a large shortfall for the 
hospitals. The shrinking number of total patients, combined with the underpayments from 
federal and state health care programs forced the cash-strapped hospital to make a decision 
on the proposed merger.78  
The absence of a large scale concentrated effort from the Jewish community to help 
Mount Sinai Medical Center in the years of 1984-87 is significant. After decades of 
appealing to the Jewish community during fiscal crisis, there is no evidence of any sort of 
appeal to help the hospital during the years leading up to the merger. No appeals for 
donations, no fundraising drive, no appeal to the Jewish community of Milwaukee to save 
their hospital. The leaders left to decide the fate of Wisconsin’s only Jewish hospital 
approved the merger to continue to care for the indigent in Milwaukee. Good Samaritan 
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Medical Center also needed the merger in order to avoid closure. Three Milwaukee 
hospitals, Deaconess, The Passavant, and Mount Sinai, provided the foundation for the 
Sinai Samaritan Medical Center. The histories of the community contributions to the three 
Milwaukee hospitals that merged are not evident at Sinai Samaritan today. 
On June 18, 1987, eighty-four years almost to the day, the Board announced the merger. 
Mount Sinai Hospital Medical Center, Wisconsin’s first Jewish hospital, located at the 
corner of 12th and Cedar since 1913, was merging with the Good Samaritan Medical Center. 
The merger created Sinai Samaritan Medical Center. President of the Mount Sinai Board, 
Stanley Kritzik, announced the merger in a short, concise letter that explained that this 
necessary action would allow for the work at Mount Sinai to continue. As a stand-alone 
medical institution, Mount Sinai Medical Center was “excellent but underutilized 
downtown Milwaukee hospital. The goal of the merger is to form one high quality 
organization capable of more efficiently meeting the community’s needs.”79 The merger 
agreement consolidated the downtown medical Centers in order to efficiently utilize 
departments within the existing facilities. The creation of Sinai Samaritan ended the history 
the only Jewish hospital ever to operate in Wisconsin.  
After decades of service to Milwaukee, the hospital buildings remained downtown to 
continue the original mission of caring for those in need. The responsibility for funding that 
mission passed from the Jewish community to government programs. The decreased 
Jewish presence at Mount Sinai Medical Center had a profound impact on its Jewish 
identity. The Rosenfeld Study of 1967 suggested that there was no need for a Jewish 
hospital for Milwaukee’s Jewish physicians because other hospitals had lifted the ban on 
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Jewish doctors. However, Mount Sinai Medical Center did need the Jewish doctors, 
among others, in order to remain a Jewish hospital. Mount Sinai did not need to be 
religious in order to be a Jewish hospital; it had always been Jewish because of the Jewish 
Board members, Jewish doctors, Jewish patients and Jewish volunteers. The withdrawal 
of Jewish doctors, patients, and volunteers from Mount Sinai paved the way for the 
hospital’s merger in 1987 with a Christian one. Elliot Lubar resigned from his position at 
Mount Sinai in 1982 stating, “I saw the handwriting on the wall, that this was not going 
to be a Jewish hospital much longer. The commitment went away and that was because 
the doctors went away.”80 
The decrease in Jewish community support, particularly the volunteer hours and fund 
raising, was significant in the decline of a sense of Jewish identity at Mount Sinai. The 
number of volunteers at Mount Sinai Medical Center decreased by the 1980s. Fears about 
personal safety is one possible explanations as to why the volunteers stopped coming to 
Mount Sinai. David Amrani noted that while Jewish doctors continued to admit patients 
to the hospital, albeit less frequently, the wives would not go. They cited the 
neighborhood “down there” and safety concerns kept them away.81 The safety concerns 
stemmed from incidents in the 1960s. Civil unrest and riots in 1967 in Milwaukee 
influenced the attitudes of white suburban residents. In response to the overzealous 
response of the Milwaukee Police Department to relatively minor protests, Mount Sinai 
Medical Center worked with the Milwaukee police Department on a preparedness plan in 
case of riot and a large number of casualties. However, there were no major riots in 
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Milwaukee.82 Deindustrialization and increased poverty in Milwaukee led to urban blight 
in many neighborhoods, including Mount Sinai’s.83 Lehman stated there were instances 
of armed patients and an increase in the number of victims of violence treated at Mount 
Sinai. She stated that it was random but, “it exists, right outside the hospital, and when it 
does, it creeps into the hospital.”84 She also noted that Mount Sinai, like some of the best 
hospitals in urban areas are in “horrible neighborhoods” including Walter Reed National 
Military Medical Center in Washington D.C., where her son received medical services as 
part of the military: “it is in a horrible neighborhood, but President Bill Clinton went 
there for his care.”85 Mount Sinai was an excellent hospital in a declining 
neighborhood.86 
Changes in the lives of women are a salient reason for the decrease in female 
volunteers during this time. Starting in 1970 women began to enter the paid labor force in 
large numbers, even after having children. In 1970, thirty-nine percent of American 
children had mothers who worked outside the home; by 2000, sixty-seven percent of 
children had mothers in the paid labor market.87 Sociologists Vicki R. Schram and 
Marilyn M. Dunsing noted that college education and a husband that did not support a 
wife working outside the home increased the number of volunteer hours spent by married 
women in the 1970s. Younger women were also more likely to volunteer than older.88 In 
1965, the typical volunteer was married, female, aged 22-44 with a high school education 
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and no employment outside the home. By 1974, the typical characteristics of a volunteer 
changed little, the exception being she was now more likely to have a college education.89 
Sociologists Thomas Rotolo and John Wilson found that employment status and 
parenthood affected the number of volunteer hours. Women who worked part time 
volunteered more time, but those who worked part time and had children of school age 
volunteered more than homemakers with younger children.90 
Many of the Mount Sinai Ladies Auxiliary members of the 1950s and 1960s were 
educated, married and did not work for pay outside the home after the birth of their 
children. They volunteered at the hospital for a variety of reasons, but not for a salary. 
Some had attended college but did not pursue careers.91 Marilyn Kahn, a member of the 
Ladies Auxiliary, remarked on the change saying, “It was drastic to me. It was difficult to 
get volunteers, to get new volunteers. It was a great opportunity for young educated 
women of my time who really wanted to contribute to the welfare of others; some loved 
just being there. The new generation were not willing to be there as volunteers, and there 
was no group to draw on after we got older.”92 Kahn remembered one instance in which 
a younger woman was unwilling to serve on an art committee for the hospital as a 
volunteer, despite having a degree in art. Her art degree provided the means to establish a 
career.93 Young women in the late twentieth century used their educations to gain 
employment, not to support exclusively volunteer activities. Volunteers at other Jewish 
institutions also decreased at the same time; leadership at the Sisterhood group at 
Congregation Emanu El B’ne Jeshurun reported that, “The end of the century [20th] 
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brought important societal changes that slowed the activity of the Sisterhood under the 
weight of time crippling schedules for young family women, a great many of whom also 
filled jobs outside the home.”94 The decrease in women volunteers, Jewish doctors and, 
patients weakened the Jewish presence at Mount Sinai. Their contributions to the hospital 
had always been an aspect of Mount Sinai’s Jewish identity. The Milwaukee Jewish 
population redirected resources that used to donated to Mount Sinai to institutions in their 
own suburban areas. The Jewish identity of Mount Sinai waned without the historically 
strong support of the community. The Star of David signified a sense of history and 
Jewish identity, but the sponsorship of Mount Sinai by the Jewish population ended with 
the merger. After eight decades, the work of the Jewish population of Milwaukee at Mount 
Sinai Medical center concluded.  
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CONCLUSION 
THE MILWAUKEE JEWISH FEDERATION AND COMMUNITY BUILDING 
The Milwaukee Jewish Federation is in the process of exploring ways to unite the 
Jewish population in the state of Wisconsin. On June 26 and 27, 2011, approximately 300 
members of the Wisconsin Jewish community met at the Milwaukee Public Museum for a 
2 day “Jewish Summit.” The event, officially recognized by Mayor Tom Barrett as the 
Milwaukee Jewish Summit Day, was advertised for weeks beforehand in the Wisconsin 
Jewish Chronicle.1 The Milwaukee Jewish Federation, the current name of the former 
Federated Charities, viewed the Summit as a chance for the Jews in Milwaukee and other 
cities in Wisconsin to meet and discuss the future of the Wisconsin Jewish community. 
The Federation collects donations for a variety of local, national, and international causes. 
I attended this event. We received literature about current Milwaukee Jewish resources, 
from adult day care services to two free adult admissions to Jewish Museum Milwaukee. 
A booklet was distributed to all participants. The goal of the Summit was to ascertain the 
needs of the diverse Jewish community and the city of Milwaukee. It stated that the 
Summit’s first task was to “Uncover and identify our strengths so that we can understand 
the elements that make our community special and give it life and meaning.” The second 
purpose was “to dream a bold future for ourselves and for future generations emphasizing 
our deepest hopes and desires for Jewish Milwaukee.” Finally, participants were to “to 
engage ourselves in bringing about the future we want to see, so that our dreams can 
come true.”2   
The first day of the event included round table discussions between randomly 
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selected groups. The Summit included a luncheon, with an Orthodox member of the 
Milwaukee community on hand to insure the adherence to Kashrut laws. The summit was 
held on Sunday and Monday, to ensure that those who observed Sabbath could attend. 
Orthodox, Conservative, Reform, and unaffiliated Jewish people spent two days 
interacting in workshops and breakout sessions discussing Jewish identity and the state of 
the Milwaukee Jewish community.  
The Federation used the data collected from the Summit and created thirty-two 
Dream Statements and eighteen Community Initiatives to bring together the Jewish 
people of Milwaukee. They created a scale in order to measure the political, social, and 
religious views of the attendees. Eighteen community initiatives were created using input 
from the Summit scale including a concierge program for new Jewish residents in 
Milwaukee to free Jewish education. There was no discussion of Mount Sinai Hospital.3 
The Dream Statements include passages meant to invite individuals into the Jewish 
community. For example, 
In our Jewish community each individual member is valued. We embrace our 
diversity and provide opportunities for all Jews, regardless of religious affiliation, 
marital status, sexual orientation, skin tone or economic status. An individual’s 
financial resources are not a barrier to participation in Jewish education, Jewish 
social and cultural events and Jewish camping experiences. We provide for the 
needs of people who live alone, who are elderly, mentally ill or disabled. We 
collaborate to share our financial as well as personal resources. We ensure that all 
members of our community are aware of volunteer opportunities, and we view our 
human capital as a valuable resource to be efficiently managed. We immerse 
ourselves in the Jewish values of tzedakah, pride in our Jewish heritage, 
commitment to Israel and doing of good deeds.4 
 
 
 
                                                 
3 Milwaukee Jewish Federation, “Milwaukee Summit 2011,” Milwaukee Jewish Federation. 
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Another statement describes the ideal Jewish community, 
Our community will be a warm welcoming family, fulfilling the needs of all Jews as 
we learn more about our Jewishness. This can be facilitated through collaboration 
between institutions of the Jewish community (e.g., group purchasing, group 
planning, shared facilities). – There would be education of needs and similarities 
between the streams of Judaism to foster unity. Unity = respect of differences and 
connection through our similarities as we work side by side on our shared goals. – 
The values of community would be steeped in Tikkun Olam, tzedakah, and warmth. – 
Education would be available to all regardless of cost. To accomplish this we would 
use technology collaboration and volunteerism. – The elderly would have affordable 
services based on innovative design mechanisms.5 
The leaders of the Milwaukee Jewish Federation are trying to strengthen relationships 
between diverse Jewish groups in Milwaukee. They are using scales, surveys, and other 
means to try to define a collective Jewish identity and appealing to individuals, 
welcoming them to a Jewish community. It is a good start. Sociologists Peter L. Berger 
and Thomas Luckmann argued that identity, once crystallized, is maintained, modified, or 
even reshaped by social relations. The social processes involved in both the formation 
and the maintenance of identity are determined by social structure.6 In order to form 
stronger relationships between these present day Jewish residents, it is crucial to create 
opportunities to modify and reshape the social meanings of being from the East or West 
Side. Federation leaders must acknowledge the history of the conflicted relationship 
between East and West Side Jews, especially on matters of religious practice and ethnicity, 
in order to create social bonds within their population. As the Federation moves forward 
with these plans, it would be beneficial to their cause if leaders reacquainted themselves 
with the history of stratification and conflict within the population, in order to address 
                                                 
5 Milwaukee Jewish Federation, “Milwaukee Summit 2011,” Milwaukee Jewish Federation. 
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these same concerns as they seek to build a strong Jewish community.   
Sociologist Ralph Segalman commented on the limitations of using scales for the 
purpose of measuring identity. They are often constructed in order to measure the strength 
of an individual’s connection to established Jewish organizations, rather than measuring 
the strength of their Jewish identity.7 Sociologist Simon N. Herman believed that a better 
way to measure an individuals’ Jewish identity was to measure the impact of participation 
in Jewish organization on their lives.8 The scales constructed for the Summit also do not 
reflect the contention religious diversity history as it relates to Milwaukee Jewish identity. 
The social segregation and differences in religious observance within the Milwaukee 
Jewish population remain crucial issues in light of the attempts at community building 
today. The history of Jewish participation at the former Mount Sinai Hospital is missing 
in their quest to define identity and build community. An articulate definition of identity 
is important to the leaders of the Milwaukee Jewish Federation, they hope that by 
defining Dream Statements and community initiatives, a collective Jewish identity will 
take hold and increased Jewish collective action will be a part of that identity. This 
research found that this will not be an easy process. 
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ETHNIC AND RELIGIOUS DIFFERENCES IN MILWAUKEE 
The Jewish identity of Mount Sinai was not overtly religious. The available literature 
and interviews from members of Milwaukee’s Jewish population reveal the original 
mission of Mount Sinai was nonsectarian. Mount Sinai served the city of Milwaukee for 
almost eighty-four years as a nonsectarian hospital. When Rabbi Caro approached 
Abraham Slimmer for funds to establish the hospital, Slimmer insisted on a broad, 
nonsectarian mission and matching community funds with his donations. The result of 
that stipulation was that Mount Sinai Hospital was a nonsectarian hospital that received 
support from the more affluent members of the Milwaukee Jewish community.  
This research posited three distinct facets served as the foundation of Milwaukee 
Jewish identity: the conflict within the community between East and West Side Jews; a 
preference for Reform Jewish religious tradition by the first wave Western Europeans and 
the social distance from the later Eastern European immigrants due to ethnic differences; 
and philanthropy for all of the indigent of Milwaukee as a means of expressing civic 
pride through their collective action at Mount Sinai Hospital. The most salient part of 
early Milwaukee Jewish identity is not so much religiosity, but the conflict between the 
two ethnically diverse Jewish groups. All three facets of Milwaukee Jewish identity 
remain evident today. 
The research of the early years of Jewish history in Milwaukee revealed discord 
between two different groups of Jewish immigrants. Historian Avraham Barkai noted that 
Germanic Jews acted with “The urgent aim was to wean newcomers, or at least their 
children, from their alien ways. The underlying fear was that the Eastern European Jews 
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would endanger their social status and achievements of the whole community.”9 
Historian Daniel Soyer noted that the relationship between more Americanized first wave 
German immigrants and later arrivals from Eastern Europe has been a subject of 
scholarly debate. Historians generally recognize that after initial tension and even 
hostility between the two groups, cooperative community action existed as the later 
arrivals gained prosperity and took their place in positions of influence in their 
communities.10 This was the case in Milwaukee. Country of origin and the timing of 
arrival in Milwaukee were two crucial facets of the early immigrant experience. Rae C. 
Ruscha, an East Side Reform leader, observed in 1951 that “At about this time [turn of 
the century] I became conscious of the phrase, ‘East is East and West is West and never 
the twain shall meet.’ For no reason, some Jews living east of the river became imbued 
with the wierd [sic] notion that they were somewhat superior--of finer ilk than those 
living west of the river. The cleavage, entirely without merit, produced a logical 
resentment and resulted in somewhat strained attitudes.”11 Echoing Ruscha’s thoughts 
sixty years later, Pat and Joan Kerns, an East Side Jewish couple, illustrated the lingering 
divide between the two communities; 
Joan: “Milwaukee was a very segregated city, it still is.” 
Pat: “Not anymore.” 
Joan: “A little bit, we still talk about people we were friends with.” 
Pat: “That was way back.” 
Joan: “They were West Side Jews.” 
Pat: “We were just kidding.” 
Joan: “Well, there is still a little bit of that mindset you know, never the twain shall 
   meet.” 
Pat: “It has something to do with where their parents and grandparents came from.” 
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Joan: “Did your parents have any friends from the West Side? NO!” 
Pat: “No.” 
Joan: “Pat’s mother was so happy when he met me because I was an East Side girl, 
   so it was a real division. 
Pat: “The West Side boys used to come over because they wanted to date East Side 
   girls. You remember that? 
Joan: ‘Sure, I went out with them.” [laughs]12 
  
Class divisions and religiosity, were at the heart of the difference between the 
original East and West Side Jewish populations. Milwaukee afforded the East Side Jewish 
community many opportunities. Jewish businessmen, professionals, and politicians 
established themselves within the city’s Germanic community on Milwaukee’s East Side. 
The city granted suffrage to all male immigrants, Jews included, after a period of 
residency and did not impose punitive taxes on Jewish businesses. Many East Side Jewish 
men achieved financial success and established Mount Sinai to serve the indigent 
members of the West Side Jewish immigrant wave.13 The hospital did not bridge the 
social gap between the Jewish East and West. The East Side community provided support 
for the care of those in need from the West Side. Some members of the West Side 
community established successful businesses of their own. They contributed to the 
hospital as well. Their success did not change the social differences in the community. 
East Side Jewish parents still wanted their children to marry on the East Side.  
However, the West Side Jews eventually had opportunities to climb the 
socioeconomic ladder. The hospital was a meeting place for the Jewish population: 
common ground. There, they were united in their support for the mission. Pat Kerns 
related that with the right circumstances, namely religious affiliation and achieving 
upward social mobility, one could come from a West Side Jewish family and join the East 
                                                 
12 Pat and Joan Kerns, Interview by author, Mequon, Wisconsin, May 24, 2011. 
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Side.14 The West Side Jewish population grew quickly in the 1880s. The creation of 
Mount Sinai Hospital, along with the Settlement and the Abraham Lincoln House, Jewish 
Social Services, and the economic success of some West Side Jewish men allowed some 
descendants of West Side Jews to join the East Side Jews in their new neighborhoods 
north and east of downtown Milwaukee. Dr. Jay Larkey had Russian grandparents who 
“envied the Germans.” He lived on the West Side but remembers that when he was 
younger he took a streetcar from his home at 2763 N. 53rd Street to Emanu-El Temple for 
Confirmation classes, instead of preparing for a Bar Mitzvah at nearby Beth Israel.15 He 
was born and raised on the West Side, but his parents sent him to the Reform 
congregation for religious education. Pat Kerns and Jay Larkey practiced Reform Judaism. 
Pat Kerns grew up as a Reform Jewish man.16 Larkey’s parents put him on a streetcar to 
get him across the Milwaukee River for religious education, and both define themselves 
as East Side Jewish men.17 Religiosity, in the more traditional observance sense, divided 
the Milwaukee Jewish community in the early decades of the Twentieth century, but 
remained one viable option available to signify the Jewish history at the former Mount 
Sinai in 1992. 
This research revealed that in Milwaukee, the East and West Side Jewish populations, 
historically divided along ethnic and class lines, formed a community at Mount Sinai 
Hospital through their collective action to support their hospital. This support represented 
one of the few collective community actions between the two groups, and the most 
successful. The “Germans” and the “Russians” in Milwaukee did not eat, pray, or marry 
                                                 
14 Pat and Joan Kerns, Interview by author, Mequon, Wisconsin, May 24, 2011. 
15 Dr. Jay Larkey, Interview by author, Milwaukee, Wisconsin, August 17, 2011. 
16 Pat and Joan Kerns, Interview by author, Mequon, Wisconsin, May 24, 2011. 
17 Dr. Jay Larkey, Interview by author, Milwaukee, Wisconsin, August 17, 2011. 
 258 
 
one another in great numbers. They did, however, work together for the good of “their 
hospital.” It is their historic care and support for, and pride in their hospital, that best 
explains why a sense of Jewish identity mattered after the merger, why Sinai Samaritan 
had a menorah. The “Jewish identity” of the hospital prior to the 1987 merger came from 
the physical presence of the Jewish collective community. After the merger, after the 
dissolution of the Jewish Board and the sharp decrease in Jewish collective action at the 
hospital, Jewish ritual objects and observances replaced the people who used to make the 
hospital Jewish just by being there. Mount Sinai Hospital served as an icon in Milwaukee, 
representing the contributions of the Jewish population. Their commitment to the hospital 
continued even after much of the Jewish population moved outside of the city. Milwaukee 
Jewish gratitude for the opportunities provided by the city and the hospital explains their 
dedication. It is an important part of the Jewish narrative in Milwaukee. The Jewish 
community in Milwaukee continued to support the hospital even after relocating. It was 
by choice, and in the words of Pat Kerns, a duty for the community to “give back” to the 
people.18 
Mount Sinai Hospital contributed to the creation of the Jewish medical profession in 
Milwaukee. The Jewish doctors who worked at Mount Sinai cited anti-Semitism as a 
prevailing factor in creating a Jewish hospital in Milwaukee; it was as much about 
offering a place for Jewish doctors to practice as it was about treating Jewish patients. 
Jewish doctors established medical practices and professional careers because of Mount 
Sinai. Dr. Jay Larkey also noted the history of exclusion of Jewish doctors and the 
importance of a Jewish hospital in Milwaukee. There was no other option available to 
Jewish doctors,” You have to remember the essential part of this story is anti-Semitism., 
                                                 
18 Pat and Joan Kerns, Interview by author, Mequon, Wisconsin, May 24, 2011. 
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he said 
And the Jewish doctors that practiced in the city of Milwaukee had to practice at 
Mount Sinai or some of the smaller hospitals. They couldn’t get on the staff of the 
major hospitals like St. Luke’s, St. Joe’s, Columbia; those were the upper echelon 
hospitals. . .Jewish doctors could not get on staff at these major institutions so 
they had to go to Mount Sinai Hospital.19 
 
Dr. Harry Kanin related his early career in terms of the opportunity provided to Jewish 
doctors in Milwaukee: 
One of the motivations was not so much to take care of Jewish patients but also 
provide a place a hospital for the Jewish doctors to work. Because they couldn’t, 
they weren’t accepted as a rule at the other hospitals. By the time I came here that 
was breaking down. There were Jewish doctors at various hospitals, not many but 
a few. But the reason I decided to do my internship here was simply because it 
was automatic; I just felt comfortable here.20  
 
The plan to institute specific religious observations, closing for Jewish holidays and 
erecting a Menorah for Hanukkah, in order to maintain Jewish identity, did not come 
from any religious tradition at Mount Sinai over its eighty-four years of operation before 
the merger.21 The attempt, in 1992 after the merger, to retain a “Jewish identity” does not 
necessarily represent a shift of opinion regarding the more religious and traditional 
Jewish observances in Milwaukee’s Jewish population. In the early years of Milwaukee 
Jewish history, distinctive religious observances and traditions divided the East and West 
Side Jewish residents. Dr. Harry Kanin recalls a sense of embarrassment on the part of 
East Side Jews toward those who adhered to traditions from Europe.22  
 
The East Side Jews, by virtue of being among the first to arrive, established 
                                                 
19 Dr. Jay Larkey, Interview by author, Milwaukee, Wisconsin, August 17, 2011. 
20 Dr. Harry Kanin, Interview by author, Milwaukee, Wisconsin, July 14, 2011. 
21 Louis J. Swichkow and Louis P. Gartner, The History of the Jews in Milwaukee (Philadelphia, PA: The Jewish 
Publication Society of America, 1963), 228. 
22 Dr. Harry Kanin, Interview by author, Milwaukee, Wisconsin, July 14, 2011. 
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themselves as the arbiters of what constituted Milwaukee Jewish identity, including 
culturally acceptable religious expression. Many of the individuals Interviewed about 
Mount Sinai Hospital for this project related similar narratives about the Jewish 
community who founded it. They described the “German” Jews who built the hospital for 
“Russian” Jews at the turn of the 20th century.23 During their Interview, Pat and Joan 
Kerns reported that the Milwaukee Jewish community is now run by “The Russians” and 
related their experience with a “Russian Rabbi” from Milwaukee. After giving him a 
donation, he continued to call the Kerns until Joan finally told him not to call for 
additional donations.24 The tone of that exchange was reminiscent of some of the 
reported interaction between East Side German and West Side Russian Jews a century 
ago.25 However, when asked if the Russians in Milwaukee today were those that had 
arrived from the Soviet Union, he did not know for certain if that was accurate.26 
The rational for the adoption of certain religious observances after the merger, the 
religious traditions and observances proposed to retain “Jewish identity,” were most 
likely less about religious practices and more about Milwaukee Jewish history. These 
proposals represented an attempt to maintain the memory of Jewish contributions to 
Milwaukee at Mount Sinai. The intent was not to establish a religious tradition at Sinai 
Samaritan Hospital. It was designed to retain the Jewish past, after Jewish doctors 
established themselves at other hospitals and Jewish philanthropy stopped providing for 
indigent care. Milwaukee had a small Jewish population compared to Chicago, New York, 
                                                 
23 Dr. Harry Kanin, Interview by author, Milwaukee, Wisconsin, July 14, 2011; Pat and Joan Kerns, Interview by 
author, Mequon, Wisconsin, May 24, 2011; Dr. Jay Larkey, Interview by author, Milwaukee, Wisconsin, August 17, 
2011.  
24 Pat and Joan Kerns, Interview by author, Mequon, Wisconsin, May 24, 2011. 
25 Pat and Joan Kerns, Interview by author, Mequon, Wisconsin, May 24, 2011. 
26 Pat and Joan Kerns, Interview by author, Mequon, Wisconsin, May 24, 2011. 
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Newark, and Boston and treated more Gentile patients than Jewish from the beginning.27 
However, the Milwaukee Jewish residents established a hospital for those in need, even if 
they did not use the hospital themselves. Jewish financial donations and Milwaukee’s 
Jewish doctors and volunteers established a Jewish identity by virtue of their direct 
support and presence at Mount Sinai. It was Jewish by virtue of their very visible 
presence at Mount Sinai. 
 
JEWISH COLLECTIVE ACTION AND HEALTH CARE TODAY 
This research revealed the strength of Milwaukee Jewish collective action at Mount 
Sinai Hospital. They built and sustained it despite the vast differences between members. 
They donated time and money to this common cause at a time when East Side and West 
Side residents did not socialize with one another. Their legacy is one of caring for those 
in need in Milwaukee, and it is no wonder that the pride of those interviewed is evident. It 
is tempting to assume that the revival of collective community action at Mount Sinai 
Hospital by today’s Jewish population would have the same results today. That is, to 
assert that if religious communities reclaimed their traditional roles in creating hospitals, 
somehow, free care for the indigent would materialize, would be misguided.  
Health care was once a community effort, but the sense of ownership and personal 
connection that inspired the foundation of many American hospitals was weakened by the 
growth of hospital systems. Increased government regulations and existing hospital 
systems that also own physician networks limit the ability of any one community, no 
matter how dedicated, to establish a new hospital. Doctors and patients are also bound by 
                                                 
27 Newspaper Clipping, Editorial, Wisconsin Jewish Chronicle, June 30, 1922, Box 51, Folder 1, Sinai Samaritan 
Collection. 
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insurance plans, which dictate where they can practice and receive care, respectively.  
However, the barriers to affordable health care for the poor in Milwaukee in 2016 are 
actually similar to those in 1903. There is still a need for health care assistance for the 
poor and no widespread community efforts to offer assistance. Hospitals, including 
Aurora Sinai, now ration Emergency Department services. Patients with ear aches, sore 
throats, and other minor complaints are referred to primary care facilities that many 
cannot use because of their limited transportation options.28 Hospitals are businesses, and 
have adjusted their policies to reflect that model. Government programs remain unreliable, 
and the age old notion of worthy and unworthy poor lives on in a means tested system of 
limiting health care for the poor. Scott Walker, the current governor of Wisconsin, has 
declined to accept additional federal funds for Badger Care.29 This could result in lost 
health insurance for current Badger Care participants and limits the chance of new 
patients to get covered. Many Milwaukee residents remain in need of medical care. The 
government programs that replaced collective community action fall short of providing 
care. Hospitals like Aurora Sinai continue to treat patients, even as they lose money in the 
process. The changes in the American hospital system and in funding for indigent care 
distanced many private religious hospitals from their communities of origin, and Mount 
Sinai was no different. The hospital changed names and ownership, but the needs of the 
poor did not disappear. Sociologists Cal Clark and Rene McEldowney postulate that there 
are three basic tenets of a comprehensive health care system. First, high quality care must 
be provided; second, there should be universal access to that quality health care; and finally, 
that high quality, freely accessed health care should be delivered at a reasonable price. The 
                                                 
28 George Hinton, Interview by author, Milwaukee, Wisconsin, December 2, 2011.  
29 Mark Peters, “A Medicaid Bet in Wisconsin; Gov. Scott Walker Says He Wants to Protect the Poorest; Critics Assail 
Him for Not Taking U.S. Funds,” The Wall Street Journal, December 18, 2013 
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authors state this is the “trinity” of the health care sphere. The problem with the trinity, 
these authors note, is that changes in one of the facets will often negatively impact the other 
two parts of the whole.30 The rising cost of health care made delivering health care at a 
“reasonable” price difficult for hospitals.  
This was not always the case. Many American hospitals opened at the turn of the 
twentieth century because local communities wanted them, and were willing to support 
them. Hospitals today are a part of a health care industry. Government rules and 
regulations affect funding for the health care systems that treat the poor. Now, Aurora 
Sinai, the former community hospital, belongs to a large health network, Aurora Medical 
Group. It continues to serve the people downtown Milwaukee, many of whom are 
uninsured or depend on Badger Care, the means tested insurance program in Wisconsin. 
Medical Ethicist David M. Craig noted an important development in the reform of U.S. 
health care impacted nonprofits like Aurora Sinai. The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) 
developed a new Schedule H for nonprofit hospitals as part of its revised Form 990, the 
form that nonprofit organizations use to report the year’s financial activities in 2008. He 
noted that  
This revision responds, in part, to the scrutiny of nonprofit hospitals’ community 
benefits practices, which has come from Congressional committees, state 
legislators, Attorneys General, tax officials, and the Service Employees 
International Union. These critics argue that tax-exempt hospitals should be 
providing higher levels of uncompensated care to patients who are uninsured or 
underinsured. Nonprofit hospital leaders have countered. They cite the various 
benefits they already provide under the 1969 community benefit standard, 
including rising amounts of uncompensated care. They also note that the standard 
does not mandate charity care. Neither does the new Schedule H, but the form 
signals a set of priorities with moral implications for the public responsibilities of 
nonprofit hospitals, and treating poorer patients tops the list. Central to Schedule 
H is the question, what level and what kinds of responsibilities do nonprofit 
                                                 
30 Cal Clark and Rene McEldowney, “The Health Care Financial Crisis: Reorganization and Evidence-Based Medicine 
as a Response to an ‘Unholy Trinity,’” Review of Policy Research 17, no. 1 (Winter 2000): 2. 
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providers have for the American health care safety net? This question has gained 
traction as the number of uninsured and underinsured Americans rises and as 
health care costs outpace public financing. The debate over community benefits 
has been the special purview of health care insiders and policymakers, but it 
anticipates important issues of access and public responsibility that loom large in 
the national debate over health care reform.31 
 
 
These changes sought to address problems with the Community Benefit Standard of 
1969. The creation of safety net programs in 1965 prompted changes in nonprofit 
operations. The Community Benefit Standard removed the provisions that required 
nonprofits to offer patient care free of charge or below actual cost of care. It granted tax 
exemption status to nonprofits that passed two tests. First, they had to operate as a 
nonprofit, with an open medical staff and community board. Second, the nonprofit had to 
promote health in the community it served.32 The issue raised by David M. Craig is that 
there is no hard and fast rule about what exactly constitutes community benefit. He points 
to three models of “moral conceptions” about nonprofits and their obligation to the 
community at large, particularly hospitals as a way of determining what community 
benefits nonprofits owe the public. The social contract model views the tax exempt status 
of the nonprofit as a gift, and because of that gift, they owe the community and should 
provide care for the indigent. The common good model, found in many Catholic hospitals, 
believes that community benefits are part of the common good and include providing 
health care to all in need. Charity care is an essential community benefit, but the main goal 
is to improve health care delivery institutions by working with other groups to identify and 
                                                 
31 David M. Craig, “Religious Health Care as Community Benefit: Social Contract, Covenant, or Common Good?,” 
Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 18, no. 4 (2008): 301-302. 
32 Craig, “Religious Health Care as Community Benefit,” 304. 
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respond to the needs of poor patients in under-served areas.33 Finally, the covenant model 
is a more appropriate model to describe Jewish community efforts. These organizations 
give priority to their original mission, in their communities.34  
Mount Sinai Hospital was an important cooperative community accomplishment for 
the Milwaukee Jewish community. The hospital served Milwaukee for eighty-four years 
because of the support that came from a segregated and conflicted population. The two 
groups worked together to support it. The Jewish population created the hospital through 
collective community efforts. That effort created a sense of community between them that 
did not exist elsewhere. David M. Craig’s research provides “moral models” that could be 
used as a starting point for the revival of the once successful community health care 
setting–the Dispensary. Katz noted that dispensaries closed as hospitals expanded their 
facilities and opened specialized departments.35 Rosenberg believed that dispensaries 
closed due to the increase in both the number of hospitals and the fact that hospitals 
wanted to create opportunities for medical students.36 The Mount Sinai Dispensary 
worked with other religious community organizations to meet a variety of health care 
needs. In Milwaukee, patients with diabetes, asthma, high blood pressure, and other acute 
conditions used the Dispensary and doctors and nurses received training.37 Social 
workers assisted patients during their stay and after discharge. The staff of the Dispensary 
worked with Jewish Social Services, and other hospitals to treat patients and provide 
assistance. The Dispensary offered referrals for home care assistance, respite care for 
                                                 
33 Craig, “Religious Health Care as Community Benefit,” 302. 
34 Craig, “Religious Health Care as Community Benefit,” 315. 
35 Michael B. Katz, In the Shadow of the Poor House: A Social History of Welfare in America (New York: Basic Books, 
1986), 138. 
36 Charles E. Rosenberg, The Care of Strangers: The Rise of America’s Hospital System (New York: Basic Books, 
1987), 318. 
37 Dr. Harry Kanin, Interview by author, Milwaukee, Wisconsin, July 14, 2011. 
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families with children, and outpatient follow up care.  
The history of the Milwaukee Jewish Federation provides insight as to the 
effectiveness of collective Jewish action. It began as the Hebrew Relief Association in 
1889, and became Federated Charities in 1902. The charitable work of the organization 
expanded and the name United Jewish Appeal was first used in 1938.38 It became the 
Milwaukee Jewish Federation in 1970 as a response to the changing needs of the 
Milwaukee Jewish community.39 Individual members of the Jewish community 
continued to support the downtown Milwaukee hospital, but it no longer received support 
from the Milwaukee Jewish Federation.  
The Star of David on the hospital signified a Jewish presence at Mount Sinai to Dr. 
David Amrani and led him to Milwaukee.40 The removal of the Star in September of 
1988 did not so much end the Jewish identity of the hospital, it removed one of the most 
obvious symbols of its Jewish past.41 When the historic fundraising efforts for indigent 
care ended and Jewish doctors practiced at other hospitals, the proposed religious icons 
and observances in 1992 represented a desire to preserve the Jewish history of Sinai 
Samaritan. Despite the negative feelings of the founders of Mount Sinai toward the 
religious traditions of some of their brethren, these traditions now represented a means to 
preserve the Jewish legacy of the hospital.  
 
 
 
                                                 
38 Louis J. Swichkow and Louis P. Gartner, The History of the Jews in Milwaukee (Philadelphia, PA: The Jewish 
Publication Society of America, 1963), 342. 
39 John Gurda, One People, Many Paths: A History of Jewish Milwaukee (Milwaukee, WI: Jewish Museum Milwaukee, 
2009), 256-57.  
40 Dr. David Amrani, Interview by author, Milwaukee, Wisconsin, July 14, 2011. 
41 Dr. David Amrani, Interview by author, Milwaukee, Wisconsin, July 14, 2011. 
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A COMMUNITY TRADITION 
The tradition of philanthropy, one of the historic facets of Milwaukee Jewish identity, 
continues today. Members of the Jewish population continued to contribute to the hospital 
long after their families had left their original neighborhoods. Many Jewish residents had 
long since relocated, taking many of their synagogues and community centers north of 
downtown Milwaukee, outside of the city limits. Mount Sinai Hospital was one of the 
few institutions left in Milwaukee that represented the Jewish community as a whole. The 
shared sense of pride in the hospital on the part of those interviewed is evident. It was a 
Jewish institution in that it represented the Milwaukee Jewish tradition of Tzedakah. It 
was Jewish in that the Milwaukee Jewish community worked to keep it open. After the 
merger, an effort was made to find a way to replace that participation and keep the 
hospital Jewish in the eyes of the people of Milwaukee. The years of volunteer work and 
the donation drives were no more, the overt Jewish support for the hospital ended. The 
efforts in 1992 sought to remind those using Sinai Samaritan that the Jewish people of 
Milwaukee established, supported and eventually surrendered the hospital for the good of 
Milwaukee.  
Sinai Samaritan is the only hospital in downtown Milwaukee. Their patients are 
primarily underinsured or uninsured.42 Medical practices have also relocated from the 
neighborhood. Many patients use Mount Sinai for routine illnesses and acute conditions 
because it is the only medical facility to which they have access.43 Today, one “harsh 
environmental condition” that contributes to poor health and high medical costs is lack of 
primary care for the poor. Increasing the number of indigent patients with chronic 
                                                 
42 George Hinton, Interview by author, Milwaukee, Wisconsin, December 2, 2011. 
43 George Hinton, Interview by author, Milwaukee, Wisconsin, December 2, 2011. 
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conditions in primary care situations is one possible way to demonstrate community 
benefit in Milwaukee. Physician Jane McCusker et al. found that uninsured patients 
tended to use the Emergency Department for their health care needs. Patients with 
chronic conditions like diabetes, asthma, and high blood pressure need primary care 
doctors in order to manage their conditions. When given the opportunity to receive 
primary care, patients with and without chronic conditions were more likely to seek 
preventive care rather than go to an emergency room for treatment.44 In 1999, The East 
Side Community Practice, in Gainesville, Florida, began providing free primary care to 
patients admitted to the hospital through the emergency department. Physician Richard A. 
Davidson et al. noted that those patients significantly decreased the number of emergency 
room visits after entering into primary care.45 Emergency Departments are not designed 
to treat chronic conditions; patients need primary care relationships for good outcomes. 
George Hinton remarked, “We believe the ED [Emergency Department] is not the place 
for managing diabetes, asthma and high blood pressure, episodic care. Patients need to 
have medical homes. It is not as easy as it sounds because we don’t have enough [of 
them]. So we just push them into a system that is already overloaded, so automatically 
people end up right back here again.”46 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
44 Jane McCusker et al., “Emergency Department Visits and Primary Care among Adults with Chronic Conditions,” 
Medical Care 48, no.11 (November 2010): 978. 
45 Richard A. Davidson et al., “Evaluation of ACCESS, A Primary Care Program for Indigent Patients: Inpatient and 
Emergency Room Utilization,” Journal of Community Health 28, no.1 (February 2003): 61-63. 
46 George Hinton, Interview by author, Milwaukee, Wisconsin, December 2, 2011. 
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JEWISH COLLECTIVE COMMUNITY OPPORTUNITY  
The Mount Sinai Dispensary, between 1935 and 1967, worked within the community 
to meet a variety of health care needs. Patients with chronic and acute conditions, 
accidental injuries, and emergency cases used the dispensary. The staff of the dispensary 
worked with the hospital, Jewish Social Services, and other Milwaukee hospitals and 
social service agencies to treat patients and provide assistance. Home care assistance, 
respite care for families with children, and outpatient follow up care were offered at the 
Mount Sinai Dispensary. Former Aurora Sinai President George Hinton believes that, 
“The legacy of it [Mount Sinai] being a great hospital still remains; the pride of it is still 
here, the years and years of greatness. The legacy of all the hospitals that came together 
to form Aurora Sinai today [is] very much embedded here.”47  
Health care was once a community effort in, but the sense of community that 
founded many hospital has been weakened in light of the growth of hospital systems, 
George Hinton believes that, “The evolution of systems have [sic] kind of taken way the 
community feel of hospitals, and that is what I believe is trying to find that [sense of 
community] again.”48 He envisions a community effort at Aurora Sinai to “connect with 
the community. I’ve started that process because I want us to be perceived as part of a 
community solution instead of just a building sitting here waiting for people to get sick. 
The history of Sinai is not finished.”49    
Aurora Sinai continues to treat many patients in its emergency department and is 
currently exploring options to expand its services in community health initiatives, but 
how committed the hospital is to caring for those patients remains unanswered. A 
                                                 
47 George Hinton, interview by author, Milwaukee, Wisconsin, December 2, 2011. 
48 George Hinton, interview by author, Milwaukee, Wisconsin, December 2, 2011. 
49 George Hinton, interview by author, Milwaukee, Wisconsin, December 2, 2011. 
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Jewish-sponsored community health movement in Milwaukee could help both the 
Jewish community and Aurora Sinai Medical Center continue the original mission of 
Mount Sinai Hospital. Political action on behalf of those in need of stable primary care 
for their chronic conditions and wellness programs to prevent those conditions are all 
viable possibilities. The Milwaukee Jewish Federation is invested in strengthening the 
Wisconsin Jewish community. Mount Sinai, now Aurora, does have a history of 
strengthening community ties; it strengthened the ties between two very different 
Jewish communities. The opportunity to revive the relationship between the Jewish 
Community and Milwaukee exists at Aurora Sinai Medical Center through 
participation and support of a community based health care program. The divided 
Jewish community created a hospital, a united Jewish community could, in the future, 
rebuild the community health care system of Mount Sinai in Milwaukee, on a 
foundation wide in scope. 
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